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The late Val Plumwood was a feminist writer and scholar, the author of three 
books and over 80 published papers. Her major books, Feminism and the 
mastery of nature, and Environmental culture: The crisis of reason published by 
Routledge, London, in December 1993, were major contributions to feminist and 
environmental philosophy. Having deliberated profoundly on her experience of 
surviving a crocodile attack in February 1985 in Australia’s magnificent Kakadu 
National Park (the setting of Crocodile Dundee, filmed there a few months after 
the attack), Val Plumwood was equipped to write an account which is much 
more than an adventure story, one which addresses the meaning of our lives 
and major philosophical issues of our time. Unfortunately this account was 
unfinished at the time of her death and The Eye of the Crocodile combines the 
three completed chapters of this book with earlier writings on the themes of 
animals, death and predation.
Val understood the crocodile as it was seen in both Indigenous Australian and 
ancient Egyptian narrative, as a trickster figure, a deliverer of judgement on the 
errant human. In biblical metaphor, the crocodile delivers adverse judgement on 
human pretensions to master a malleable world. The crocodile is now one of the 
last remaining major predators of human beings, a creature which perceives us 
not in the inflated terms in which we tend to view ourselves, as cyber-masters 
or techno-gods transcending the merely animal realm, but simply as another 
palatable item of food. Crocodile predation on humans still has a unique ability 
to recall to us something uncomfortable and unflattering about who we are, to 
teach a lesson from the past we forget at our peril about the unconquerability of 
the world we think we master. 
These opening tense chapters are a story of struggle and survival set in 
the powerful landscape of Australia’s Top End. As a feminist writer and 
environmental philosopher Val Plumwood looked into the eye of the crocodile 
and reflected on the meaning of her experience of being crocodile prey. This 
was an experience which changed her view of selfhood, human life and human 
freedom. The master story of Western culture places at the centre of the human 
story an invulnerable, heroic rational consciousness, struggling to reduce the 
energy, excess and otherness of nature to a humanised and moralised order 
which will do his bidding and reflect back his own conception of his deserts. 
Val Plumwood shows how the crocodile as trickster can help us reshape the old 
human-centred master narrative into a more modest tale appropriate for new 
times.
Few people have survived three death rolls from the Saltwater Crocodile, perhaps 
the most formidable remaining predator of humans, and lived to tell the tale. 
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The Eye of the Crocodile is not only a survival tale, but a unique reflection on the 
meaning of human identity, human struggle and human death from a narrator 
who was also a major environmental philosopher. 
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Introduction 
Freya Mathews, Kate Rigby, Deborah Rose
Val Plumwood was one the great philosophers, activists, feminists, teachers, and 
everyday naturalists of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In the course of her 
productive life she wrote two great philosophical monographs which became 
key texts in the emerging fields of environmental philosophy and ecofeminism. 
Her stature as a thinker of power and influence was reflected in the fact that she 
was included in the 2001 book 50 Key Thinkers on the Environment1 along with 
luminaries such as Buddha, Gandhi, and Arne Naess. Val died of a stroke in 2008 
at the age of 68. She was not only an influential environmental thinker, whose 
book Feminism and the mastery of nature has become a classic of environmental 
philosophy; she was also a woman who fearlessly lived life on her own deeply 
considered terms, often in opposition to prevailing norms.
Val’s philosophy had its origins in, and vigorously contributed to, a pivotal 
moment in Western thought. In the 1970s a radical critique of traditional 
Western conceptions of nature emerged simultaneously at opposite ends of the 
Western world, in Australia and in Norway. The Norwegian critique emanated 
from philosopher, Arne Naess, who became the founder of the deep ecology 
movement. The less well-known but just as trenchant Australian critique 
emanated from a small group of philosophers centred on The Australian National 
University in Canberra. Val, who was then known as Val Routley, and her 
partner, Richard Routley (later to become Richard Sylvan) were key members of 
this group. They, like Arne Naess, recognised that the environmental problems 
that were coming into view at that time were the result not merely of faulty 
policies and technologies but of underlying attitudes to the natural world 
that were built into the very foundations of Western thought. According to 
the Routleys, these attitudes were the expression of human chauvinism, the 
groundless belief, amounting to nothing more than prejudice, that only human 
beings mattered, morally speaking; to the extent that anything else mattered 
at all, according to this attitude, it mattered only because it had some kind of 
utility for us. Together the Routleys challenged this assumption; together they 
posed the pivotal question, ‘is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic’, 
an ethic of nature?2
1 J. Palmer, ed. 50 Key Thinkers on the Environment, London, Routledge, 2001.
2 Richard Routley, ‘Is there a need for new, an environmental ethic?’ Sophia, Vol. 1 (proceedings of the 15th 
World Congress of Philosophy, 1973). Although the original paper was published in Richard’s name, it was 
greatly elaborated by Richard and Val jointly, and re-published several years later, as ‘Human chauvinism 
and environmental ethics,’ in Don Mannison, Michael McRobbie and Richard Routley, eds, Environmental 
Philosophy, Canberra, The Australian National University, 1982.
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The questions the Routleys and their colleagues unearthed and tackled in the 
1970s were questions that would help to set the agenda for environmental 
philosophy. In those early days they were mainly writing for other philosophers, 
and being logicians as well as environmental thinkers, their papers drew heavily 
on the vocabulary of logical and semantic theory. This background in logic gave 
both the Routleys prodigious intellectual muscle, and later, in Feminism and the 
mastery of nature, Val was to turn her training in logical theory to advantage 
with her impressive analysis of the logic of dualistic thinking. But the technical 
register of the early writing also meant that, unlike Naess’ deep ecology, the 
Routleys’ version of radical environmentalism failed to gain the currency it 
deserved outside the academy. 
However, the Routleys were forest activists as well as philosophers, and in 1975 
they published a seminal activist book which did reach a more general audience. 
This was The fight for the forests, a comprehensive economic, scientific, socio-
political and philosophical critique of the Australian forestry industry. As David 
Orton pointed out in a memorial essay on Richard Sylvan after Sylvan’s death 
in 1996, the book was pioneering not only in its comprehensive approach to an 
environmental issue, but in its insistence that the most fundamental conflicts in 
forestry were over values, not facts.3 
During the 1970s, Val and Richard built a remote stone house in a rainforest on 
Plumwood Mountain south of Canberra. They constructed the house themselves, 
out of stones found on the property, and as they built they also wrote some of 
the key articles which were to shape environmental philosophy. The amazingly 
creative Routley partnership broke up in the early 1980s, and divorce followed. 
Val stayed on at the mountain, taking the name of the magnificent plumwood 
tree that was the signature species of the local rainforest ecosystem. (It was at 
this time that Richard also changed his name to Sylvan.) It remained important 
to Val to live the ecological values she was dedicated to theorising, the ‘thinking’ 
flowing naturally from ‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ in the heart of her mountain, as 
Heidegger might have put it.
The question that continued to preoccupy Val throughout this period was that of 
anthropocentrism. Along with others, she saw that anthropocentrism, as a value 
system, rests on the assumption that there is a categorical distinction between 
humanity and nature: human beings are endowed with something the rest of 
nature lacks. This ‘something’ is of course assumed to be mind. Just like plants 
and animals and rocks, we are made of matter, but in addition to our material 
bodies, we possess minds, and minds are somehow categorically different from 
bodies and superior to them. Underlying the conceptual division between 
humanity and nature then, is a deep conceptual opposition between mind and 
3 D. Orton, ‘In memory of Richard Sylvan,’ The Trumpeter, Vol. 14 No. 1, 1997.
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matter, which becomes refined, in the Western tradition, into an opposition 
between reason and nature. In her doctoral thesis, which was published in 
1992 as Feminism and the mastery of nature, Val provided a comprehensive 
analysis of how this division between reason and nature had historically been 
constructed and how it informs many of the ongoing foundational categories of 
Western thought. Hers was by no means the first analysis of such dualism, or 
binary thinking; but it was the most comprehensive within the environmental 
literature. She showed brilliantly how this dualistic system of thought created 
value hierarchies that systematically rendered inferior all the terms that came 
to be associated with nature rather than reason: women, the working class, the 
colonised, the Indigenous, as well as the other-than-human world. She thereby 
demonstrated that the ideology underpinning the domination of nature in the 
contemporary West is simultaneously an ideology legitimating and naturalising 
the domination of many subjugated social groups. The implication was that 
environmentalism and struggles for social justice cannot be separated out 
from one another. Moreover, as long as the assumptions underlying our social 
and environmental thinking remain unexamined, these pervasive patterns of 
oppression will remain inescapable. We need new understandings of the human 
and of nature that close the conceptual gulf between them. This means putting 
mind back into matter: restoring intelligence to body, and agency to nature.
In her book, Environmental culture (2002), Val elaborated her original analysis 
of dualism, and especially of reason, and applied this analytical framework in 
an up-to-the-minute way to questions of science, politics, economics, ethics, 
spirituality and ecology itself. She argued for a form of ecological rationality 
that would replace the instrumentalising rationalism that has characterised 
the Western tradition and that has reached its apogee in the modernity of the 
contemporary global market. After this book, Val began writing essays that 
increasingly drew stories into philosophical argument. Having developed 
a powerful analytic framework, she wanted to find ways to continue to 
communicate her life’s passion, and to have an impact on readers outside the 
academic world. As she wrote in her beautiful essay ‘Journey to the Heart of 
Stone’, ‘creative writing can also play an important part by making visible 
new possibilities for radically open and non-reductive ways to experience the 
world.’4 
Clearly, Val had come to believe that diagnosing the problems was not enough. It 
had been decades since she and Richard had asked that crucial question: is there 
a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? In turning toward the imagination, 
and the creative, she was making a cultural and political point: ‘If our species 
does not survive the ecological crisis, it will probably be due to our failure to 
4 Val Plumwood, ‘Journey to the heart of stone,’ in Culture, creativity and environment: New environmentalist 
criticism, eds. F. Beckett and T. Gifford, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2007, p. 17.
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imagine and work out new ways to live with the earth, to rework ourselves 
and our high energy, high-consumption, and hyper-instrumental societies 
adaptively. The time of Homo reflectus, the self-critical and self-revising one, has 
surely come. Homo faber, the thoughtless tinkerer, is clearly not going to make 
it. We will go onwards in a different mode of humanity, or not at all.’5 Along with 
her continuing work as a forest activist, she was making a turn toward stories in 
her writing, and developing an interest in the new field of ecologically oriented 
literary and cultural studies, or ecocriticism. In 2002, she was invited to present 
a keynote lecture at the biannual conference of the Association for the Study of 
Literature and Environment (UK), which led her to venture into a more lyrical 
mode of philosophical writing, as can be seen from her beautiful homage to 
stone in the volume that arose from this gathering (2007). In her words, ‘writers 
are amongst the foremost of those who can help us to think differently’; by 
writers she meant story-tellers, poets, and other creative communicators who 
could produce enlivened or re-animated accounts of the agency and creativity 
of nature.6 
Although, in her later writing, Val was beginning to relate her philosophical 
reflections more explicitly to salient personal experiences, she was dismissive 
of the idea that she should write a memoir of her own life. It was clear to those 
who were close to her, however, that she had been no stranger to hardship and 
heartbreak. Val was born on the eve of World War II into a relatively poor, 
but well-educated family living on a small land grant at the edge of Sydney. 
Her mother home-schooled her for a while, which allowed her plenty of time 
to explore the local bushland and bond with the family’s chooks, the sale of 
whose eggs supplemented her father’s meagre income. Subsequently excelling 
at school, she received a scholarship to study at Sydney University, where she 
majored in Philosophy, graduating with First Class Honours in 1965. During 
this time, she fell pregnant to a fellow student, John Macrae, whom she 
subsequently married. Their son was born in 1958, and a daughter followed in 
1960. However, the emotional and financial difficulties of supporting two small 
children was overwhelming for two such young parents, and Val felt obliged 
to give up their baby girl for adoption in order to continue with her studies. 
Tragically, their daughter, whom they had already lost once, was murdered in 
her teens, while their son died of a degenerative illness in his 20s. Although 
she never wrote about the pain of these terrible losses, she has described her 
struggle to maintain the little rural cemetery in which her son is buried as a 
place where death can be folded back into life by allowing native vegetation to 
flourish on and around the graves.7 
5 Val Plumwood, ‘Review of Deborah Bird Rose’s Reports from a wild country,’ Australian humanities review, 
Vol. 42, 2007.
6 Val Plumwood, ‘Nature in the active voice,’ Australian humanities review, Vol. 46, 2009, pp. 113-129.
7 Val Plumwood, ‘The cemetery wars: Cemeteries, biodiversity and the sacred,’ Local-Global: identity, 
security and community, Vol. 3. Special issue: Exploring the legacy of Judith Wright, eds. Martin Mulligan 
and Yaso Nadarajah, 2007, pp. 54-71. 
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One of the most famous events in her life was the crocodile attack that occurred 
in 1985, and it was this event that she was writing about when she died. While 
kayaking alone in Kakadu National Park in northern Australia at the onset of 
the Wet season, she was seized by a large crocodile, and death-rolled not once, 
but three times. (Crocodiles drown their prey by holding them under water.) 
Unaccountably released from the croc’s jaws after the third roll, she crawled for 
hours, with appalling injuries and stunning courage, through tropical swamps, 
never far from further crocodiles, in search of safety. Eventually, somewhat 
miraculously, she was rescued, by a park ranger. This epic experience of 
course made her uniquely credentialed, as an environmental thinker, to write 
about death and its place in nature, and she proceeded to do this in a series of 
beautiful and widely read essays, on the human as prey and as food for nature. 
She was much preoccupied in latter years with re-visioning death and revising, 
in appropriately ecological terms, the rituals that accompany it in our society. 
The essays included in this book are divided into three sections: the first three 
comprise the beginning of the book she was working on at the time of her 
death. Arising from her own near-death experience in Kakadu, these chapters 
are specifically concerned with crocodile predation on humans, where this 
phenomenon recalls to us, Val argues, something uncomfortable and unflattering 
about who we are, teaching us a lesson from the past we forget at our peril about 
the resistant agency of the material world we think we master. We expect this 
world to do our bidding and conform to a human conception of our rights, but, 
as Val shows, the crocodile can help us reshape this old human-centred master 
narrative into a more modest tale appropriate for new times. 
The essays included in the second section address nonhuman animals, and 
express Val’s growing interest in the complex lives of nonhumans and the kinds 
of questions we face when we regard nonhuman others as sentient agents, 
perhaps even kin. The first examines human grief at the death of a wild wombat 
and celebrates the author’s relationship with this native animal. The second 
takes the film Babe as an example of how a work of representation can pose 
many ethico-political questions that lie at the heart of human-animal relations.
The third section opens with an essay which provides an excellent introduction 
to Val’s thinking over the last few years of her life on the relationship between 
humans and animals. It focuses on the treatment of farm animals and advocates 
an ecological animalism which supports and celebrates animals and encourages 
a dialogical ethics of sharing and negotiation or partnership between humans 
and animals. The final chapter interweaves the crocodile story with the story of 
the ‘cemetery wars’8 in an endeavour to rethink the ways in which our culture 
deals with death, including, and especially, the materiality of the corpse. These 
8 Val Plumwood, ‘The cemetery wars’, Local-Global.
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two narratives are linked by seeing life as being in circulation and they suggest 
that mortuary practices might affirm death as an opportunity of life for others 
in the ecological community. As this chapter contains a significant amount of 
repetition from earlier chapters, we decided to publish an abridged version as 
the material on death and particularly the material on Val’s son’s burial place 
seemed an appropriate place to draw the book to a close.
Val’s visionary preoccupation with the question of death in the final years of her 
life was honoured after her own death by the impromptu circle of friends and 
associates who spontaneously came together into a kind of informal ‘friends of 
Val’ group to arrange her funeral and put her affairs in order. Overcoming huge 
bureaucratic and practical obstacles, members of this little group managed to 
obtain a permit for a home burial on Plumwood Mountain. Val was duly and 
reverently laid to rest, with full-flight ecological poetics, in the beautiful garden 
she had established around the house she had built with her own hands out 
of the rock of the mountain. Even in her death then, she led by her ecological 
example.9
Acknowledgement
Sections of this introduction have been adapted from F. Mathews, ‘Vale Val,’ 
Environmental values, Vol. 17, 2008, pp. 317-321.
9 Accounts of the burial, as well as tributes and discussions, can be found on a web site that has been set up 





1. Meeting the predator
Try to look a crocodile in that eye hovering just above the waterline of the 
swamp. Do you detect recognition of your humanity there? You are a matter 
of indifference to it when it is full, a prey to be devoured when it is hungry. 
The eye of the crocodile is a Jobian metaphor for the world, not the only one, 
but one, perhaps that deserves more attention from those who demand that 
‘god’ or ‘nature’ be designed for them and them alone. 
William E. Connolly, ‘Voices from the whirlwind’ in Jane Bennett and 
William Chaloupka eds. In the nature of things (Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 205).
No matter how long the log lies in the river, it will never become a crocodile. 
African Proverb 
My story begins and ends in tropical northern Australia, in the Stone Country 
of Arnhem Land. This is a land of stone sculpted by sky, wind and water 
to immense, fantastic forms. The abrasive power of the dry season winds is 
matched by the erosive power of the wet season storms whose rains pound the 
land from December to April.
Shrouded stone figures and great sandstone heads gaze out over country formed 
by a thousand million years of vigorous marital struggle between mother earth 
and father sky. The energy of that struggle, amorous perhaps as well as abrasive, 
between the sandstone sheet and the hot, hyperactive atmosphere, has ground 
the great stone plateau into strange, maze-like ruins, ever-new disclosures of the 
infinite variety of the earth narrative that is weathered stone. 
Stone, wind and water in collaboration shape this land. The power of the Stone 
Country is manifest in the estuary below, in the extreme annual flooding so 
crucial for the ecology of the Kakadu region. For the human cultures who lived 
in the fertile estuary of the East Alligator and other rivers fed by the Stone 
Country, cultures that had a deeply nourishing relationship with their country, 
it was a place abundant in food and natural beauty, but where the human had 
to situate itself in relation to many other powerful forces and elements. It is 
Ngalyod, the Rainbow Serpent, who holds the power of water, the key to life in 
this environment. Her water cycles are majestic and creative. As the wet season 
rainbow arches across the sky, Ngalyod recycles life in this place and performs 
the yearly integration of land, sky and water. 
The Eye of the Crocodile 
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***
I suppose I have always been the sort of person who ‘goes too far’. I certainly went 
much too far that torrential wet season day in February 1985 when I paddled 
my little red canoe to the point where the East Alligator River surges out of the 
Stone Country of the Arnhem Land Plateau. It was the wrong place to be on the 
first day of the monsoon, when Lightning Man throws the rainbow across the 
sky and heavy rains begin to lash the land. The rains, pouring off thousands 
of square miles of sandstone plateau, unleash huge seasonal floods that sweep 
downriver and submerge for the next half-year the low-lying country on the 
flood-plain below. It was in this place, as the gushing rain squalls reunited earth 
and sky, I had a close encounter with a crocodile. My saurian teacher was a 
wrestling master and a far better judge than I of my incautious character, the 
precarious nature of human life, and of various other things I needed to know 
and have striven to pass onto others. 
It is not a minor or inessential feature of our human existence that we are food: 
juicy, nourishing bodies. Yet, as I looked into the eye of the crocodile, I realised 
that my planning for this journey upriver had given insufficient attention to 
this important aspect of human life, to my own vulnerability as an edible, 
animal being. This was the country of the largest of the living crocodiles, a 
close relative of the ancient dinosaurs, the Estuarine or Saltwater Crocodile. 
Not long ago saltwater crocodiles were considered endangered, as virtually all 
mature animals were shot out of the rivers and lakes of Australia’s north by 
commercial hunting. But after more than a decade of protection, their numbers 
were beginning to burgeon. The saltwater crocodile is a predator of humans 
from the distant past, a creature that can move so fast it appears to the human 
eye as a flash. It was hard for me to judge the size of the one that had attacked 
and pursued my canoe and now fixed its gaze on mine, for all of it except 
the head was under the murky water, but it was clear that I aroused intense 
interest. I now know that an animal that can give its intended prey a misleading 
impression of its size, can also help them to a less misleading sense of who and 
what they are. 
Of course, in some very remote and abstract way, I knew it happened, knew 
that humans were animals and were sometimes—very rarely—eaten like other 
animals. I knew I was food for crocodiles, that my body, like theirs, was made of 
meat. But then again in some very important way, I did not know it, absolutely 
rejected it. Somehow, the fact of being food for others had not seemed real, not 
in the way it did now, as I stood in my canoe in the beating rain staring down 
into the beautiful, gold-flecked eyes of the crocodile. Until that moment, I knew 
that I was food in the same remote, abstract way that I knew I was animal, was 
mortal. In the moment of truth, abstract knowledge becomes concrete. You gaze 
with dumb astonishment as your own death, known only as a shadowy, distant 
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stranger, suddenly rises up right before you in terrifying, technicoloured detail 
and gasp in disbelief that some powerful creature can ignore your special status 
and try to eat you. 
How had I come to make this terrible mistake about myself, my place, my body? I 
asked myself, with that sinking sense of serious stupidity that mars many a final 
moment. Was it a philosophical mistake about identity, the self as disembodied 
consciousness dissociated from the food-providing self as material body? Or the 
idea that humans are special, above and apart from other animals? I had no real 
opportunity to ponder the cultural genesis of my false consciousness, for at that 
moment the crocodile made its move, leaping from the water so fast I saw only a 
flash, and grabbing me painfully between the legs before pulling me down into 
the water. Nor did I pursue the issue later that day as I lay, terribly injured, in 
the path of the oncoming flood. But I have had many years since in which to 
think about these disastrous illusions, and to try to track them down. 
***
Some events can completely change your life and your work, although sometimes 
the extent of this change is not evident until much later. They can lead you to 
see the world in a completely different way, and you can never again see it 
as you did before. You have been to the limit, and seen the stars change their 
course. That extreme heightening of consciousness evoked at the point of death 
is, as many testify, of a most revelatory and life-changing kind—for those who, 
against all odds, are given a reprieve and survive. The extraordinary visions 
and insights that appear in those last seconds can be hard to reconcile with our 
normal view of the world. In the vivid intensity of those last moments, when 
great, toothed jaws descend upon you, it can HIT YOU LIKE A THUNDERCLAP 
that you were completely wrong about it all—not only about what your own 
personal life meant, but about what life and death themselves actually mean.
That’s how it was with me, anyway. What is called the ‘moment of truth’ 
revealed the world I thought I lived in to be illusory, my own view of it terribly, 
shockingly mistaken. But the sense of being completely wrong about it all 
was much more than just being wrong about the value of my own life, and my 
stupidity in risking it. I don’t mean self-castigation or regret, being mistaken 
about the immense value of your life—the intense perception as you face your 
end that you’ve been a fool in risking it, that life is much more precious than you 
counted it, and that you should have given its preservation much more care. 
The regret evoked by impending death was there, but there was something else, 
something much more than regret. 
 This was a strong sense, at the moment of being grabbed by those powerful 
jaws, that there was something profoundly and incredibly wrong in what was 
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happening, some sort of mistaken identity. My disbelief was not just existential 
but ethical—this wasn’t happening, couldn’t be happening. The world was not 
like that! The creature was breaking the rules, was totally mistaken, utterly 
wrong to think I could be reduced to food. As a human being, I was so much more 
than food. It was a denial of, an insult to all I was to reduce me to food. Were all 
the other facets of my being to be sacrificed to this utterly undiscriminating use, 
was my complex organisation to be destroyed so I could be reassembled as part 
of this other being? With indignation as well as disbelief, I rejected this event. 
It was an illusion! It was not only unjust but unreal! It couldn’t be happening.
After much later reflection, I came to see that there was another way to look at it. 
There was illusion alright, but it was the other way around. It was the world of 
‘normal experience’ that was the illusion, and the newly disclosed brute world 
in which I was prey was, in fact, the unsuspected reality, or at least a crucial part 
of it. But all I saw then was the lack of fit between the experience of being prey 
and the framework of belief and life I took to be normality. If the framework of 
normality was true, the lack of fit could only be explained if this experience of 
being prey was an illusion, was a dream or nightmare. But if it wasn’t, I had to 
face the possibility that the lack of fit was there because both I and the culture 
that shaped my consciousness were wrong, profoundly wrong—about many 
things, but especially about human embodiment, animality and the meaning of 
human life.
Sometimes ordinary experience can trick you, can be profoundly wrong, 
profoundly out of touch. My most recent encounter with sustained illusion 
occurred a few years ago on another canoe trip, this time in the far north of 
Canada. I came to a place on the Peel River where all the landforms I could see 
around me were strongly marked by parallel strata that tilted slightly upwards. 
Since the human eye is guided in these circumstances to take the land as its 
horizontal reference, I experienced a powerful and persistent illusion that we 
were moving across a level landscape and that the river was running very 
sharply downhill. But there were some things that didn’t fit. The river gradient 
seemed very steep, but the water was placid and unhurried, without rapids. 
Our calm movement downriver took on a surreal, dreamlike quality, not at all 
unpleasant—indeed rather enchanting and liberating, as if we had somehow 
escaped from normal gravity and entered a parallel universe. It took some 
reflection on various subtle clues, the little pieces of corrective experience that 
did not fit, to reveal the presence of illusion and show that it was the river and 
not the land that was true, on the level. 
The illusion revealed by the crocodile encounter was of a different, more 
philosophical kind, about the meaning of everyday experience. But in the same 
way it revealed that it was possible for people—as individuals, groups, perhaps 
whole cultures that subscribe to a particular dominant story—to be completely 
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and systematically wrong about quite simple and basic things—our relationship 
to food, to one another, the intertwining of life and death, the fleshly, embodied 
character of human existence—and be quite unaware of it. A few people may 
come to see the illusion for what it is because they stumble across certain clues, 
experiences that do not fit the dominant story. Suppose that in the same way 
as the illusion that the land was on the level, the fact of being always on the 
‘winning side’ of the predation relationship tricks us, conceals from us the real 
slant of things, the real measure of our animality and embodiment. Now suppose 
that the clue experiences that can correct the illusion become for some reason 
increasingly scarce—perhaps because the dominant story itself brings about 
their elimination! Then the illusion might go on for a very long time, might have 
to result in real catastrophe, before anyone realises anything is wrong. And by 
then the culture might be out of touch in a very big way. 
That I think is what has happened to Western culture under the influence of 
the dominant story about our animality. For a modern human being from the 
first, or over-privileged world, the humbling experience of becoming food for 
another animal is now utterly foreign, almost unthinkable. And our dominant 
story, which holds that humans are different from and higher than other 
creatures, are made out of mind-stuff, has encouraged us to eliminate from our 
lives any animals that are disagreeable, inconvenient or dangerous to humans. 
This means, especially, animals that can prey on humans. In the absence of a 
more rounded form of the predation experience, we come to see predation as 
something we do to others, the inferior ones, but which is never done to us. 
We are victors and never victims, experiencing triumph but never tragedy, 
our true identity as minds, not as bodies. Thereby we intensify and reinforce 
illusions of superiority and apartness. Since the potential for more corrective 
and chastening forms of experience has been eliminated from normal life, there 
is less and less experience available of the type that can correct the illusion. 
On reflection, I came eventually to see that I was subject at that moment of 
truth to an illusion about death and my place as a human being in the scheme 
of things rather similar to my illusion upon the Peel River. Confronted with the 
prospect of being food, my sense of who I was was profoundly out of whack, 
in just the same way as my perception of that piece of the Peel River. Then, it 
seemed as if I had entered a parallel universe in which rivers flow slowly down 
mountains at the same leisurely pace as they meander across the plain. 
I leapt through the eye of the crocodile into what seemed also a parallel universe, 
one with completely different rules to the ‘normal universe’. This harsh, 
unfamiliar territory was the Heraclitean universe where everything flows, 
where we live the other’s death, die the other’s life: the universe represented 
in the food chain. I was suddenly transformed in the parallel universe into the 
form of a small, edible animal whose death was of no more significance than 
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that of a mouse, and as I saw myself as meat I also saw with an incredible shock 
that I inhabited a grim, relentless and deplorable world that would make no 
exceptions for me, no matter how smart I was, because like all living things, I 
was made of meat, was nutritious food for another being. 
Later, because against the odds I survived, I could begin the process of 
reconciling the two universes. The parallel universe was my very own, this 
world of experience and embodiment in which I have always lived my life, the 
world that gave birth to me and has made me what I am. It was because the 
world in which I was meat diverged so wildly from what I saw as reality that 
I could not recognise it as the world of my own everyday experience, and had 
to adopt the ‘parallel universe’ fiction. But that was a measure of my delusion 
rather than of its departure from the real world of earthly life. It has been a great 
struggle for me to recognise and reconcile with this harsh world as my own. 
That recognition and reconciliation is what this book has to offer. 
***
These events provided me with rich material for reflection long after my recovery 
and left me with many intellectual puzzles around food and death and a strong 
sense of incompleteness. Why could I not see myself as food—why did it seem 
so wrong? In what sense was it wrong? Why was being food such a shock? What 
kind of shock was it? Why did I do such dangerous things and not perceive 
my danger? Why did I not see myself as subject to these kinds of dangers in 
this place? Why was I, as a critic of anthropocentrism over many years, able to 
harbour so many illusions about human apartness? Does this reveal my personal 
confusion or how deep the sense of human superiority and apartness runs in the 
dominant culture? Or both? I hope to lay to rest some of these questions here. 
For thousands of years, Western religions and philosophies taught that the 
human was set apart from the animals and the rest of nature, made, unlike them, 
in the image of God. It was heresy to believe that any species other than humans 
could be saved or go to heaven, a place of sacredness and perfection reserved 
exclusively for human beings. God is transcendent, not material, apart from 
nature, and is for our species alone. Our investment in this special status remains 
enormous. Despite what we have learnt from Darwin, our culture has been a 
dismal failure at coming to terms with our inclusion in the animal and natural 
order, and this is a major factor behind the environmental crisis. It is no trivial 
matter for a culture which locates human identity outside and in opposition to 
the earth, in a disembodied universe even beyond materiality itself, to receive 
the news Darwin brought, of our descent from other animals through evolution. 
The Darwinian knowledge has been accepted in some places, after a long 
struggle, but it has been absorbed at a very superficial, mainly intellectual level. 
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It has not penetrated into other parts of our consciousness and is still at odds 
with the deep culture. Most of the dominant culture still resists this knowledge 
and some is explicitly rejectionist. Even at an intellectual level, there are all sorts 
of dodges for evading its egalitarian import. For example, Papal doctrine until 
recently, instructed us that our bodies may have evolved from other animals, 
but that the real basis of our humanity, our minds have not—they are god-
given, and in no way comparable to those of animals. We remain special, as the 
real owners of the world, the pinnacle of evolution, the ultimate species for 
whom it was all designed and to whom it all leads.
This way of viewing the world makes it very painful to come to terms with 
features of conscious animality, insofar as our culture has made of it a painful 
contradiction—a sidereal identity in a fleshly, decaying body, thinking flesh, 
knowing flesh, singing flesh, flesh that knows of its own vulnerability. Being food 
confronts one very starkly with the realities of embodiment, with our inclusion 
in the animal order as food, as flesh, our kinship with those we eat, with being 
part of the feast and not just some sort of spectator of it, like a disembodied 
eye filming somebody else’s feast. We are the feast. This is a humbling and very 
disruptive experience. 
Although we may be brimming with fanciful speculation about the place of 
mind in the world we are still and overriding all, food like all other animals. 
Our ability to deny this fact and ‘stand apart’ is dangerously reinforced by our 
elimination of those to whom we are prey. My answer to this conundrum has 
been a philosophical one and is positioned within the theory of human/nature 
dualism. 
I see human/nature dualism as a failing of my culture, time and history. Human/
nature dualism is a Western-based cultural formation going back thousands of 
years that sees the essentially human as part of a radically separate order of 
reason, mind, or consciousness, set apart from the lower order that comprises 
the body, the animal and the pre-human. Inferior orders of humanity, such as 
women, slaves and ethnic Others (so-called ‘barbarians’), partake of this lower 
sphere to a greater degree, through their supposedly lesser participation in 
reason and greater participation in lower ‘animal’ elements such as embodiment 
and emotionality. Human/nature dualism conceives the human as not only 
superior to but as different in kind from the non-human, which as a lower 
sphere exists as a mere resource for the higher human one. This ideology has 
been functional for Western culture in enabling it to exploit nature with less 
constraint, but it also creates dangerous illusions by denying embeddedness in 
and dependency on nature. This can be seen in our denial of human inclusion 
in the food web and in our response to the ecological crisis. 
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Human/nature dualism is a double-sided affair, destroying the bridge between 
the human and the non-human from both ends, as it were, for just as the 
essentially human is disembodied, disembedded and discontinuous from the rest 
of nature, so nature and animals are seen as mindless bodies, excluded from the 
realms of ethics and culture. Re-envisaging ourselves as ecologically embodied 
beings akin to, rather than superior to, other animals is a major challenge for 
Western culture, as is recognising the elements of mind and culture present 
in animals and the non-human world. The double-sided character of human/
nature dualism gives rise to two tasks that must be integrated. These are the 
tasks of situating human life in ecological terms and situating non-human life 
in ethical terms. 
Although, by definition, all ecologically embodied beings exist as food for some 
other beings, the human supremacist culture of the West makes a strong effort 
to deny human ecological embodiment by denying that we humans can be 
positioned in the food chain in the same way as other animals. Consequently, 
predators of humans have been execrated and largely eliminated.
***
The eye of the crocodile—the giant estuarine crocodile of northern Australia—
is golden flecked, reptilian, beautiful. It has three eyelids. It appraises you coolly 
it seems, as if seldom impressed, as one who knows your measure. But it can also 
light up with an unexpectedly intense glint if you manage to engage its interest. 
This was the mistake I made on that day in February 1985 paddling a canoe on 
the backwaters. 
Since then I have come to understand that the eye of the crocodile, along with 
the voice of the prey of the crocodile—and one cannot be understood without 
the other—is also a position to speak from, to think from. It is one I have found 
illuminating in building a philosophy that can celebrate the world in which we 
live with joy and understand our current relationship to the biosphere. 
But it is a position increasingly shut out, eliminated from the world. To hear this 
voice requires seeing yourself in ecological terms, in historical–evolutionary 
terms. This crocodile-eye view is the view of an old eye, an appraising and 
critical eye that potentially judges the quality of human life and finds it wanting. 
Crocodiles are the voice of the deep past, covering the time span of the rise and 
extinction of many species. It is a voice we need to hear but it is increasingly 
drowned out by loud party music and noisy self-congratulation. Above all, it is 
drowned out by the sound of humans fighting.
The eye of the crocodile also provides us with a perspective that can help us to see 
ourselves in ecological terms; help us towards a theory of ourselves in thorough-
going evolutionary–democratic terms, disrupting our view of ourselves as set 
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apart and special. We need to respond rationally to the environmental crisis by 
adopting a much more ecologically democratic position. From such a viewpoint 
we can love fellow humans without needing to maintain an exclusionary 
stance towards non-humans. To date we have seen ourselves as masters of the 
universe. In theological times this meant seeing ourselves set apart as the single 
recipient of divine regard while in modern times we interpret our position as 
the culmination of the evolutionary endeavour. 
Moving from one world to another involves a leap, not because the frameworks 
of ideas we must leave behind are completely discrete—indeed they may overlap 
considerably—but because there is a major change in the interpretations of 
certain keystone concepts so that theories are no longer compatible. Death, like 
food and being human, is one of those keystone concepts that registers change 
and sources of resistance to change. Narratives of death and the afterlife give 
important clues to concepts of ecological identity and membership of an earth 
community.
In that flash, when my consciousness had to know the bitter certainty of its 
end, I glimpsed the world for the first time ‘from the outside’, from outside the 
narrative of self, where every sentence can start with an ‘I’. That story actually 
entails a process of what Deborah Bird Rose calls ‘denarrativisation’, whereby 
Western culture ceased to regard the world as having its own story and started 
to look at the world as a storyless object. The old, I now know, goes on, although 
it is no longer a story revolving exclusively around a human subject. 
Humour is one way to maintain the ‘outside’ story. The disruptive and radically 
humbling potential of the eye of the crocodile perspective has been the basis 
for several very fine crocodile cartoons which poke fun at the pretences of 
humanity. One cartoon, by Gary Larsen, shows two large, fat green crocodiles 
lying on a bank rubbing their tummies appreciatively, while in the stream below 
floats a broken red canoe, a paddle and a solar topee. One crocodile is saying to 
the other, ‘That was marvellous! No hair, no hooves, no hide, just white, soft 
and succulent’. Another shows two tourists wearing shorts and tropical gear 
walking past two concealed crocodiles. One crocodile is saying to the other, 
‘They look disgusting, but I believe they’re very good for you’. 
I always found the Larsen cartoon spoke powerfully to me first because I had 
had a red canoe, and second because I came to feel strongly that I wanted to 
defend the crocodile’s right to eat humans who strayed into their territory. 
Thirdly, I appreciated how humbling a perspective was that of the crocodile, 
and one we now stand greatly in need of! The crocodile stands apart from the 
human and makes a fearless judgement which diminishes human significance. 
The crocodile is the purveyor of a critical view of humans which cuts us down 
to size, cuts through our pretensions to be a superior species above the food 
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chain and figures us as just another animal, a particular kind of food, food with 
pretensions. Yet this important perspective or speaking position is increasingly 
denied cultural representation and only rarely achieves cult representation. 
An understanding of ourselves as food is the subject of horror as well as humour. 
Horror movies and stories reflect this deep-seated dread of becoming food for 
other forms of life: horror is the wormy corpse, vampires sucking blood and sci-
fi monsters trying to eat humans as in Alien 1 and 2. Horror and outrage usually 
greet stories of other species eating live or dead humans, and various levels of 
hysteria are elicited when we are nibbled by leeches, sandflies, and mosquitoes. 
But humans are food, food for sharks, lions, tigers, bears and crocodiles, food for 
crows, snakes, vultures, pigs, rats and goannas, and for a huge variety of smaller 
creatures and micro-organisms. An ecological animalism would acknowledge 
this and affirm principles emphasising human–animal mutuality, equality and 
reciprocity in the food web. 
All living creatures are food, and also much more than food. In a good human 
life we must gain our food in such a way as to acknowledge our kinship with 
those whom we make our food, which does not forget the more than food that 
every one of us is, and which positions us reciprocally as food for others. A 
reconceptualisation of ourselves in ecological terms has many aspects, but one of 
the most fundamental is to begin to think of ourselves in terms of our usefulness 
to the other elements of our ecosystems, in the same way as other components. 
One of the most basic ways is to begin to think of ourselves—humbly—as food 
for others. 
Let us then radically revise our conception of food. Being and thinking of 
ourselves as of use as food for others is the most basic way in which we can 
re-envisage ourselves in ecological terms and affirm our solidarity with other 
animals in opposition to the dominant cultural conviction that we humans are 
set apart, too good to be food. For we are made for the other. Such a mutual use 
does not mean we exist for them to colonise and destroy as we have colonised 
and destroyed them. It is simply a re-visioning of our place in more egalitarian 
terms. 
My disbelief about being food, of believing the human to be apart, eaters of 
others but never ourselves eaten, or that it is profoundly wrong has been the 
dominant story about human identity, a story of human hyper-separation from 
nature. This is an old and very powerful story which is in turn linked to our 
culture’s approach to the problem of death.
This denial that we ourselves are food for others is reflected in many aspects of 
our death and burial practices. The strong coffin, conventionally buried well 
below the level of soil fauna activity, and the slab over the grave to prevent 
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anything digging us up, keeps the Western human body (at least sufficiently 
affluent ones) from becoming food for other species. Sanctity is interpreted 
as guarding ourselves jealously and keeping ourselves apart, refusing even to 
conceptualise ourselves as edible, and resisting giving something back, even to 
the worms and the land that nurtured us. 
Upon death the human essence is conventionally seen as departing for a 
disembodied, non-earthly realm, rather than nurturing those earth others who 
have nurtured us. This concept of human identity positions humans outside 
and above the food web, not as part of the feast in a chain of reciprocity but as 
external manipulators and masters separate from it. Death becomes a site for 
apartness, domination and individual salvation, rather than for sharing and for 
nurturing a community of life. Being food for other animals shakes our image 
of human mastery. As eaters of others who can never ourselves be eaten in turn 
by them or even conceive of ourselves in edible terms, we take, but do not give, 
justifying this one-way arrangement by the traditional Western view of the 
human right to use earth others as validated by an order of rational meritocracy 
in which humans emerge on top. Cannibalism aside, humans are not even to be 
conceptualised as edible not only by other humans, but by other species.
My proposal is that the food/death imaginary we have lost touch with is a key 
to re-imagining ourselves ecologically, as members a larger earth community of 
radical equality, mutual nurturance and support. Our loss of this perspective 
has meant the loss of humbling but important forms of knowledge, of ourselves 
and of our world. We can learn to look for comfort and continuity, meaning 
and hope in the context of the earth community, and work in this key place to 
displace the hierarchical and exceptionalist cultural framework that so often 
defeats our efforts to adapt to the planet. This involves re-imagining ourselves 
through concrete practices of restraint and humility, not just in vague airy–
fairy concepts of unity.
Modernist liberal individualism teaches us that we own our lives and bodies: 
politically as an enterprise we are running and experientially as a drama we are 
variously narrating, writing, acting and/or reading. As hyper-individuals, we 
owe nothing to anybody, not to our mothers, let alone to any nebulous earth 
community. Exceptionalised as both species and individuals, we humans cannot 
be positioned in the food chain in the same way as other animals. Predation on 
humans is monstrous, exceptionalised and subject to extreme retaliation. 
The Western problematic of death—where the essential self is disembodied 
spirit—poses a false choice of continuity, even eternity, in the realm of the 
spirit, versus the reductive materialist concept of death as the complete ending 
of the story of the material, embodied self. Both horns of this dilemma exact a 
terrible price, alienation from the earth in the first case and the loss of meaning 
and narrative continuity for self in the second. 
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Indigenous animist concepts of self and death succeed in breaking this 
pernicious false choice and suggesting satisfying and ecologically responsive 
forms of continuity with and through the earth. By understanding life as in 
circulation, as a gift from a community of ancestors, we can see death as recycling, 
a flowing on into an ecological and ancestral community of origins. In place of 
the Western war of life against death whose battleground has been variously 
the spirit-identified afterlife and the reduced, medicalised material life, the 
Indigenous imaginary sees death as part of life, partly through narrative, and 
partly because death is a return to the (highly narrativised) land that nurtures 
life. Such a vision of death fosters an imaginary of the land as a nourishing 
terrain, and of death as a nurturing, material continuity with ecological others, 
especially the lives and landforms of country. 
***
Other questions came to my mind later when reflecting on my experience. 
Why did I do such a dangerous thing and not perceive my danger? Why did 
I previously not see myself as subject to these kinds of dangers? One way of 
answering these questions lies in my background in a certain kind of culture, 
my background relationship to the land I was visiting and the land of home. My 
relationship, in other words, to place. I was in a place that was not my own and 
which was very different from my own place. An important part of place is one’s 
sense of the large predators for placing us.
Europe and North America have their wolves and bears, some of which can be 
a serious danger to the human species. South America and Africa have many 
species which make walking, camping or adventuring alone in many habitats a 
dangerous enterprise. 
Those like myself who have grown up in the bush of Southern Australia have had 
our awareness of danger formed in an apparently more benign environment that 
lacks serious human predators. It is not that danger is lacking in the bushlands 
of SE Australia. In the forest where I live there are many very dangerous spiders. 
Snakes, including several that are among the most venomous in the world, are 
commonly encountered. One of the most important and subtlest dangers is fire. 
When I returned home to my current abode in early December last year, the 
forest was frighteningly dry, there were three bushfires around me and the 
air was full of smoke. Then a few days later we had one of those wonderful 
interventions that excite this part of the coast: the Cool Change! Along these 
coastal ranges over the summer months we experience a great tug of war between 
two elements, the cool, moist maritime element from the southern oceans versus 
the hot, dry fire-bearing element, the fire dragon from the scorched heart of the 
continent. (Of course this good/bad alignment is much too simple—each side 
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has its positives and negatives). In most seasons the moist maritime goddess can 
be counted on to win, but in drought seasons such as this one the balance is 
more precarious. Here, every week, the question seems to be: will we make it 
again this year? Will the silver goddess get here in time to expel the fire dragon? 
Will we survive?
The southerly change really is Cool. Water trickles steadily into my rain tanks 
as cool moist cloud sweeps in from the ocean through the forest. I dig out a 
sweater; lyrebirds are singing again; grasses greening. All the fires around me 
now seem to be out. The dripping forest feels good now, but I know it’s not over 
yet until we get a lot more rain. It can all change back in a week or two of heat 
and drying winds into a fire powder keg. You have to be able to look at the bush 
you love and also imagine it as a smoking, blackened ruin, and somehow come 
to terms with that vision. I am trying to make my house fire-ready, but in the 
cool moist airstream of the moment I am finding it hard to sustain the sense of 
urgency and inevitability that moved my efforts a week or two ago. Now a little 
hope has returned that I’ll be lucky and that the encounter with that particular 
demon can be yet again postponed. But I know I will have to meet the fire 
monster face-to-face one day.
Well I’m pleased to report now in mid-January that the silver goddess has won 
again, that the forest moisture is now very good and the fire element has been 
expelled—but only for the moment, and only for this local coastal mountain 
rainforest microclimate. Further west it’s still very dry.
Not so in Kakadu which is a very different and much more dangerous 
environment, one in which I was to learn the agonies of the world from which 
my safe life in southern Australia had protected me, where the animal fate of 
being food is extended to the human species.1 
1 This chapter is a revised version of an article published by the journal Terra Nova titled ‘Being Prey’. 




2. Dry season (Yegge) in the stone 
country
The ripples spread across the turquoise waters of a deep, clear rock-lined pool 
as I fill a billy with water. Until I shattered their reflections, the peaceful waters 
mirrored patterns in colour palettes of breathtaking beauty—the green of 
fringing pandanus and umbilik (Allosyncarpia), the unbroken blue of the early 
dry season skies, and the brilliant orange of the rock face on the pool’s opposite 
edge. I look again at the bright rock face, wondering if the wet season flood of the 
creek had here exposed the unweathered face of the Arnhem Land escarpment. 
The top section of the pool consists of shelves of polished, rocky ledges forming 
a small poolside platform like an intimate stage. The stage is backed by the 
orange rock face and faces north-west to a group of weathered creek-side rock 
ledges that rise in ranks like the seats of a Greek theatre. Although the platform 
looks perfect for a small human dance or dramatic performance, its only present 
occupants are a small group of human-sized wattles and young eucalypts.  
On the lowest part of this platform, on opposite sides of the small fall of water 
tumbling melodiously into the pool, sit two water monitors. Well named, these 
large hunting lizards scan the parade of water creatures passing through the 
channel, always on the lookout for a tasty meal. Every so often one of them dives 
and returns shortly to its edge position to munch its living feast. Further down 
the pool, the moist sandy edge spots are covered with delightful crowds of tiny 
delicate bladderworts like eager debutantes, each pale apricot flower modestly 
covering its sexual parts with what looks like a white apron with red spots—
(very occasionally it has white spots upon red, as if the apron were turned inside 
out). But the innocent appearance is a trick, for these elegant, shy beauties 
are in fact carnivorous plants which lure and prey upon the rich insect life of 
this tropical stream. Predation and food seem pretty big in this environment: 
even the plants are doing it. In the south, orchids lure insects through their 
private parts to achieve pollination; here in the north their equivalents, the 
bladderworts, eat the insects they lure beneath their aprons. 
It is hard to imagine anything more innocent and inviting than this superb pool, 
especially after a long walk with a heavy pack through the midday heat of Yegge, 
the early dry season in Binitj country of Australia’s Northern Territory. But is 
the innocence of the pool also a trick? What lurks beneath the overhanging 
banks, in the shadowy caves of roots? I sit for a while, tense and watchful, 
remembering sharply the grasp of vice-like jaws rising from the water. Here, 
I try to reassure myself, I am well up into the stone country, where you could 
encounter at most a freshwater crocodile, the smaller species that rarely inflicts 
serious damage on humans. You would surely never meet here the fearsome 
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Saltwater Crocodile, terror of the floodplain and coastal waterways, probably 
the most dangerous predator for humans on the face of the earth. But doubts 
still intrude. I have been warned that the Salties, not long ago close to extinction 
after the ravages of commercial crocodile hunting, seem to be expanding their 
range in these times of official protection and global warming, moving into the 
habitat of their smaller neighbours, habitat more or less like this. I’m not taking 
a chance on a swim just yet. 
I resist for now the call of the pool, best to sit and gaze for a while into its green 
sandy depths. Soon time and place combine to stimulate (or was it insinuate?) 
some idle speculation about cross-species theatre. What if the natural cycles 
I see around me were the dramatic subject for which the poolside theatre 
was the setting, the reverse of our usual order? Might not the drama to be 
played out there demand both human and non-human actors? Could the plot 
map the characters onto the struggle between mind and matter, or freedom 
and justice versus necessity and chaos? How could we express the tensions 
between perceptions of cruelty and cyclical ways to think about the workings 
of nature, which correspond roughly to the contrast between the desires of the 
animal liberationists and ecological perspectives? Perhaps as a conflict between 
presiding deities, unhappily married—like Jupiter and Juno? Is it inevitable 
that consciousness is unhappily married to embodiment? If the bladderworts 
and lizards enact the dramatic struggles of predation lower down the pool, for 
whom or what might the main upper section of the platform be reserved? What 
was that shadow I thought I saw among the rocks above the platform, about the 
right size and shape for a crocodile? Of course, I have to remind myself, I often 
see these fearsome figures where others see only old stumps, rocks and fallen 
trees. 
At last I take the plunge, swimming at first cautiously, uneasily, then after a while 
relaxing and letting the green-rayed water soothe my spinifex-punctured limbs. 
I am still remembering. Lower down, I crossed the sandy floodplain reaches of 
this very same creek, with some trepidation, on that first journey I made in this 
country in February 1985. That walk that took me along the western side of this 
same massif. I then travelled on by boat towards the East Alligator River, that 
journey which was subsequently so momentous for me, and for others as well, 
culminating in my narrowly surviving a predation attempt on the river by a 
saltwater crocodile. 
My experience then left me with a huge sense of puzzlement, as if I had somehow 
stumbled into a sinister unfamiliar world that was not my own, but perhaps 
the stage-set for a movie like Jurassic Park. Now after years of reflecting on 
those events, and of teaching and writing about the philosophical issues raised 
by predation, I believe I am at last ready to return and recognise that strange 
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terrifying world as my own. This journey, I hope, will help me to understand 
the meaning of what happened there not only for my own life, but for life itself, 
from the perspective of both the eater and the eaten. 
The stone country pool invites—then, once you have surrendered to it, seduces 
and delights. Its freshwater pools of incredible natural beauty and variety offer 
what must be the world’s most irresistible temptations to blissful immersion. But 
one that is perhaps at the same time the most dangerous. A thriving crocodile 
population reminds us of the power of Ngalyod the rainbow serpent, who 
recycles life in this place and performs the integration of land, sky and water. 
Ngalyod’s cycles have made this place a great dialogue between the tropical 
monsoon elements and the stone country, that great sheet of tilted sandstone 
that emerges above the Arnhem Land floodplain. 
The Rainbow Serpent has made water the key to life in this environment. 
Here in the immensity of the stone country, where we are probably the only 
humans for many square miles in a vast and rugged area of protected land, 
we can safely do without the water purifier I have lugged over many miles of 
hot spinifex, rock and rainforest. The water is inviting, clear and caressing, its 
temperature is refreshing, but you can spend luxurious, lazy hours in these 
pools without getting cold. There is a world of difference between the dialogical 
encounter and excitement the endless variety of life forms this pool provides 
and the monological, utilitarian chemical predictability of the suburban pool, 
dedicated to the sole use of an unhealthy subspecies of the human, harried by 
time, driving on a mechanical body for empty exercise. The water cycle here is 
majestic and creative, as the Rainbow Serpent tells, and it is under threat from 
environmental destruction here as everywhere else. 
The Rainbow Serpent’s acolytes, the water monitors, yellow diamonds on brown 
reptile skin, face like an otter, watch me swim by unperturbed, occasionally 
flicking out a forked tongue in my direction when I come too close. I could have 
caught one quite easily when I first arrived, could have had it sizzling on the 
fire for supper. Startled from its watching spot above the falls, it slipped into 
a submerged but easily reached pothole to hide, one fat leg and part of its tail 
protruding, an easy catch. But no, the monitors, and everything else here, are 
stringently protected in the Kakadu World Heritage Area, and anyway, I prefer to 
enjoy the water monitor in other ways. I will stick to my dehydrated vegetarian 
package dinner, of whose healthiness I am much less sure. I can imagine the 
possibility of dining on the juicy water monitor, unlike some modern urban 
intellectuals, but mine is not a hunting life. I do not universally condemn such 
a life, which under some conditions has been able to express the condition of 
the human as a top predator without arrogance and with integrity and honesty. 
The ethics of eating others is complex and contextual, I believe. But it is the 
terrible injuries that modern capitalism’s interpretation of predation inflicts on 
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its category of economic animals that have made me into a vegetarian, rather 
than any ascetic distaste for the flesh. Even if the wildlife regulations did not 
stop me, I have now developed a sensibility of restraint in relation to killing and 
eating animals which I cannot suspend even for water monitors. They are safe, 
at least from me. 
The pool surface, still when I arrived, is now rippled by water boatmen and 
by a sharp gust of wind. As if inspired by this arrival, the wattles spring into 
instantaneous theatrical action. The big gold-tipped wattle tree flowering next 
to the pandanus waves, rustles and almost sings. The old wattle blossoms she 
has dropped upon the pool’s surface are driven into the far corners of the 
pool to form a golden brown audience facing the platform. Thus acclaimed, 
three sinuous young wattle trees dance gracefully on centre stage. The whole 
performance lasts less than a minute. Action is thought of differently over 
yonder in the sandstone. From my state of watery relaxation, I take in the 
scarred, distant body of the massif, eaten away by a thousand million years 
of hyperactive tropical atmosphere. Here the ancient sandstone plateau is 
weathered to immense, fantastic ruins that bring to mind enigmatic artefacts 
from some titanic civilisation of the past. An inchoate sphinx face and a perfect 
sarcophagus, both the size of battleships, top the towers of the great domed red 
cliffs that rise to the south. 
But tickling and nibbling sensations on my feet and legs bring me quickly back 
to the immediacy of my own scarred body. Tiny fish are now dining off my 
skin, gently nibbling, and small, not so gentle freshwater prawns are tugging 
diligently at the hairs of my big toe. Ow! This tribe of capering crustaceans, or 
waagi as they are called by the Gundjiehmi people who hunt them hereabouts 
with small wooden spears, are now handing out some distinct nips. The waagi 
are quite willing to eat living flesh. Luckily waagi are too small to break the skin 
directly, but they have other methods. I watch fascinated as one of the larger 
ones makes for a sore point on my hand, conveys the pieces of scab delicately 
to its mouth, and then makes a start on the flesh beneath. When I lift my hand 
from the water it is bleeding. The waagi however will only eat you alive if you 
are foolish enough to act dead. Time to get moving again.
Lower down the pool, near the bladderworts, I encountered the kunbak, a small 
water plant whose fine green fronds represent the hair of the Yawk Yawk sisters. 
The Yawk Yawks live in the slowly moving water along the edges of this little 
stream that drains a huge area of the stone country. In the narratives of the 
Kunwinkju people of western Arnhem Land (part of Kakadu), these sisters are 
little spirit mermaids with fish tails instead of legs. They dwell in the holes 
beneath the banks and come out to sing and play where the pandanus grows. 
From underneath the water they watch women swimming, ever on the lookout 
for one ready to become their mother, to birth them as human. 
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Aboriginal people of Arnhem Land use the terms binitj for Aboriginal people 
and balanda for settler people. For a balanda woman like myself, the Yawk Yawk 
offer welcome sisterly and binitj travelling company in the landscape, enticing 
Westerners across the high wall we have tried to build between the human 
and non-human worlds. We journey, of course, not only with our obvious 
and immediate human companions but also with an unseen band of cultural 
company. The Yawk Yawk sisters evoked for me the much loved balanda figure 
of Alice, also a traveller and a shape-changer, who enriched journeys through 
the Sydney sandstone landscapes of my own childhood. I wish to join these 
binitj and balanda sisters in playful company: I too would like to be a shape-
changer. I would like to be a wattle. 
Many binitj namings invoke narratives like those of the Yawk Yawk. These 
striking stories function both to impress their meanings cunningly and 
irresistibly in the memory, and to bind together botanical, experiential, practical 
and philosophical knowledge, community identity and spiritual practice in a 
rich and satisfying integration of what we usually place in opposing groups 
of life and theory. Binitj stories envelope a journey in their land in narrative, 
so that one travels through a speaking land encountered in dialogical mode, as 
a communicative partner. By contrast the main balanda cultural namings you 
encounter around here represent a monological relationship to land. Namings 
like ‘Mount Brockman’ take no notice at all of this extraordinary place, or of its 
power and agency. The puzzling, pointless and Eurocentric naming of this great 
outlier of the escarpment, marked by remarkable and ancient Aboriginal places 
and rock art galleries, commemorates a European ‘discoverer’ and finds the place 
notable only for the accident of its falling in the way of a member of the colonial 
aristocracy. Such monological namings treat the place itself as a vacuum of 
mind and meaning, to be filled through the power plays of those in favour with 
the colonial office or the resource activities of mining companies. This deeply 
colonised naming practice still disfigures too much of the Australian map, and 
neither it nor its underlying narrative of eurocentrism and of colonial power is 
in any way challenged by formal decolonisation exercises like republicanism. 
It is precisely such cultural practices we have to take on if we Australians are 
ever truly to belong culturally to this land and develop a mode of exchange that 
attends to and respects the uniqueness and power of place. 
The westering sun finally calls me from the pool. Time to prepare for the 
evening meal and the avid attentions of those tax collectors of the ecosystem, 
the mosquitoes. Earlier, when we arrived at this superb pool campsite, it was hot 
and quiet/hushed, as if everything was resting, even the mountains—all except 
the murmuring creek and the monitors. Now, as it begins to cool off, new voices 
come to life. Earth others of this landscape are emerging from cool resting-up 
places, negotiating and announcing their arrangements for the coming evening. 
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A sandstone friar bird, noisy and pugnacious, calls a greeting-challenge, and is 
answered by a second sending back what sounds like a tenfold elaboration on 
the first, a sassy reply with plenty of brass knobs on (to invoke the term children 
use to effect escalating insult). A rainbow bird pair, bundles of rainbow colour 
and ceaseless energy, buzz out the song that accompanies their playful, erotic 
hunting dance. I briefly envy the wholeness of their existence, apparently a 
seamless combination of hunting, dancing, singing, eating, and love, thinking 
of the painful partitions and oppositions we moderns have created in these 
areas. (When will we understand that smarter is not always better, that greater 
sophistication and complexity are not always an improvement?). A grey falcon 
lands in a nearby tree, and the rainbow songs are silenced for the day. Soon 
the great orange stone sarcophagus on the top of the facing cliff is catching 
the setting sun, which rests finally on it alone, dying it deep red, the colour of 
blood.
***
From the poolside camp as our base location, my companion Mark and I set out 
to walk next day up the creek into the arid interior of this great outlier of the 
stone country. We journey through a mighty landscape of silent, solemn ruins; 
the intricate detail of their great wrecked ramparts seems imbued with the 
heightened significance of dreamscape. Before us, forming the northern walls 
of our shallow valley, rise battered towers of stone the size and complexity of 
cathedrals, toppled and leaning at precarious angles, fantastic pieces in some 
game of giants strewn carelessly across the floor of this rocky world. Every turn 
of the creek brings new tilted columns, crazy stacks or shady temples into view, 
new disclosures of the unimaginably infinite variety of the earth narrative that 
is weathered stone. Each formation is a revelation of wonder to be encountered 
on its own terms and in its own time, rather than commanded to fit some pre-
established schema by a supreme, impatient, all-knowing eye. We are truly in 
the presence of the old ones. 
You do not have to stretch yourself too much here to get a sense of the land 
as powerful and intentional, ultimately beyond us, one of the old ones, the 
creator beings. To those of us balanda, who have in our conceptual frameworks 
systematically denied the power of the old ones, experiencing the power of 
ancestral processes can evoke almost the kind of fear we associate with the eerie. 
Some mystics believe spirit photography to have the power to reveal the unseen, 
mysterious shapes and figures that do not appear to the immediate human gaze. 
Among my snapshots of the place is one unexpectedly showing what appears to 
be a giant white alien figure standing, one arm extended, in front of what looks 
like a strange ruined city. Such a sense of power does the background landscape 
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evoke, of being in contact with something much more than you can sense, that 
this mysterious figure (which I would not presume to call a trick of the light) 
does not seem at all out of time or place. 
But the character of revelation such experience evokes is thoroughly 
paradoxical, for it is precisely the revelation of the extraordinary character of 
what the balanda framework makes invisible, treats as an utterly familiar and 
unimportant background—the passage of geological time—that is foregrounded 
and communicated so powerfully in the eroded grey and red rock ranges 
that surround us on every side. They confront us sharply with the difficult 
knowledge of our limitations, for in the complex and intricate narrative that 
explains the emergence of the correspondingly complex and intricate forms 
we see around us, we can as human observers never know the full story that 
matches the intricacy we observe. We can discern only a few of its broader 
outlines: that all this has evolved through the ancestral processes of sea, rain 
and wind that have sculpted it through the tides of 1800 million years. To save 
face, we conveniently dismiss the rest under the rubric of contingency, accident, 
or formless chaos, belittling all complexities we cannot know or control. 
It gets hotter and hotter as we walk up the creek into the higher parts of the 
stone country. As we leave behind the shady canyons, pools and the creek-
side rainforest groves of Allosyncarpia (umbilik), the heat of Yegge is visibly 
reflected in heat waves rising from a region of much harsher country, great stone 
expanses where most of the vegetation in sight edges the creek or clings to 
the sides of distant ranges. The wattles, previously mainly up in the higher 
and drier parts, have moved down to the creek margins, and sparse spinifex 
increasingly occupies the broken country that stretches away from the creek. 
Much of the mobile life in this landscape depends on the small flow of creek 
water now trickling over and between exposed rocky ledges. The creek itself 
soon disappears underground into deep fissures, and when we pick it up again 
gratefully we stop to wet our shirts and hats to keep cool. We are not the only 
ones here under heat stress. The beautiful grey felty-leaved Gossypium mallow, 
she of the huge deep pink flowers, has to keep her treasures tightly folded during 
the heat of the day and dares to open up shop for reproductive business only in 
the coolness of the late afternoon. It is hard to follow the map, so confusing is 
the detail of the ruined ranges and so vast the scale of this enigmatic country. 
Like the vegetation, we cling precariously to the creek, trying to hold ourselves 
open for the pull of an Aboriginal art site. We have been told there are some 
galleries here we can visit without offence, but have been given little more than 
a vague indication of where they might be.  
There has been some controversy over the intrusion of balanda walkers into this 
landscape, and talk in some quarters of banning balanda bushwalking altogether 
in Kakadu, although traditional owners are by no means all of that view. Already 
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walking is exceptionally tightly controlled, and all routes and camping sites 
have to be vetted by the park service. But some suggest that balanda walkers are 
disrespectful and seek to know what had best remain unknown, perhaps to all 
human eyes to the extent that few binitj now go to these places. 
There are many kinds of walking, of course. There is the monological kind 
of walking that is for exercise only, with no objective of encounter with or 
knowledge of another beyond the self. (For this type, a Walkman radio is often 
attached to the head to counter the inevitable boredom). There is instrumental 
walking, as when you pass rapidly through a place treated as of no interest in 
itself en route to somewhere else which is your real objective, and experience 
the others only as places ‘along the way’, a means of reaching the desired goal. 
There is also the kind of leisure walking which involves what might be thought 
of as visual consumption of the landscape experienced as famous, ‘must-see’ 
scenery, or collected as an addition to some list of endurance tests, hard-to-
reach places you have mastered. (Both of these achievement-oriented types 
tend to instrumentalise, subordinate or screen out places you encounter along 
the way other than the designated goal, and treat these with less than respect. 
Bringing this kind of mind to this kind of place would be very disrespectful. 
At the other extreme, there is the kind of walking Thoreau called ‘going to the 
holy land’, walking as a dialogical and spiritual practice oriented to meeting and 
knowing the sacredness of the earth and valuing whatever the journey itself 
throws up. This can involve a type of journeying (wandering or ‘sauntering’ 
in Thoreau’s terminology) where you encounter each place along the way with 
wonder, as perfect, amazing or instructive in itself. In practice, most walking 
probably involves some more or less conflicting mixture of all of these, and 
Thoreau’s practice of free ‘spiritual walking’ was more bounded by his time 
and place than he recognised. But the intense and open kind of experience he 
describes may have some evolutionary value for the times, not long gone, when 
our human survival depended on the quality of our knowledge of the land. 
We may be programmed by our evolutionary inheritance with the neural 
capacity to register the land by walking through it, for a landscape you have 
travelled through on foot can stay fresh in the memory for an extraordinary 
length of time, and can live in your dreams, sometimes for decades. Thoreau’s 
successors’ idea of sacred wilderness as pure nature and of ‘human interference’ 
as inevitably degrading the land is not very convincing in this country, where 
the presence of great galleries of rock art testifying to human habitation over a 
period of 20,000 years adds immeasurably to its richness, power and fascination. 
Although we may have our doubts about the applicability here of concepts of 
wilderness, the wilderness movement has helped to foster several dialogical 
approaches of great value in an increasingly over-rationalised and monological 
world. One of these is the wandering, crossroad mind, which can accept as its 
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muse the contingency of the journey, valuing the unplanned, the unintended 
as contributions to a dialogical exchange with the world, as sources of wisdom 
and revelation. 
Wilderness tends to be understood, however, as something that is separate from 
land that is used, land that supports us. There is a sundering, a splitting in this 
outlook that differs from an Indigenous understanding of unity of place. For 
the people who live here wilderness (wildness) was not a special place set apart 
as sacred in contrast to the profane earth. For them all the earth was sacred and 
there was no necessary split between use and respect.  
Another aspect of this outlook is the understanding of the importance of 
embodiment. The intense, intimate and physical bond of knowledge with 
the earth to be gained by walking opens up a form of conversation with the 
earth’s great body which can only be entered into through the answering effort 
of our own human bodies. Wilderness travellers must carry survival on their 
backs and measure themselves as limited and only half-hardy animals. Through 
such a journey you come to encounter nature in many forms and in the active 
rather than the passive voice, and to know the land in the mode of a lover, as a 
wonderfully elaborated, beloved and communicating body. 
In the dualistically gendered Western story of spirituality in which the male is 
identified with an interior and ascetic ‘perennial’ spirituality that turns away 
from the body and the material world, and the female with the ‘immanent’, 
material, and mundane concerns opposed to spirituality so interpreted, many 
things that may be important for our survival cannot be expressed. Among 
these is the possibility of a materialist spirituality that explores and rejoices 
in the body of the world, knowing it as thoroughly and physically as you can 
know the body of a lover. In this direction may lie the possibility of a spirituality 
that is not etherealised or other-worldly, that fully celebrates the nourishing 
capacities of the earth and knows the sacredness of the everyday, the here and 
now, of the mundane or quotidian. 
If walking provides an opportunity to encounter the power that is in the land, 
to experience it in terms of a dialogical rather than monological relationship, 
it can also provide a spiritual encounter at various levels with the narratives 
of time written in the land. The work culture of late capitalism casts time as 
the enemy of profit, its elixir of eternal life. This distorted framework has 
deprived us of much. In it time plays a largely instrumental role as the medium 
in which certain goals are to be achieved or projects completed. Time is an 
enemy, an oppressor, a hard and painful taskmaster who will destroy us in the 
end. An intense and intimate foot journey through the stone country generates 
a powerful and different experience of time—as geological time actively shaping 
the extraordinary sandstone ruins, as evolutionary time creating the animal life 
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around us, as the human time evinced in the rock art galleries, and as personal 
‘time out of time’, time to draw with a finger in the sand, time to envy the 
rainbow birds, time to reflect on and integrate experience. Here in this place, 
under these conditions, time becomes a teacher and travelling companion, a 
friend who will carry us away. Time is not the medium, time is also the message. 
The day progresses, getting hotter. Almost as we are ready to turn back, we 
reach a point where from the creek bed we see a long low line of collapsed 
rock that suggests the outline of a cave. The etiquette is to call to make contact, 
establish our presence, ask permission to approach. My own ringing cooee call 
is well practised, since I spent much of the previous summer walking in grizzly 
bear country in the northern Rockies, where you must call constantly to warn 
the grizzlies of your presence and avoid disconcerting and dangerous surprises. 
(‘That silly Cooee call again! Another loud-mouthed, tasteless Australian, dear,’ 
one can imagine them yawning). 
‘Cooee!’ I call out loudly. Back from the rock face comes the cooee call, just as loud 
and astonishingly clear. ‘It’s Val and Mark, can we come up?’ ‘Come up!’—comes 
the response, strong and unhesitating. Binitj perform this calling ceremony to 
let the ancestors know they are present and to seek their permission to enter. 
What could be the point of such a practice of seeking permission for balanda? I 
answer: to acknowledge power in the land, to respect and acknowledge the place 
as agent and as presence or presences, whatever these may be; and to express a 
dialogical understanding of relationship to the earth as communicative partner. 
Also to register respect for Aboriginal culture, its creations and customs, and 
for any artefacts that might be present. And to be open to and respectful of 
Aboriginal narratives of landscape. 
The cave is cool and dim, and the magnificent art gallery on the cave walls well-
guarded by ranks of great stone blocks fallen from the roof. Upon the walls of the 
ochre-whitened passages running beneath the shattered roof we recognise figures 
associated with several prominent themes in Binitj culture—the double rainbow 
serpent entwines itself, recycling turtles and fish, kangaroos and humans, rain 
and creek water. We admire the powerful realisation, close observation of the 
paintings, wondering at their meaning. Then, round the corner, we gasp and 
clutch each other. Upon the wall, outlined clearly in red ochre, is the almost 
life-sized profile of an animal that has been extinct upon mainland Australia 
for perhaps 5,000 years, the Thylacine or marsupial wolf. There is no possible 
doubt about the subject of the painting: the stripes depicted across the rear of 
the body are diagnostic along with the body shape and bearing. 
The person who executed this painting was familiar with the thylacine. The 
animal in this painting bears its extraordinary tail aloft not as an afterthought or 
optional extra, like a dog, but as a powerful and crucial continuation of its body. 
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Then we see something else. Directly underneath the painting lie a set of large, 
white doglike droppings looking only a week or two old. Perhaps these are 
those of the thylacine’s canine rival, the dingo, or perhaps, as I am not unwilling 
to think, they have been left by a spirit Thylacine itself. We are again in the 
presence of the old ones, the ancestors. 
***
Leaving at last and reluctantly the cave and its coolness, its encounter with time, 
we enter another remarkable and richly symbolic realm of old ones beyond it, 
a whole Valley of Balanced Rocks. These figures of eroded stone, representing 
the oldest and most resistant pieces of the sandstone sheet still somehow against 
all odds bravely carrying their form into the present, often take a visual form 
that eerily recalls a shrouded animal or human head. Above the cave gallery 
they are planted on the skyline on each side of the valley. Always we are in the 
presence of the old ones, but nowhere more clearly than among such highly 
weathered rocks. Weathered rocks are among the oldest children of the earth 
and its surrounding aura of atmosphere. They are, according to the earliest 
accounts, the product of the marriage struggle between mother earth and father 
sky. The balanced rock represents the maximum in resistance to the processes of 
destruction, the original sandstone sheet distilled down to the smallest possible 
unit of survival, and one not likely to survive for very much longer, one already 
struggling in the river of time. 
This form of the balanced rock has great personal meaning for me. It was a form 
I attached great significance to in my youth in the Sydney sandstone. Although 
this is a much younger and less exposed body of stone, the balanced rock is a 
form created with some regularity by the weathering of sandstone. Balanced 
rocks were for me symbols of presence, symbols of balance, but also symbols 
of life’s danger, of vulnerability that cut close to the bone: we can fall, we are 
balanced, our lives are kept open precariously. It is curious that these old wise 
rocks should so often take a form that recalls a shrouded animal or human head, 
This form is the sandstone’s warning to all embodied individual life: It says, I am 
about to decompose and crumble, losing my individuality and organisation, but 
in the process creating others. In the same cause you, you living ones, must die, 
and since life is defined by its attempt to resist the inevitable decomposition, 
loss of form, you will finally have to surrender to something you do not want, 
that which of all things you do not want, to death. 
It is curious on another count that these oldest, most tested rocks should so 
often take a form that recalls a shrouded human or animal head, for that would 
seem to place them alternatively as symbols of consciousness or meaning—
which some identify—too narrowly I think—with humanity. In Cartesian and 
neo-Cartesian ideology this would be a paradoxical symbolism, since across 
The Eye of the Crocodile 
34
the great Cartesian divide the non-conscious have nothing in common with 
the conscious and could not represent them. The balanced rock is therefore 
a counter-Cartesian symbol, representing the world’s resistance to hierarchical 
Cartesian orderings. It represents also certain aspects that are common in our 
animal condition, questions of vulnerability and security of life tenure that 
really mark the difference between the realms we call nature and those we call 
culture. Animal liberationists tend to assume a domestic and tenured life. The 
balanced rock is for me a symbol of predation, of the cyclical aspects of nature. 
But the balanced rock has meaning of this kind for another reason also, for it 
was the symbol I saw also on that fateful day, just before my encounter with the 
crocodile, that caused me to turn and come back when I did, just in time to meet 
what was waiting for me. 
***
We returned to the coolness of the pool for the evening, to rest and to prepare 
for our departure the following morning. Finally, as we are about to leave we 
are granted a further layer of revelation. I discover the paintings of the rainbow 
serpent on the orange cliff behind the platform on the pool. I see at last why the 
cliff glows so brilliantly.
The old one shines with power and presence that encompasses and nullifies the 
binaries with which I have been wrestling. 
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3. The wisdom of the balanced rock: 
The parallel universe and the prey 
perspective
I leapt through the eye of the crocodile into what I have now come to think of as a 
parallel universe, one with completely different rules—the Heraclitean universe 
where everything flows—where we live the other’s death, die the other’s life. 
This is the universe represented in the food chain whose logic confounds our 
sense of justice because it presents a completely different sense of generosity. It 
is pervaded and organised by a generosity that takes a Heraclitean perspective, 
one in which our bodies flow with the food chain. They do not belong to us; 
rather they belong to all. A different kind of justice rules the food chain, one 
of sharing what has been provided by energy and matter and passing it on in 
what Gary Snyder refers to as, ‘the sacramental energy-exchange, evolutionary 
mutual-sharing aspect of life—that sharing of energies, passing it back and 
forth, which is done by literally eating each other’. 
But in the individual justice universe the individual subject’s universe is like 
the person-as-the-walled-moated-castle-town. It is under constant siege and 
desperately, obsessively seeking to keep the body—this body made out of 
food—away from others and retain it for ourselves alone. Of course we know the 
walled-moated castle will fall in the end but we try to hold off the siege as long 
as possible while seeking always more and better siege-resisting technology that 
will enable us to remain self-enclosed. 
In the individual/justice universe you own the energy volume of your body 
absolutely and spend much of that energy defending it frantically against all 
comers. Any attempt by others at sharing is regarded as an outrage, an injustice, 
that must be resisted to the hilt (consider our reaction to the overfamiliar gate-
crashers at our high-class feast—mosquitoes, leeches, ticks. These outrage our 
proprietary sensibilities). In the other, Heraclitean universe, being in your body 
is more like having a volume out from the library, a volume subject to more or 
less instant recall by other borrowers—who rewrite the whole story when they 
get it. 
There is no corridor that links these two universes. They are two radically 
different systems—incommensurable ways of conceiving the world. There is no 
nice, sedate orderly way of getting out of the individual justice world into the 
food-chain world. No, you have to leap, wildly and desperately, to get into the 
Heraclitean universe—and what I leapt through was a golden hoop, the eye of 
the crocodile. 
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The eye of the crocodile showed me that there really is a world in which we are 
all food. As the crocodile pulled me out of my normal universe and down into 
that watery parallel universe I thought that the world revealed there was one of 
terrible injustice, indifference and grim necessity. I now think differently. Now 
I have thought about it more. I think the food chain world is a world of radical 
and startling equality—it is not unfair, it treats all the same way.
According to Eskimo shamans the greatest danger we face in life is that our food 
consists of souls. The dilemma we face is seeing the other as food and as souls 
both at the same time. That is the trick—the wisdom of the balanced rock. We 
have to see from both these worlds. The wisdom of the balanced rock tells us as 
humans we live and have our home in both these worlds, although we do not 
know we do. 
Oh, we know about it intellectually, some of us, who’ve learnt about ecology but 
experientially we don’t know it. Or we only know it experientially exclusively 
from one position in it—from on top, the perspective of the predator. Some of us 
have even lost contact with that and think our food comes from the shops where 
we buy it. This predator perspective gives us a distorted view. It prevents us 
from thinking in terms of an exchange, a radically levelling exchange. 
Instead, from that only-predator angle we come to think the food chain reflects 
our species’ greater worth and we try to remake everything so that it reflects 
that outlook back to us. This is how we confirm to ourselves the idea that it’s 
our role in life as humans to always have the upper hand. It enables us to justify 
decimating crocodile populations when any of them have the gall to puncture 
our illusion. The top–down angle of seeing the food chain always from above 
is corrupting and distorting. In fact, we don’t really know it at all, not as other 
creatures know it. 
We don’t ever know its terrible logic fully, experientially, until we have to give 
our bodies up—in my case a good quality body in perfect working order—give 
them up to some other life form. When we know the Heraclitean universe fully 
as the prey knows it, then we know ourselves to be human in an astounding 
and utterly dismaying way. We suddenly know about giving up that precious, 
inviolate body—to the jaws of the crocodile! Another borrower recalls the 
volume—and we haven’t even finished reading/writing it! 
So who was I to deny the crocodile the food of my body? In the logic of the 
Heraclitean universe the food of my body, representing the body as energy–
matter, never belonged to me. It always belonged to the ecosystem. Its belonging 
to me is a fundamental illusion in the Heraclitean universe—an illusion that is 
imported from the other universe. And it was this illusion from the individual 
justice universe I had just been grabbed out of that underlay my disbelief and 
outrage. 
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If the ‘meat’ we are does not belong to us then the predator is neither a master 
nor a monster. We have to see things from both universes. This is the wisdom 
of the balanced rock. The prey perspective can help us see the absurdity and 
arrogance and parochialism of our assumption that we can impose our moated 
castle-person claims, in any general way, on the ecological universe. If, thinking 
solely in the terms of the person-justice universe, we believe that meat is misery 
we will indeed soon persuade ourselves to leave the ‘world of changes’ behind 
us and return to the comfort of the old themes of transcendence, somatophobia, 
and alienation. 
The boundary and radical difference between what I am calling the person/
justice and the food/ecological framework is real. I have been there, I have 
journeyed to this other world in which we are all food, and I have come back, 
like the one who journeyed out from Plato’s Cave, to tell you that it is real. 
There is an incommensurability which shuts these two worlds off from each 
other. They exist as parallel universes, in different dimensions. Yet, we exist in 
both simultaneously. They do not invalidate one another, except when people 
mistakenly try to reduce one to the other or make other mistakes resulting from 
human arrogance. These lead us to divide the world between the one in which 
you are a person-subject from an individual justice perspective, and that other, 
older shocking, subversive and denied world in which you are food. 
I received many letters from religious folks when I was recuperating in hospital 
who wrote saying they believed I had been saved for a purpose. For a long time 
I discounted such views but now I think perhaps the task those events have 
given me is becoming clearer, although I would not concede the teleology of my 
individual salvation. My task is to remind people of the wisdom of the balanced 
rock. It is to show people how each universe exists and how each limits the 
other. It is to discover their relationship and how we can move conceptually 
between the justice and ecological frameworks. This, of course is the great 
conflict between animal justice and ecology perspectives which has vexed so 
many environmental philosophers. 
We have to learn to see from both worlds, for we live in both. We will be seriously 
astray if we fail to realise that both are our home. Unreserved affirmation of 
predation requires, as it were, blotting out one of these worlds. To argue that 
being eaten is bad for the prey animal but valuable for the predator, that the 
violent death of the hunted gives life to the hunter and should be regarded 
not as value lost but rather as ‘value capture’, fails to open up the boundary 
between the two worlds. Taken to its extreme, unreserved affirmation of 
predation requires what is an even more problematic illusory assumption, the 
standard one that humans exist in the world of culture and animals are in the 
other ‘food’ world of nature. This is the ultimate human supremacist illusion. 
The reality is we are both of us in both worlds at once. 
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The realisation that you are eating misery is only possible from one of these 
worlds. From the other the very thought is unthinkable. Misery in the 
Heraclitean world is a meaningless concept. To argue from the point of view 
of misery alone is to clearly deny the ecological framework in which we are all 
food. This is to deny our own availability in practice while insisting on that of 
animals. We must either recognise our own availability or insist on the non-
availability of other animals. To do otherwise is to covertly appeal to the dualism 
of the humans-in-justice/animals-in-nature framework. 
It is also false to see the boundary between these universes as coinciding with 
the wild /domestic boundary. Living within an urban and domestic/cultivated 
sphere does not preclude being in an ecosystem framework. Likewise, the wild 
can be subject to the perspective of individual justice in various ways. Staring 
into the eyes of the crocodile the predator/prey conversation I had with myself 
was precisely about the boundary and transition between these worlds. 
These two worlds qualify each other and an unqualified affirmation of predation 
requires looking at it from only one side. Affirmation requires we confront the 
reality of both. Although they are parallel, they are not completely independent. 
Completeness requires a recognition of both along with an understanding of 
why and how they differ. Being prey helps here as you have to confront the 
reality of both. A truly embodied knowledge of the self is not possible until you 
have experienced both worlds and realised embeddedness in both. Somehow, 
we have to live in both worlds and find viable ways to cross between them.
I have given an experiential picture of these two parallel universes as starkly 
different because I wanted to honour and reflect my own experience of their 
shocking, radical otherness. The question remains whether this difference 
between the part of the universe we can control and the part we will never 
control is ineradicable. On the one hand, they can be regarded as being as 
incommensurable as the levels of description involved in physics and morality. 
For example we might take the difference between talking about a person as the 
physicist might see them and talking about the same person as a friend, wife or 
husband might see them. Perhaps we can simply allow this difference to coexist, 
regarding the two kinds of knowledge as irreducibly different. From this point 
of view they do not have to compete or contest with one another about who 
is really real and it would in fact be a fundamental mistake to reduce one to 
the other. We must, in acknowledging this difference, aim to react to each as 
is appropriate for it so that we do not allow ourselves to be turned into a sore, 
bleeding wound or a monster of indifference by bringing to each sphere the 
reactions appropriate to the other. 
On the other hand however, it seems imperative that we try to smooth out the 
edges between the two universes. To do so acknowledges the tension between 
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them and acknowledges us as beings who live in both worlds. To acknowledge 
the soul of our food is to acknowledge that both we ourselves and what we 
eat belong to both worlds; it is to try to bring these worlds into harmony at 
the point where they touch. This is also the point where what we eat morally 
touches our lives. It is the point at which we have to do right by our food 
and acknowledge its generosity. It calls on us to be generous in our turn and 
relinquish the desire for a mean-spirited self-maximisation that takes as much 
from each life we use as we possibly can. It requires we learn to be generous 
with ourselves and generous to all other life by honouring those always animate 
others whose generosity provides our food and ultimately takes us as food in 
our turn. 
Is there any justification for keeping nature and culture apart in mutual purity? 
Emphatically no. In opposition to the human desire to succour nature and 
adhere to the old story of nature as red in tooth and claw, an uncaring sphere of 
injustice, I advocate the need to make up for your own and others’ callousness. 
To confine criticisms of pointless suffering to the realm of culture yet to see 
suffering as a necessary aspect of natural selection, as an essential aspect of 
the survival of the species is to argue that a similar ethic of compassion is not 
appropriate in nature and the two forms of pain in these different spheres are 
not analogous. It is to see us as no longer buffeted by natural selection in the 
same way as those species who live in the wild. 
However, although misery and pain within the animal/food world cannot be 
viewed in just the same way as it is from within the human/justice world, our 
experience of the human/justice world gives us a sense of solidarity with the 
striving of all creatures, and this sense of solidarity is as valid a perspective 
as the necessity-of-suffering perspective that emanates from the animal/food 
world. I am vividly reminded of moments when, for example, I find myself 
urgently backing up my car after spotting a helpless and terrified parrot hit, 
lying in the middle of the road but obviously still lively, still with a chance. 
Quick, I think, before the next car comes by! (Once, to my grief, disgust and 
resignation I saw a road tortoise squashed flat in the time it took me to stop the 
car and run back to rescue it). I pile out of the car, race furiously up the road 
to where the parrot lies. I spot the mate waiting anxiously and fearfully in the 
nearby tree, poised for flight. The stricken one must have just been hit—quick 
now, I can hear another car approaching around the bend—just time to reach 
out and grab the small pulsing red body, despite my fear of her tearing bite. But 
she lies passive in my hand and I reach the cover at the side of the road and lift 
her into a nice thick bush, feel her wriggle free. I know she will be OK and with 
a sense of gladness for her small life, so red and joyful, I return to my car. Watch 
out, I say to myself, which universe is this? But do you really need to know? If 
it needs to it will define itself. 
The Eye of the Crocodile
40
Incommensurability was indeed my experience when I accidentally fell, like 
Alice in her tumble down the rabbit hole, through the connecting tunnel of the 
crocodile, from the one system into the other. So utterly strange to one another 
did they seem and so utterly astonished was I by their supposed incongruence 
that the challenge now is not that of studying up but of studying down. It is 
actually the reasons why our culture has supposed them to be so remarkably 
incongruent, presented them as incongruous, that I must try to study. 
As a child in the grim, toyless days of World War II, I spent many happy 
hours engrossed in an old Wonder Book. Its frayed red cover embossed with 
a trumpeting African elephant, the wonder book was a childhood cornucopia 
which spilled from its tattered black-and-white pages the marvellously varied 
and amazing creatures of the planet. This was a pre-war edition, innocent of 
the idea of extinction, except for skeletal dinosaurs. The book presented a 
Eurocentric view of the forest world, its Indigenous peoples and its animals, 
affirming their supposedly primitive vitality. But the half-conquered world it 
showed me still seemed wide and bountiful, clothed with the deep, lush forests 
where most of these marvellous beings made their homes. To the European 
imagination, the forest world it showed was inexhaustibly virgin and still 
largely unexplored, beckoning the imagination as a place of mystery, danger, 
surprise, and self-dwarfing age and grandeur. Wonder, and anticipation of a 
world of marvels that would one day be yours, were what the old book evoked.
The real world that I found outside my windows was rich enough to confirm in 
immediate, daily experience the old book’s promise of adventure and revelation 
in the enchanted forest. Majestic Sydney Blue Gums and smooth, salmon-
trunked Angophoras surrounded the clearing made on the sandstone for our 
little mixed farm, which was plucked free of trees by my father’s sweat just as 
the chickens we raised and sold on our little roadside stall were plucked free of 
feathers by my mother’s night-time labours. My mother’s weary work left me 
an unusual degree of freedom to enter the beckoning forest. I became a forest 
wanderer almost as soon as I could walk, venturing far enough unreproved 
to gain familiarity with the forest fringing our clearing and some of its more 
arresting inhabitants. These included snakes, goannas, and a rich variety of 
ferocious bull-ants.
I was tutored at home and formally registered, like so many bush children 
of the time, in Correspondence School. But the bush was my real school. It 
supplied most of my friends, adventures and conversations, often inspired by 
those of my favourite fictional character, the fearless and philosophical Alice. 
My wonderland included delightful, sandy wildflower country interspersed 
with bold, mysterious rock formations which I could explore at will, with no 
one to ridicule or restrain excesses of conversational familiarity with the other 
inhabitants. My mother’s striking common names for the flowers—Grandfather’s 
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Whiskers, Spiderflower, Bottlebrush, Belrose—were supplanted later by colder 
scientific terms whose abstract distance could never break that bond of our 
early familiarity.
But there was a worm in my apple, a fault in my Eden. It was the fault of 
devaluation of what is around you, of the everyday, the substance of life, in 
favour of a distant abstract ideal or heaven which leaves everything drained of 
light, life and beauty. It makes the colours duller and destroys one’s receptivity 
to beauty. Australia with its cultural cringe has, like other settler colonies 
suffered badly from this syndrome. Despite the wildflower glory, I puzzled 
about whether the landscape I experienced daily conformed to proper ideals of 
beauty. It didn’t look at all like the pictures my aunties had on their walls, the 
idealised mountains, parks and formal gardens of the distant place that I still 
heard spoken of as ‘home’. Australians of those times complained often about 
the endless grey bush and its inexhaustible dullness and monotony, still often 
looking to a half-remembered Europe for visions of beauty. My third generation 
parents had gone part-way towards breaking with these colonial values, and 
I was taught to enjoy and admire the bush, and not to pick the wildflowers 
or harm the creatures. Yet some unconscious baggage from my cultural milieu 
remained an obstacle to full and public affirmation of my surroundings.
Yet mostly the sensuous richness of the forest world around me was an overwhelming 
joy, immediate and undeniable, that won out against this thief of the moment’s joy. 
In summer the forest unfolded its ecstasy of creamy, honey-scented myrtle blossom, 
dwarf apple, bloodwood and Kunzea, to delight the nose and drive the beetles wild. 
The nectar-filled Banksia candles were there for the honeyeaters each autumn, 
burning orange brilliant as the sun foretold winter sunsets. From August onwards, 
white Tick Bush, pink Boronias and Waxflowers, red Grevilleas and the well-timed 
Christmas Bells were a feast for the eye, each with its retinue of birds and insects 
thirsting for a piece of the action. This was a reproduction-centred world, the work it 
seemed, of an imagination of great fertility entirely uninhibited by any taboos about 
cross-species sex.
Like Alice who goes sailing, dreaming among the rushes, among the pink, white 
and blue waterlilies which she picks, I lived a little girl’s dream of a world where 
even the stones might speak, where animals and plants spoke and were all active 
forces in life. This world was a lover. Nature was full of presences, presences 
such as the lyre bird, a bird lover calling through the forest, with his rivals 
calling up the powers of the forest. And so somehow during these childhood 
wanderings I learnt to think of the world like this, as a lover, and I acquired 
an unquenchable thirst for life, for the wisdom of the land. An enriching 
perspective but perhaps incautious. Perhaps this background explains in part 
why I met the crocodile like a child who has just become aware of the evil in 
the world, a sharply demonic experience of some great wrong done to another. 
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In earlier puritan times, nature was pushed away and seen as an evil animal realm 
in which civilised rules and practices were abandoned in favour of wholesale 
licence. Nature from this perspective was the wild, threatening female other 
who must be brought under control and harnessed in the garden. The garden 
was depicted, by this suspicious, civilising and crusading culture, as the 
realm of collaborators and domesticated things around the house. It existed in 
opposition to the realm of the wild.
This is an outlook that decides that, rather than deal with the dangerous things 
out there that could cause you a moment’s inconvenience or even something as 
terrifying as a mosquito bite, it is preferable to stay within the comfort zone 
and forget about the rest. The result is that we are now faced with answering 
the question of what our relationship with the wild must be. Can there really be 
such a thing as the old regime, the old order of the world with its evolutionary 
time? Surely there is a real point in solidarity with that world, that vivid world 
of sharp colours, of quickening pulse, that comes into focus again when you 
know that the next moments and your decisions in those next few moments will 
decide your life or death. That is something that sends you spinning through the 
tunnel at a frightening speed to arrive with a very big bump, a terrible bump, 
in the parallel universe. For in the death moment we are reclaimed once again 
by the sphere of nature, of death as nature, and especially so when we die by a 
predator of nature—as do the other beings we have said are not of our sphere. 
But we can only comprehend all this through our cultural understandings. 
Culture, therefore, has a very big and responsible role to play.
First, we should certainly stop expecting an old man with a white beard to 
hold our hand and guarantee us a world where we all get just what we deserve. 
Equally we need to stop telling elaborate and patently ridiculous stories about 
the problem of evil and how it was sent to test us and save the day, or take us 
away into a better world somewhere else that will look after us and soothe our 
every want and which will make up for all the injustices of this one. These ideas 
bear no resemblance to the actual ecological world we live in. It is time we faced 
up to the fact that we’re here and we must try to tell a story that brings the two 
worlds into some greater congruence and balance.
What sort of story would we have to tell to create a crocodile narrative as a 
narrative of justice? That is the key question—what sort of story would you 
have to tell to bring the two worlds together? To be able to see into each from 
the other one, not to experience that alarming doubleness of the duck-rabbit—
now we can see this way, but not that. Rather than a sort of blindness we need 
to develop a double vision. 
The need to explain my own lack of consciousness of the two worlds led me 
to re-examine the denial of materiality or corporeality in Western culture. My 
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reaction to the crocodile showed me I was not fully liberated from the influence 
of the ideology common to white Western inhabitants of ‘culture’. Although 
humankind is known to have evolved from the same genetic stock as all other 
primates and to be closely related to all living things we endlessly engage in 
activities and beliefs that seem to minimise our connections to other animals. 
My dramatic entry into the Heraclitean universe opened my eyes and made me 
acutely aware that we are not in fact different from other animals but material 
beings vulnerable to death and decay. By keeping ourselves separate from, 
and ignorant of, this other universe, we maintain a distinction that provides 
protection from deeply rooted anxieties about mortality and our supposedly 
superior human status. By imagining that we live solely within culture we 
can allow ourselves to think that our lives count more than the lives of other 
physical beings. At base, it is our bodies that we find a particular problem 
because, unlike our minds, they remind us of our animal limitations.
So what sort of story would enable us to connect the two universes, to interweave 
them at the level of personal and immediate life as well as social life? It seems to me 
that the ingrained mind/body dualism in Western culture prevents us from knowing 
the story of our ecological embeddedness in any way except as it were distantly 
and at some great remove, in the abstract manner of narrative science or in the same 
kind of way I discover facts about the state of outer space or Uranus. Normally it 
seems as if our culture is so constructed that we live in one of these worlds and just 
know about the other via this removed, abstract kind of knowledge or through an 
occasional visit to the summer wonderland aspect of nature.
In other words, we live our lives in a human-made world of culture and we 
define ourselves in terms of human justice. We forget that our lives of culture 
grew out of the older world that has somehow now floated clear from it—or 
so it thinks—except that occasionally there are line breaks, interruptions to 
transmissions, and recently some of the system alarms have been going off at 
regular intervals. But we have long ago stopped paying much attention to the 
dials that tell us what is going on in the ‘other’ system because we are engaged 
in a competitive game played among a large human population, a scramble for 
survival in a gigantic machine that runs on the rationality of maximising and 
concentrating property formation. 
So we are not looking in that direction, although occasionally another breakdown 
forces itself on our attention and causes us to cast a glance back at the dials. It 
is especially at the point of death and food that the two systems converge on 
a personal level. So there is an obvious need for a guiding narrative, or better, 
a set of narratives which reposition us personally in nature. These must also 
operate at the economic level. They cannot be simply stories of ‘visiting’ the 
other domain, of being a summer good-time girl holidaying briefly in nature 
before returning to the ‘proper’ sphere of culture.
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We are in desperate need of stories that create much greater transparency of 
these relationships in our day-to-day lives. We must once again become a culture 
of stories—stories that link our lives with the Great Life which some call Gaia, 
but all should call by names of their own devising. This is the real meaning of 
ecological literacy, to have stories that speak of the culture/nature boundary and 
of where the two cultures meet. Instead we have one discourse about the domain 
of culture (us) and another discourse, formulated in an especially detached and 
distant way, about the domain of nature (them). Our conviction that ‘we’ live in 
culture and ‘they’ live in nature is so strong that all that is left is a passionate 
story about consciousness, history and freedom—about us—and another story 
about fiercely uninvolved causation and clockwork—a story about them.
The dualistic Christian/Western framework of alienation and material denial has 
erased our connecting narratives at a number of key meeting points. I am here 
concerned specifically with those of food and death but there are others that 
also create dead areas or voids, places of insensitivity where we have no contact 
structures and no useful guiding stories. 
The Western dualistic construction which proclaims separate and never meeting 
realms continues to hinder these crucial constructions and connections. It allows 
us to deny grief and mourning for the suffering that animals such as wombats 
endure in severe drought conditions. I cannot ignore the grief I feel for animals 
that I have picked up injured or dying—the glimpse of their perfection and the 
knowledge that they are dying—the robin thrown onto the ground at my feet 
whose yellow and grey perfection I could only gasp at with grief and contrition 
as it died slowly in my cupped hands. Or there was the fairy penguin I found 
washed ashore on a Tasmanian beach, dead from starvation due to waves of 
disease spread throughout the local pilchard population (a main food source 
for fairy penguins) by foreign pilchards imported to provide food for farmed 
salmon. We know that such animals are individuals who often value and know 
themselves as such and it is important that we should do the same. 
The polarity between nature and culture is of the type Marilyn Frye discusses 
in terms of the feminist project. She argues that it is necessary to move beyond a 
concept of woman as ‘deficient male’ to the idea of woman as ‘positively-other-
than’. What is at stake here is whether current, environmental categories are 
interpreted as inclusive instead of overlapping. 
We cannot ignore the fact that all our food is souls. In my opinion, it is misguided to 
follow the example of vegetarian imperialists who aim to eliminate any ensouled food 
by insisting that only non-ensouled food can be eaten. This placing of ourselves outside 
the food chain and the exchange of reciprocity in food and death and then trying 
to impose this on other cultures is a dangerous denial. Such alienated vegetarianism 
has a direct relationship with the dualism of Descartes and the Cartesian separation 
of moral orders. It equates culture with consciousness and nature with clockwork 
mechanisms devoid of feeling and governed solely by instinct. 
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It is this attitude that allows us to treat our food so badly. The factory farmed 
animal has already been desouled in advance and constructed as future food. 
The animal becomes just the living end of the production line; it’s just meat, 
mere denigrated, lowly matter. We cannot admit we are eating souls. How can 
our food be sacred in the way described by Gary Snyder at the start of this 
chapter if we view ourselves and it through these lenses? I believe vegetarianism 
in this alienated form is also the product of this mindset. 
Despite the main message of ecology that we live in both worlds there remains 
a great deal of conflict around these issues among environmentalists. I believe 
this is because we have eliminated the stories that connect the two realms due 
to our alienated conceptions of the key events in human life where the culture/
nature stories come together. 
What is holding us up from resisting this piece of imperialism is the insistence on 
not construing the ecological sphere as a sphere of justice. We need to employ a 
richer understanding of ethics that gives an important place to emotionality and 
particularity. Jim Cheney has indicated ways in which this might be developed by 
arguing for stories in which the use of metaphor is an apt vehicle for introducing 
new conceptions of theory and the self, or knowledge and the knower. Justice 
in the ecological sphere has tough rules that we have shown great resistance to 
accepting. It consists of a very radical egalitarian framework in which you have 
your little piece of life force for just so long as it’s not wanted by another. These 
are the Heraclitean rules where your body does not belong to you. There is no 
delineation of an individual justice framework. However, from the standpoint of a 
human justice system that doesn’t mean we must ourselves treat the whole thing, 
the more-than-human world in the same way. We are not solely nature and quite 
a lot of localised parts of ‘nature’ work in accordance with a sense of individual 
value. It is a fallacy to assume that we cannot mix realms. What is crucial is to do 
so in non-appropriative ways. It is possible to make different rules that we will 
care about and consider individuals where it is appropriate. 
We know for example, that crocodiles value individuals in ways that are similar 
to our own story. There is no reason why we cannot adopt their own standards 
as a mark of respect for this localised community and for the larger system that 
allows it to thrive. The alienated vegetarian, I believe, does not admit more 
than one standard and construes the animal predator as simply outside ethics 
rather than an operator in a different ethical framework. To see the predator 
as outside ethics requires positioning them as ethical non-actors—like a child 
or disadvantaged human categories we do not treat well. If they are not so 
positioned, they must be seen in an even worse light as an evil character.
***






4. A wombat wake: In memoriam Birubi
My wombat Birubi died after a brief illness sometime around Wednesday 18 
August 1999. I miss Birubi greatly and continue to catch his beloved form (or 
‘ghost’) out of the corner of my eye, a half-seen image flitting around the corner 
of a cupboard or across the veranda. Long after his death, my eyes continued to 
search out his shape on the moonlit grass. He was part of my life for so long—
over twelve years—that I found it hard to believe he would no longer wait for 
me or greet me, that he was finally gone. 
We had a wake for him a few days later. The idea of the wake was to focus on 
his life rather than his death, to honour presence rather than mourn absence, 
and to celebrate and express gratitude for Birubi’s life and for wombat life more 
generally. We had a small ceremony for him, and told many Birubi stories and 
wombat stories generally. Many of the people who helped care for Birubi over 
the years when I was working overseas or in distant parts of Australia were 
present with their own experiences and thoughts to contribute. The wake was 
far from being a dismal occasion. Birubi had a full and whole wombat life and 
died what seemed to be a dignified and peaceful wombat death. He came to the 
house for sanctuary in his final months and often rested or slept in front of the 
fire, but returned to his burrow, snug pouch of mother earth, in his last hours. 
Birubi came to me from the wildlife rescue service as a malnourished and very 
sick orphan. His mother had probably died of the mange, a disease introduced 
by Europeans with their dogs that brings so many wombats to an early and 
tormented death. Since my own human son had recently died, Birubi and I 
bonded strongly. Birubi (the name, meaning I believe ‘the drum’, was given 
him by his first carers in the rescue service) was about a year old, furred but 
still suckling, when he took up residence with me. He seemed to have suffered 
greatly from his mother’s death and was desperate for care. 
Birubi had received from his wombat mother a good quality wombat education; 
she had taught him to defecate outside the burrow (or its equivalent, my house), 
and the rudiments of survival in the bush. Within a day of arriving he learnt 
to open the sliding glass doors of the house and could go outside into the bush 
whenever he wished (which was often). His ability to control the access between 
his world and mine enabled him to be active in choosing and structuring the 
balance between us, to enter my world while still fully retaining his wombatness. 
He was generally wary of humans until he had clearly established their identity, 
and would exit the house if it was too noisy or unsettling.
Birubi grew to belong to both the world of the house and that of the forest, 
supposedly exclusive and mutually oppositional. He needed a lot of medical 
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treatment and supplementary feeding for the first year, so he became accustomed 
to the house and knew something of its comforts. But from the beginning he 
was based primarily out of doors in various holes he selected or renovated, and 
always preferred that world. Once established in his own nearby burrows in 
the forest, he came to the house on a visiting basis on the average for an hour 
or so most evenings for personal, moral and material support. (At his behest I 
supplemented his grazing with carrots and rolled oats, which corresponded to 
the roots and seeds sections of the wombat diet). In the first year he would spend 
part of the night out of doors, and part in my bed with me. He initiated all these 
high contact arrangements, and would not easily be turned aside from them, 
(although since wombats are nocturnal, they often led to me getting inadequate 
sleep). Sometimes I had to exclude him by locking the doors if he became too 
demanding of my time or arrived at very unreasonable hours. 
To sleep next to me was his ardent desire, but it presented some difficulties. It 
was wise to get the leeches and ticks off him before letting him into the bed if 
you wanted a comfortable rest. After I had got into bed, he would come over 
and start biting its edge furiously until I gave him a hand up. Once in bed, he 
would usually lie down next to me on his side and drop off like a light. I can 
attest that during sleep he often ground his teeth and also vocalised in ways 
that suggested the imaginary encounters of dreaming. Usually he would wake 
up again about two hours later and go outside to graze, (and of course I was then 
obliged to get up to close the door he left open in case dangerous or unsuitable 
animals entered). 
Since he was a skilful door and cupboard opener, Birubi had to be locked out of 
the house when there was nobody else there. There are many stories about what 
happened when Birubi got into the house without supervision. He was very 
skilful with his mouth, which he used for manipulation and encounter, and 
enjoyed opening and exploring food packages and biting hard furniture and 
soft stuffed things. His tastes are commemorated around my house on cushions, 
chairs, stools, hassocks and cupboard doors. 
Birubi was a vigorous player of various wombat chasing and hiding games he 
began to teach me as soon as he recovered his strength. These games seemed to 
me (there is of course much uncertainty here) to roll together features of play, 
love and war. He played very rough by human standards, but I do not think 
that he really intended to hurt—it’s probably just that wombats are tougher, 
especially around the ankles, his favourite nipping point when he caught you. 
He was a skilful game player who expected to win, would sulk if he did not, and 
had learnt the efficacy of feinting. When young, Birubi would have been happy 
I think to play games all day, but fortunately this desire waned a bit as he grew 
older. Even as an older wombat, though, he showed that he liked a game and 
had a sense of humour.
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I was always conscious of a dimension of mystery in my knowledge of Birubi’s 
mind. The sense of bridging a great gulf of difference was part of the magic of 
the relationship. I think it was the centrality of the mother–child relationship 
to both our species and what was shared in its framework of ethics and 
expectations that made possible intimate contact with a creature so very 
different. This kind of relationship is necessarily cast in communicative terms 
that disrupt the severely restricted vocabulary for describing animal behaviour 
and interaction allowed by reductionist science and its objectivist ideals of non-
relationship or its near approximation, subject–object relationship. Although 
you could entertain a large range of hypotheses about the meaning, complexity 
and specificity of his responses, that relationship, plus your knowledge of 
context and past interactions, usually suggested some credible and reasonably 
lucid tale about the other’s mental processes and attitudes that enabled you to 
continue relating as co-actors in a partially shared narrative of the world. There 
were times, especially when he was an adolescent testing out his power, when I 
felt my relationship with him was balanced on a knife edge, but as he matured 
it took on a less precarious form. 
Birubi, like other wombats and unlike dogs, was a resilient and determined 
animal who could not be shaped to human will. He did not recognise human 
superiority or pretensions to own the world and had a strong sense of his 
own independent selfhood, his own equal interests and entitlements. This 
stubbornness and sense of equality is the feature that has brought the wombat 
so strongly into conflict with the farmer, but to me it was wonderful. It meant 
that you were dealing with a real other; that contact had to be on his terms and 
not just on yours. Discipline, punishment and training to accept human will, 
of the sort we apply to dogs, were out of the question; not only would they be 
totally ineffective, but they would jeopardise the entire basis of relationship. 
Once you had recognised that he would not give way to you, you were 
motivated to find creative ways to work around conflict or to give way yourself. 
A corollary of his independence was his anger when thwarted. Birubi tended 
to get quite angry if shut out of the house or the veggie patch, would snort 
in a loud disgusted tone and sometimes retaliate destructively, for example 
by chewing the doormat or digging a big hole in front of the garden gate. As 
primarily a grass eater, he rarely did much harm in the veggie garden though 
(except for digging up the carrots). He did not usually hold a grudge for long, 
although there were a few occasions when he was still angry with me the next 
day for something I had done the day before. 
Wombats, being burrow dwellers, like a few home comforts. Birubi liked to 
sit (and in his latter days especially sleep) right in front of the wood stove in 
midwinter. He was fascinated by the fire and used to poke his nose right up 
against the hot glass until it hurt (something he never learnt not to do). He was 
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very partial to a hot bum rub, and loved to stand in front of the stove rubbing 
his rear end against the warm corner. Birubi’s sexual expression began while 
he was still quite young and only subsided in the last few years of his life. He 
was erotically aroused by cushions, and would attempt to copulate with them 
after a fifteen-minute foreplay period of savage biting. He was often absent for 
considerable periods, especially in the warmer months, and several times I came 
across him miles away. I speculate that he may have been away visiting wombat 
lovers. If so I hope he treated them better than he did the cushions. 
Because wombats are solitary and do not form family groups, I know little of 
Birubi’s relationships with other wombats, with the exception of his male rival 
Clancy. Clancy lived about two kilometres away but would often come over for 
a feed and a fight. He was openly envious of Birubi’s privileges in relation to 
humans and wanted them for himself (and himself alone). Birubi had to face up 
to Clancy’s aggression when he was still a juvenile, and was valiant in the face 
of Clancy’s superior age, size and fighting skills. Nevertheless when I heard 
the sounds of warfare between Clancy and Birubi (a high pitched, harsh call), 
I would run out and try to separate the combatants and bring peace and light, 
but was sometimes unable to prevent the infliction of some nasty wounds, 
mainly to Birubi. 
The strife between Birubi and Clancy placed me in a painful conflict between 
wombat ethical systems and human ones. Should I give my favour to the stronger, 
as Clancy clearly hoped, or use my superior strength to help and sustain the 
‘wombat son’ I was so attached to? I found this a difficult moral dilemma, since 
Clancy was the indigenous occupant, but in the end resolved it in the same way 
as most human mothers, trying to honour commitment to protect the one near 
and dear to me while avoiding injustice towards his enemy. 
Birubi was wily, wary and tough, but the forest is a dangerous place. Sometimes 
Birubi’s fear of what lay outside the door was palpable. I could not protect him, 
and every time he left the house I knew that he might be badly injured or that I 
might never see him again. So the relationship was painful as well as joyful, just 
as it is for the many human mothers who are powerless to prevent harm to the 
children they love. Birubi was in great fear of dogs, the privileged gatekeeper 
animals who are allowed and even encouraged to terrorise the others, and he 
would often avoid my company, sometimes for a week or so, if I had been to 
lunch at the house of someone who owned a dog. (I think if people realised what 
terror and danger they cause to sensitive wild animals like Birubi and those who 
care about them they would be much more careful about owning and restraining 
dogs.) This is an example of the great depth of temporal understanding available 
to those who possess a well-developed olfactory form of knowledge.
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Birubi was an intelligent herbivore, a vegetarian, I believe, in the full sense, 
both through his biological inheritance and through his convictions. As a non-
meat-eater myself, I had a rare opportunity to observe his opinions on meat 
eating when a friend came to stay bringing with them a dog they fed normally 
on fresh mutton on the bone. I watched Birubi carefully inspecting and sniffing 
the site where the dog ate its flesh meals and examining a partly consumed 
bone. He gave every sign of horror, and came to the house only infrequently and 
with the greatest reluctance while the dog and the meat smell remained around. 
On another occasion, when I had fresh minced meat on my hands from feeding 
an injured juvenile magpie, he backed away from me with obvious revulsion 
and did not return until several days later when the odour was gone. 
Reduced sexual expression was one of a number of signs of aging in Birubi’s 
last few years, which included the greying of his beautiful soft coat and the 
general reduction in his energy and vigour as indicated by his lessened interest 
in games and play. At age 13 he was one of the oldest wombats the wildcare 
people had heard of. I put this down mainly to my five kilometre distance from 
the nearest road, the automobile being such a major cause of wombat carnage. 
Wombats have been known to live to 25 years in captivity, and if Birubi aged 
prematurely in these terms it could reflect an unknown disease process or the 
extreme rigours of the early period of his life.
I feel it was an incredible privilege to be allowed to know a free, wary and 
basically wild animal so intimately and richly. Our relationship cut across the 
usual boundary between the wild and domestic, the forest and the house, 
the non-human and the human, nature and culture. The ‘culture’ world is 
understood to be a humanised world in which identities are assimilated to the 
human and conformed to human will, interests and standards. In this world the 
‘good dog’ is part of human culture, trained to accept human dominance and 
human terms, (terms made possible by the canine social system to be sure but 
still set by humans), rather than to interact as an equal party bringing their own 
independent terms. On the other side, the ‘nature’ world is one we in the West 
tend now to see mainly through the instrumental and reductionist framework 
of ‘detached’ science that tries to delegitimate the rich personal knowledge of 
highly developed individual caring relationships. 
It is no coincidence that the more revolutionary forms of ethology pioneered 
by women like Jane Goodall have given us new insights precisely because 
they have broken these false choices down. Between them, the ‘nature’ and 
‘culture’ frameworks rule out the possibility of deep personal contact with 
animals except on our terms. Birubi was a ‘wild familiar’ who established his 
own terms for contact and friendship. It was an enormous thrill to explore forms 
of contact that transgressed the nature/culture boundary, so constitutive of our 
civilisation. It was enchanting, the enchantment of childhood imagination and 
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story, to walk side by side with Birubi along a forest track, to look up from my 
desk to find a forest-dwelling wombat sitting in my armchair by the fire. You 
had the courage and freedom to cross the boundary, Birubi. But do we? 
Ave atque vale, Birubi. We will remember you. 
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5. ‘Babe’: The tale of the speaking meat 
Part I
“You look a little shy: let me introduce you to that leg of mutton,” said the 
Red Queen. “Alice — Mutton: Mutton — Alice.”
The leg of mutton got up in the dish and made a little bow to Alice, and 
Alice returned the bow, not knowing whether to be frightened or amused. 
“May I give you a slice?” she said, taking up the knife and fork, and looking 
from one Queen to the other.
“Certainly not,” the Red Queen said, very decidedly: “it isn’t etiquette to 
cut anyone you’ve been introduced to. Remove the joint!” 
Alice through the looking glass, pp. 132–133. 
The unprejudiced heart
I would like somebody somewhere to endow an annual prize for a work of art 
which takes a group of the most oppressed subjects and makes an effective 
and transformative representation of their situation. The work would make its 
audience care about what happens to those oppressed subjects and to understand 
something of the audience’s own role in maintaining their oppression. It would 
foster recognition of the subjectivity and creativity of the oppressed group 
and consciousness of the need for redistribution of respect and of cultural and 
material goods. Above all, it would help to support and protect them. If these 
are subjects who are conventionally seen as radically excluded, for example 
as beyond the possibility of communication or as embodied in ways which 
occasion aversion or anxiety, the prize work should attempt to disrupt those 
violence-prone perceptions. 
One of my nominations for such a prize would be the film Babe. Before seeing 
the film, I would have doubted that it was possible to make a highly successful 
film for mass audiences that could do those things for one of the most oppressed 
subjects in our society, the meat pig. One feature that made this achievement 
possible was that the film successfully disrupted the adult/child boundary and 
created space for adults to share certain kinds of openness to and sympathy for 
animals permitted to children but normally out of bounds for mature adults. 
This is one of the devices which enables the film, like Dick King-Smith’s prize-
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winning book The Sheep–Pig on which it is based,1 to succeed to a remarkable 
degree in opening for the pig the ‘unprejudiced heart’ invoked in the narrator’s 
opening sentence. It is not just the film’s problematisation of the concept of 
meat that makes this film philosophically interesting; it also poses ethical and 
political questions, analogous to some of those arising in post-colonial theory, 
about the distinction between meat and non-meat animals and about the role of 
the human contract with those special more privileged ‘pet’ animals who can 
never be ‘meat’.
Because the main theme of Babe turns around the refusal of communicative 
status to animals, the film is of considerable interest for philosophical accounts 
of human–animal relations. The story provides a rich context for thinking 
about this communicative status, posing questions about the inadequacy 
of narrow rationalist accounts of communication, about representations of 
animal communication and the charge of anthropomorphism, and about 
the contradictions and paradoxes disclosed when we recognise the meat as a 
communicative subject. Babe repeatedly problematises the kind of prejudice 
that relegates the other to a sphere of radical otherness marked by rational 
deficiency, mechanistic reduction and exclusion from communicative status. 
The pig Babe disrupts the assumption that because he is a meat animal, he is ‘too 
stupid to understand’; the story problematises the sheep–dog Fly’s dismissal of 
sheep-talk as ‘just so much rubbish, to which she never paid any attention’. The 
refusal of communicative status to animals is a crucial, formative arena where 
closure and exclusion strategies which affect many humans are developed and 
perfected. Babe thus provides many insights into closure strategies as they 
affect both humans and non-humans. 
Babe also offers a recognition of communicative virtues and characteristics as 
central to both human and non-human forms of life, and offers a vision of the 
emergence of communicative forms of relationship as victorious alternatives to 
forms based on violence, domination and terror. The film does not suggest any 
exploration of the ethical and political ambiguities of communicative forms, 
which are potentially rather more compatible with oppression than it suggests, 
and are implicated in the replacement of repressive patriarchal models by 
hegemonic models based on the master subject, as in certain forms of liberal 
democratic politics for example. But as Dryzek and Plumwood2 have argued, 
communicative models of relationships with nature and animals seem likely to 
offer us a better chance of survival in the difficult times ahead than dominant 
mechanistic models which promote insensitivity to the others’ agency and 
denial of our dependency on them. Babe crystallises in a useful way a clash of 
models that is critical for our times. 
1 Dick King-Smith, The sheep–pig, Harmondsworth Middlesex, Puffin Books, 1983. 
2 John Dryzek, Discursive democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990 and Val Plumwood, 
Feminism and the mastery of nature, London, Routledge, 1993.
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My initial reason for going to the movie however had much more to do with 
being homesick—I was away from Australia for a long period and the film had 
been shot in a shire near my home. I hoped to hear again the sounds of the 
bush—those small but intensely evocative background calls—especially the 
local birds and frogs which appear in the background on most soundtracks—
that creep up on you unawares to create powerful longings for a much-loved 
place. But when I took my seat in the darkened cinema, something else made 
me cry too, with sorrow and shame for my own complicity in the dominant 
cultural tradition of rational human mastery over animals and nature—as 
well as everything else considered beneath the master realm of reason. These 
were the powerful opening scenes of Babe showing the terrible cruelty of the 
intensive pig farms in which the pig Babe, treated as living meat, is introduced 
to us as narrative subject. 
These visions of hell took on special power and poignancy for me because at 
the time I saw the film I was living in the second highest US state for intensive 
hog production. The state of North Carolina was a place where one rarely saw 
farm animals out in the open and many of the rivers and estuaries were seriously 
degraded or under assault from the toxic run-off generated by the intensive 
factory farms. Many of the huge pig ‘slaughter facilities’ in the US employ 
largely prison labour. The work of those who labour on the killing floor of these 
massive facilities slaughtering up to 15,000 pigs a day is so terrible and poorly 
paid that only the slave-like workforce of the carceral system, or those coerced 
by other forms of desperation such as indentured immigrants, are available as 
workers. The concentration camps too employed some categories of prisoners 
to organise, imprison and execute others. The treatment of the pigs and that of 
the prisoners has much in common; in both cases, the intense segregation of the 
gulag ensures that the middle class rarely has to confront the hidden connection 
between its ugly and violent reality and their own comfortable and tidy lives. 
The speech of both pigs and prisoners is erased or delegitimated, and both are 
reduced to living meat. As C. Stone Brown argues, ‘African Americans are the 
flesh that maintains a profitable “prison industry”’.3 As disciplinary democracy 
normalises massive incarceration, and more of us become either prisoners or 
keepers, the fate of non-human and human prisoners increasingly converges. 
The nightmarish opening scenes of Babe showed an ugly gulag reality that was all 
around but which was banished from thought and sight, and generally treated, 
even by the animal liberation movement, as too well established for serious 
contest. In these circumstances, who could avoid being immediately caught 
up in the little pig’s plight, or avoid comparing the misery of the incarcerated 
animals with the consumptive pleasures of the over-privileged humans the next 
shots cut to? The filmic technique at this point had us crossing that crucial 
3 C. Stone Brown, ‘Prison guards fund governor for presidential race’, Z Magazine, Sept/October 1995. 
The Eye of the Crocodile 
58
animal/human subject boundary with dizzying speed, so fast that our usual 
distancing defences did not have time to cut in and tell us that these subjects 
are not at all comparable, that humans count and pigs don’t. Who could avoid 
comparing the pigs’ misery with the humans’ pleasure, or avoid thoughts of 
concentration camps and gas chambers as the pig mothers were torn from their 
children and cattle-prodded into that terrible night journey from which there 
was no return? 
The answer, of course, to this question is: ‘quite a lot of people’. Many people 
didn’t see animals or animal liberation as the topic of the film, and some 
reviewers seemed to think it was all about how you could cross gender and 
class boundaries and burst categories to make yourself anything you wanted 
to be, even a sheep–pig, if you had enough determination and willpower—a 
sophisticated postmodern–neoliberal Animal Farm allegory about personal 
responsibility, individual merit rewarded, and trying harder. Babe does have 
valid things to say to a human audience about not staying in the boxes convention 
puts you into, but the message here is also relevant to breaking down hierarchies 
of considerability which serve to confine non-humans. And the inability to see 
how animals themselves could be a serious topic for such a film is an indicator 
of their assigned status as beneath subjectivity and seriousness, both effective 
defences against hearing the story of the speaking meat that Babe articulates. 
The pig Babe speaks from the most delegitimated subject position possible in 
our society, that of the meat, and we have developed strategies for blocking out 
and not hearing the speech of those in that position. We could not continue the 
sorts of meat practices the pig–human gulag system is based upon without these 
kinds of strategies. One of the great strengths of the film is that it invites us to 
challenge some of these paradoxes, blocks and erasures. 
The paradox of the speaking meat 
In the opening scenes of the factory farm we are introduced to the piglet Babe 
as the film’s main narrative subject (marked by the subject’s theme on the 
soundtrack, among other marks of subjecthood). We open with a shot showing 
real piglets waking in expressive communication, and then see one of these meat-
subjects expressing his/her4 sorrow at the loss of his mother, and his fear as he 
is seized by strangers and carried away to be raffled. As his mother is prodded 
into the truck, Babe utters his grief so fleetingly and naturally that we hardly 
notice that our usual assumptions have been turned on their heads. The meat 
animal is being presented to us as an expressive, narrative subject—the meat 
is speaking. There are several disruptions here. What is disrupted immediately 
4 I have assumed the masculine pronoun here for Babe because this is used in King-Smith 1983, but the film 
is more ambiguous on this point. 
5. ‘Babe’: The tale of the speaking meat 
59
is the Cartesian model of the machine–animal, the dominant model which 
enables the ontological presence, mind-like and communicative characteristics 
of animals to be so utterly denied in the factory farm, where their entire lives 
are defined and distorted by the function of serving human appetite. There 
is paradox in the concept of speaking meat Babe confronts us with, precisely 
because the concept of meat totally erases that speaking position; there is no 
possibility of encountering the meat as expressive, narrative subject.
An inquiry into the concept of meat provides a useful route into understanding 
how ‘taxonomy’ connects ontology with ethics—how certain strategies of 
representation normalise oppression by narrowing ethically relevant perception, 
erasing key ethical dimensions of situations, and sometimes even making the 
Other complicit in their own oppression through internalising oppressive forms 
of identity. As Carol Adams has argued, the concept of meat justifies oppression 
by hiding responsibility for death and the causal connection between the 
production of meat and the animal’s death.5 The backgrounding, erasure or 
denial of these connections in the abstractly quantitative and commodified 
concept of meat Adams terms ‘absent referent’. ‘Absent referent’ involves a 
complex process of splitting that renders unavailable not only the act of killing 
which makes meat available as a commodity, but any recognition of connection 
between the meat and those who consume it. To achieve this the concept of meat 
must simultaneously establish several profound splits or radical exclusions, 
between process–product, mind–body, and us–them. The first of these involves 
a radical dissociation which denies the connection between the processes set in 
motion by our intentions and the end product of commodified, quantitatively 
specifiable flesh. The second radically dissociates the subjectivity which sets 
these processes in motion from that of its victim, denying their kinship as 
socially connected, purposive and communicative beings, and presenting the 
victim reductively as flesh. ‘You looks at us,’ says King-Smith’s wise old sheep 
Ma; ‘and you sees lamb chops’. 
The third background assumption involved in modern industrial society’s 
concept of meat as commodity denies the possibility of human consumers 
themselves ever taking the form of meat, by a background assumption of a 
hierarchy of use and considerability which is linked to an alleged hierarchy of 
mental and communicative capacities between species, with humans of course 
at the top. These assumptions together make the ideas of ‘human meat’ almost 
as unthinkable a possibility as that of being introduced to the speaking meat. 
The concept of meat is a form of life6 (Wittgenstein 1954) in which taxonomy 
structures our moral vision via the ethical and epistemological possibilities it 
5 Carol Adams, The sexual politics of meat, New York, Continuum, 1994.
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, Oxford, Blackwell, 1954.
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discloses or denies.7 These sets of background denials enable the presentation of 
the other in the instrumental terms that Marilyn Frye has identified as belonging 
to the arrogant perspective in which viewers ‘organise everything seen with 
reference to themselves and their own interests’,8 in this case, in terms of a 
strong instrumental reductionism which identifies the other with what is only a 
part of their being, the part that is of use to us as flesh. Since we, in contrast, are 
identified as humans in terms which emphasise, rather than suppress or deny, 
our subjectivity, and which tend to background our bodily aspects of identity, 
beings identified as meat become radically Other: not only can we never be 
included in the category of meat ourselves, we can never be introduced to the 
meat. 
There is injustice in each of these modes of conception. There is injustice for 
a communicative and ethical being in being conceived systematically in ways 
that refuse recognition of this status and these characteristics. There is injustice 
for such a being in being conceived reductively as body, first because such 
conception singles its referent out for treatment as radically less than it is, and 
second because such an instrumental reductionism defines the Other in terms 
that assume the right of a ‘higher’ group to treat them as a resource for their ends. 
Animals so conceived are subject to both radical exclusion (as having a radically 
different nature discontinuous from that of the human meat consumer) and 
homogenisation—they ‘drown in the anonymous collectivity’ of the commodity 
form meat. The radical exclusion aspect of the meat concept denies kinship 
and generates a conceptual distance or boundary between humanity and its 
‘meat’ which blocks sympathy, reduces the risk of identification with those so 
designated, and silences them as communicative beings. The reductiveness of 
the meat concept permits a conceptual strategy designed to block recognition 
of these injustices, and its disruption in the concept of the speaking meat is one 
source of the flavour of paradox that lingers around that idea. 
But from the injustice of industrial society’s institution of meat as commodity, 
and the moral cowardice and evasion of the associated conceptual strategies of 
denial, we cannot conclude that there is no moral alternative to a universalised 
vegetarianism, that there are no other, less ethically problematic ways to resolve 
the tensions between conceiving non-humans both as communicative others 
and as food. In the complex biological exchange which sustains all our lives, we 
must all gain sustenance at the expense of the other, ‘the one living the other’s 
7 This is one reason why the task of obtaining an adequate environmental and non-anthrocentric ethic 
should not be equated with that of enunciating abstract principles of equal treatment and extending them 
to non-human others. Anthrocentric taxonomy will always defeat abstract moral principles, however 
comprehensive. 
8 Marilyn Frye, The politics of reality, New York, The Crossing Press, p. 67.
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death, and dying the other’s life’, in the words of Heraclitus. Shagbark Hickory 
outlines an alternative, non-reductive perspective on this exchange which does 
not refuse the moral complexities and perplexities involved:
For most or all American Indians food (plant as well as animal) is kin. Relationships 
to plants and animals as, on the one hand, food and, on the other hand, kin 
creates a tension which is dealt with mythically, ritually, and ceremonially, but 
which is never denied. It is this refusal to deny the dilemma in which we are 
implicated in this life, a refusal to take the way of bad faith, moral supremacy, or 
self-deception which constitutes a radical challenge to our relationships to our 
food. The American Indian view that considerability goes “all the way down” 
requires a response considerably more sophisticated than those we have seen in 
the West, which consist either in drawing lines of moral considerability in order 
to create an out-group, or in constructing hierarchies of considerability creating 
de facto out-groups in particular cases.9
Many forms of vegetarianism remain trapped in the Western strategies of denial 
and radical exclusion which create further out-groups, merely redrawing the 
boundary of otherness in a different place, at the border of animality rather than 
humanity. In contrast, the indigenous recognition that the central philosophical 
problem of human life is that ‘all our food is souls’ points towards non-reductive 
practices and understandings of food that resolve the moral failings of ‘bad faith, 
moral supremacy, [and] self-deception’ Shagbark Hickory finds implicit in the 
dominant Western meat concept. However, to the extent that these alternative 
understandings of food form part of a different ‘form of life’, in Wittgenstein’s 
sense,10 they are not readily available, either practically or conceptually, 
within the context of contemporary industrial life and its commodified food 
relationships. Conversely, the fact that vegetarianism may usually be the course 
which, in the context of such a commodity society, will best minimise our 
complicity in injustice towards others does nothing to support the Eurocentric 
conclusion that vegetarianism is a universal moral requirement for all people in 
all societies in all situations.11 
The paradox of the speaking meat is both the product of a particular social 
context, and a powerful symptom of some of the most indicative moral 
failings of that context. The Western solution to the moral dilemmas of food 
is the creation of a set of moral dualisms, involving a sharp discontinuity 
between those who deserve and those who are beyond ethical consideration. 
9 Shagbark Hickory, ‘Environmental etiquette/environmental practice: American Indian challenges to 
mainstream environmental ethics’, in Max Oelschlaeger ed. The company of others: Essays in celebration of 
Paul Shephard, Durango, Colorado, Kivaki Press, 1995. 
10 See Wittgenstein, 1954. 
11 Carol Adams, The sexual politics of meat and ‘Ecofeminism and the eating of animals’, Hypatia, Vol. 6 No. 
1, 1991, pp. 125–145.
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As we have seen, the speaking meat forces us to confront the way this moral 
dualism and discontinuity is based on reductionism, denial and silencing. Our 
civilisation’s orientation to the creation of moral dualisms may be one reason 
for its technological dominance, since it removes any constraints of respect 
which might otherwise hold back development, but it remains a major source of 
corruption of our ethical practices. The silencing solutions of moral dualism are 
always potentially capable of extension to selected groups of humans counted 
as lesser in their humanity, and we have seen this extension made many times 
in this century. This silencing possibility is always present, of course, in any 
human society, but it is greatly reinforced by the entrenchment of the dualist 
model in the basic case of food. 
The communicative model 
The overarching model which subsumes the commodity model of the animal 
and its specific modes of and motives for reduction is the Cartesian–mechanistic 
reduction of the non-human animal to its body, and the associated refusal 
to recognise non-human animals as akin to human ones in the possession of 
mind, intention and communication. Mary Midgley and Barbara Noske12 are 
two philosophers who have pointed out that the moral failings implicit in the 
modern, commodified concept of meat find their philosophical progenitor in 
Cartesian rationalism and the mechanistic model. The rationalist–mechanistic 
model of the animal is a key part of the relation between modernity and the 
non-human world, and its rationality is expressed both in reductive concepts 
like meat and in the practices of the factory farm. The mechanistic model erases 
the possibility of communication by denying mind-like properties to non-
humans; ideals of manipulation and instrumental rationality are at odds with 
communicative ideals and with the conception of the other as a communicative 
subject. Babe confronts us with the conflict between the mechanistic model of 
the factory farm, and the communicative model of human/animal relations the 
film ultimately vindicates. This alternative communicative model is located in 
the film in the romantically presented contrast space of the Hoggett’s family farm, 
where it struggles to emerge in the unconventional role tolerated for the former 
meat animal Babe and Babe’s communicative reformation of relationships with 
the sheep. But the farm itself is the site of conflict between the communicative 
and the Cartesian–reductive models, for it too contains the meat house and 
the animal regimes based on fear and force. The conflict between these models 
is also represented in the form of the conflict within the taciturn farmer and 
between him and the more conventional farm wife. 
12 Margaret Midgley, Animals and why they matter, London, Penguin, 1983 and Barbara Noske, Humans 
and other animals, London, Pluto Press, 1989.
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Nevertheless, animal liberationists have some justification for viewing the film’s 
major implicit contrast between the factory farm and the family farm with a 
sceptical eye. To say that the family farm setting of Babe is highly romanticised 
is an understatement. A cynic might say that the family farm parallels the family 
as the site of mystifying representations and idealisations. The contrasts of 
Babe hide the fact that the family farm model is compatible with, and normally 
involves, many oppressive animal husbandry practices; the destination of most 
of its animal food-producing units is ultimately the market, and all that has 
changed is the indoor setting. This would be, I think, to ignore the fact that 
moral differences of degree can be important; it would be like saying that there 
is no moral difference between being a worker on a production line and an 
inmate of a concentration camp, because both involve some degree of reduction 
and instrumentalisation. If there is a moral difference between the smaller scale 
farm and the animal gulag, however, there is also normally a lot more continuity 
than Babe makes visible. 
But to dismiss the implicit contrast of Babe in this way would be to miss 
the point that Babe also makes visible a new possibility—the possibility of 
replacing a dominant model of mechanistic relations by a communicative one 
which recognises the animal’s status as a communicative and moral being and 
revolutionises the moral basis of relationships with domestic animals. Whether 
this is compatible with farming as we know it remains an open question, but 
one the film deserves credit for raising. Babe leaves us in no doubt that meat is 
violence, and it posits a model of communication in opposition to that violence, 
and hence a new vision of relations to domestic animals. It does not explore 
the puzzles in that vision, leaving us with various paradoxes to chew on. But 
its communicative model presents a final vision of some power, including the 
triumph of the communicative skills and ethic Babe has acquired from the 
maternal wisdom of the sheep and various other proxy mothers. 
Babe’s status as a communicative subject has received so little attention in the 
monstrous regime of the gulag that he does not even have an individual name. 
But, as we soon discover when Babe is removed through the device of the 
raffle to the relatively enlightened world of the family farm, Babe’s status as a 
communicative subject still has many obstacles to overcome to gain recognition. 
Before arrival at the farm, Babe is initially just a ‘worthless little runt’, an object 
to be weighed, raffled off and eaten. In the idealised world of the Hoggett’s 
traditional farm, Babe’s communicative capacities are initially dimly, then more 
clearly, recognised by Farmer Hoggett. But they are not initially recognised by 
his wife, who addresses him as ‘you lucky little pork chop’ and looks forward to 
Babe’s transformation into the familiar commodity form of ‘two nice hams, two 
sides of bacon, pork chops, kidneys, liver, chitterling, trotters etc’. 
The Eye of the Crocodile 
64
The film version of Mrs. Hoggett, unlike the book version, is made to represent 
the most closed, convention and consumer-bound version of the human 
character.13 Although this elaboration of conflicting perspectives adds some 
richness to the film’s themes and characterisation, the linking of the conflict 
between the mechanistic and communicative perspectives in this way with 
gender introduces elements of androcentrism into the story, obscures the 
real connections between gender and consumerism and between gender and 
the mechanistic model,14 and generates contradictory messages about the 
affirmation of animality. This emerges in the film’s derogatory representation 
of the farm wife in animalistic terms and in the implicit demeaning of women’s 
understanding and tasks as consumeristic and materialistic, in contrast to the 
more ‘spiritual’ orientation of the farmer/ father. Babe’s subjectivity is recognised 
by several animal foster mothers, the dog Fly and the sheep Maa, who develop 
babe’s communicative and social abilities in the best maternal traditions. But 
although Babe’s unusual communicative abilities must ultimately derive from 
these various mothers (who must have included the original pig mother he 
missed so much), it is their completion and recognition by the father/farmer, 
represented as the ‘unprejudiced heart’, that are positioned in the movies as the 
key transformative elements for Babe and for the culture more generally.
The farmer is, for reasons the film leaves unexplored, open to certain possibilities 
of animal communication the others around him are closed to. By various 
communicative deeds, babe gradually earns the farmer’s recognition of his 
subjectivity, or so he believes, but is devastated by the final – incredible – 
discovery of his status as meat, revealed to him by the jealous cat. This apparent 
betrayal, (of almost biblical proportions) by the father, almost kills Babe, who 
like the duck Ferdie, cannot bear to live as only meat. At this point in the 
story, as at the beginning and the end, Babe is positioned as a Christ figure, the 
feminised, dependent son who is affirmed and revived by the farmer/father’s 
recognition and love, expressed in the dance of life. Together Babe and farmer 
go on to accomplish the apparently impossible feat of opening closed minds and 
demonstrating Babe’s unrecognised communicative ability to the world. We are 
invited to conclude that this revolutionises the treatment of pigs and of farming 
generally, reformulating it as an activity based on communication rather than 
force and violence. The communicative ethic is also strongly represented by the 
(female) sheep, whose persistent faith in and exemplification of the virtues and 
values of communication and non-violence is essential to their ultimate victory 
over the reductive violence of traditional relationships.
13 In King-Smith 1983, Mrs Hoggett is the first to fully recognise Babe’s contributions and to invite him into 
the house, explicitly admitting him to the contract class.
14 Especially since feminists have argued that the mechanistic models which deny communicative power 
to nature represent a masculinist response to growing technological mastery, among other things. See for 
example Merchant 1980.
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Communicative relationships open up new moral possibilities for organising 
life in ways that can negotiate conflicts of interests, build agreement, trust and 
mutuality, and avoid instrumentalism and the imposition of the will of one party 
on the other by force. Communicative relations don’t necessarily follow out those 
possibilities however, and it is important not to romanticise the communicative 
model, which does not automatically eliminate the dynamic of power, either in 
terms of equality of access, of hierarchy in forms of communication, or of the 
structuring of communication in hegemonic ways. There are various strategies 
for taking back the greater equality communicative models appear to offer. 
Rationalist models which treat communication as an exercise in pure, abstract, 
neutral and universal reason, and which delegitimate the more emotional and 
bodily forms and aspects of communication, operate to exclude non-humans 
from full communicative status just as they exclude various human others 
accorded lower human status as further from the rational ideal. These rationalist 
models exclude the forms of communication associated with animals along with 
the forms of communication associated with women, with non-Western cultures 
and with less ‘educated’ classes.15
Communicative models which allow us to overcome these exclusions for humans 
will also help us to recognise non-human animals in their denied aspects as 
communicative beings, but an excessive emphasis on communication and its 
use as a criterion of moral worth or value would remain problematic for non-
humans in basing itself on a capacity which may still be highly characteristic 
of humanity, and in biasing our valuations heavily towards those species most 
similar to ourselves. To overcome this implicit anthrocentrism, a communicative 
model would need to be part of a plural set of grounds for valuation, rather than 
its unique and exclusive basis, and to be sensitive to communicative capacities 
within species as well as to their capacities for communication with humans. 
If the film’s communicative vision offers hope of moving on to a new stage beyond 
mechanism, it also leaves us with many tantalising questions about this new 
stage which arise from the ambivalence of communication. Will communication 
be on our terms or theirs? Will Babe’s communicative abilities be used for the 
good of the animals or for that of the farmer? If the film's account of the moral 
development of ‘the farmer (reaching its climax in the step-dance) offers a vision 
of the small farm as a putative future enterprise of love and communication with 
nature and animals, the film also casts little light on the question of what the 
communicative farm would be like. Will the new communicative paradigm be 
used to liberate the sheep and the other farm animals, or merely to oppress them 
in more subtle and self-complicit ways? Will the communicative animal farm 
stand to the mechanistic farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal 
15 Iris Young, ‘Communication and the other: Beyond deliberative democracy,’ in Margaret Wilson and 
Anna Yeatman, eds, Justice and identity: Antipodean practices, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1995, pp. 134–152.
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democracy stand to the more repressive forms of patriarchal–authoritarian 
governance they replaced? The distinction between democracy and despotism 
is supposedly built on such a contrast, but as it becomes increasingly clear how 
little our own society resembles the democratic ideal of free and open dialogue 
to which all have access, it also becomes clear how our communicative abilities 
can be used to control and imprison us. A new communicative stage of human–
nature relationships would need to place such questions at the centre of its 
critical thought: at this level, the tale of the speaking meat has only just begun. 
Part II
Communication and anthropomorphism 
Babe’s opening shot shows Babe waking in communicative interaction with 
siblings, expressing sorrow at the loss of his mother and fear as he is seized 
and carried away. These are all emotions we can realistically expect real pigs 
to feel and express in this situation, and Babe’s ‘human’ speech as it emerges in 
this context seems a natural expression of these emotions, wishes and beliefs. 
The animal communication introduced here works well because it continues 
and extends the normal body language and communication of the animals. 
Nevertheless, the representation of such animal subjectivity in human terms is 
often said to be irresolvably problematic and invalidly ‘anthropomorphic’. It is 
worth considering and clarifying this charge in relation to the representation of 
animal communication and subjectivity in works of art. 
We need to distinguish various senses of anthropomorphism, including general 
and specific senses. The general concept and charge of anthropomorphism, 
as Mary Midgley has argued, is in its usual sense and definition thoroughly 
confused.16 It is ambiguous as between attributing to non-humans characteristics 
humans have (OED), and attributing to non-humans characteristics only humans 
have. Both senses are problematic, in slightly different ways, when used to support 
the claim that the attribution of characteristics such as subjectivity to animals 
must be anthropomorphic. The first sense, that something is anthropomorphic 
if it attributes to animals characteristics humans have, implies that there is no 
overlap of characteristics between humans and non-human animals. That is, it 
assumes a duality of human and animal natures and attempts to enforce upon 
legitimate representations of non-humans such a radical discontinuity. This 
sense should clearly be rejected, not only because it is based on a demonstrably 
16 Mary Midgley, Animals and why they matter, London, Penguin, 1983.
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false assumption of radical discontinuity, but because it could be used to 
delegitimate virtually any depiction of non-human subjectivity that made sense 
to us. 
The second sense of anthropomorphism—attributing to non-humans 
characteristics only humans have—is not open to this objection, but is open to 
the objection that its use to delegitimate the attribution of subjectivity and other 
contested characteristics to non-humans is simply question-begging. It assumes 
just what is at issue, what opponents of the mechanistic model contest, that 
non-humans do not have characteristics such as subjectivity and intentionality 
humans also possess. And furthermore, such a sense is otiose and human-
centred. If a representation attributes to non-humans characteristics they do 
not have, that provides (in a strictly veridical context) sufficient independent 
ground for rejecting such an attribution. It is simply anthrocentric to go on 
to add that humans do have such characteristics, and to focus on this as the 
grounds for error. There is no good basis for the general claim that an artwork 
is invalidated by anthropomorphism just because it attributes subjectivity and 
communication to non-humans in a general way. 
Nevertheless, there may still a point in more specific and limited senses and 
charges of anthropomorphism. One sense of anthropomorphism we might appeal 
to here would be analogous to, say, certain ways of rejecting Eurocentrism which 
object to representing the non-European other in terms of a European norm. 
This sense would enable an argument that the mode of representation adopted 
in particular, specific cases denied the difference of animals and represented 
them in terms of a human model. The argument would be that, although 
animals do have subjectivity and do communicate, the representation of that 
communication in the terms of human speech adopted by a film like Babe is 
invalidly anthropomorphic, depicted in excessively human terms. 
One problem with this argument is that, although it looks as if this sense appeals 
to a concept of anthropomorphism different from the objectionable general one, 
it is in danger of degenerating into a similarly general form. To bring this out, 
we need to ask, what is the contrast class? What mode of representing animal 
subjectivity or communication, beyond its bare recording without any attempt 
to convey a meaning or place in the animal’s life (as in commentary-free films 
of wolves howling or whales making sounds), would not be subject to this 
kind of objection? Any representation for a human audience will have to be, 
in some sense, an interpretation in human terms, just as any representation of 
a non-European culture’s speech for a European audience would have to be in 
European terms, in the sense that it will have to try to locate the meaning of the 
speech in terms of the closest equivalent forms of life. 
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The problem we run into here is the problem familiar from the case of 
representing human cultural difference, of translation and indeterminacy. For 
there are many well-known traps and difficulties in such representation in the 
human case, and in establishing or assuming equivalence in forms of life in 
the human case. These ensure that a weak analogue to anthropomorphism is 
involved in virtually any translation project, in any attempt to ‘bring over’ one 
culture’s forms into another’s. To avoid delegitimating all such attempts, we 
need to distinguish weaker and stronger forms of anthropomorphism, just as 
we need to distinguish weak and usually harmless forms of anthropocentrism 
from strong and damaging forms.17 
An unwarrantedly or strongly ‘Euromorphic’ depiction of another culture’s 
customs and speech would involve a methodology which tended unquestioningly 
to impose a European framework of expectations and norms, failing to note non-
equivalences in forms of life or to treat difficulties about translation as sources of 
uncertainty and tentativeness. On this model, we might expect an appropriate 
methodology for dealing with difference and translation indeterminacy in the 
non-human case to be one which could hold relatively open expectations, 
noting the presence of uncertainty and adopting a tentative stance which 
explored a range of alternatives and attempted to imagine and situate concept 
formation in terms of different forms of life. Both human and non-human cases 
require openness to the other and careful, sensitive, and above all, self-critical 
observation which admitted and allowed for perspectival and ‘centric’ biases.18 
The problems in representing another species’ speech or subjectivity in human 
terms are real, but they do not rule out such representation in any general 
way, and they pale before the difficulties of failing to represent them at all, or 
before the enormity of representing communicative and intentional beings as 
beings lacking all communicative and mental capacity. That is a much greater 
inaccuracy and injustice than any anthropomorphism. 
These points show I think that the charge of anthropomorphism cannot 
be used in a general way to delegitimate representations of non-humans as 
communicative subjects; charges of strong anthropomorphism may still be 
viable but require much more work to situate and establish than is usually 
accorded them. With weak anthropomorphism, the question is not whether or 
not some degree of humanisation is present in any particular representation 
of animal communication or of animal characteristics, but how damaging it is, 
and for what purposes? Undoubtedly there can be great variations and moral 
differences here, but again, we cannot rule out the mixed perspective which 
places a human subjectivity into an animal situation, for example, as worthless 
17 Val Plumwood, ‘Androcentrism and anthrocentrism: Parallels and politics’, Ethics and the environment, 
Vol. 1 No. 2, 1996, 119–152.
18 Sandra Harding, Whose science, whose knowledge? Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1999.
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or unenlightening, especially in a radically non-veridical (fairy tale, fictional 
or cartoon) context where fidelity is not a virtue. Indeed, as the Larsen cartoon 
demonstrates, such ‘anthropomorphic’ transferences of perspective, especially 
where conscious of their human importations, may be not only funny but 
philosophically revealing, about ourselves as well as about the other. But if 
there is no general argument that such weakly anthropomorphic mixtures are 
deceptive and illegitimate, specific cases have to be argued on their merits, not 
in terms of the alleged intrusion of human impurities but in terms of the kinds 
of insights they present or prevent and the moral quality of their representation. 
Anthrocentrism is a clearer concept than anthropomorphism (although by no 
means uncontested or unambiguous),19 and one which also bears more clearly 
on the moral quality of an artwork that represents the animal. Compare the kind 
of humanisation displayed in Babe with the Disney paradigm of humanisation. 
Disney cartoons are usually only superficially about animals; Disney characters 
with stereotypical animal bodies often have totally humanised personalities, 
frequently incorporate little or no recognisable reference to the characteristics 
or situations of the animals represented, and permit no representation of their 
relationship to the human or membership of the mixed community. The animal 
form appears in this anthrocentric conception as a nullity which is made to 
bear the burden of meanings which have no connection with the animal’s 
own subjectivity or situation. The Disney paradigm, normalised in television 
cartoons, is one in which animals are, in John Berger’s words, ‘totally transformed 
into human puppets’ whose main role is to naturalise various hegemonic forms 
of the human condition by attributing them to the animal ‘kingdom’.20 
The erasure of animals in the Disney animal cartoon is objectionable in ways 
that directly reflect its anthrocentrism and its contribution to growing human 
self-enclosure and incorporation of the other, in this case expressed in the 
inability to encounter the animal as an independent other who is more than a 
disguised form of self. These incorporative movements also underlie the highly 
anthrocentric assumption I criticised above, that an ‘animal film’ can only be 
taken seriously to the extent that it is actually about humans. In contrast, a less 
anthrocentric and belittling treatment would take animals seriously as agents, 
communicative subjects, bearers of knowledge, and members of the mixed 
community who are able themselves to observe us and perhaps to reflect critically 
on their relationships with us. On these sorts of criteria of anthrocentrism in the 
treatment of the animal other, ‘our Babe’ comes out rather well. 
Criminals, women, animals—all these are bearers of a denied or lessened form 
of subjecthood, which cannot itself command the position of knower but which 
19 Val Plumwood, ‘Androcentrism and anthrocentrism’. 
20 John Berger, About looking.
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is the object of an arrogant form of knowledge which so stereotypes and denies 
their difference and their speech that they are obliterated as possible subjects 
of reciprocal exchange or dialogical encounter. As Foucault notes, to be always 
under such an arrogating observation is also the fate of the prisoner, and as 
feminists have pointed out, a feminised subjectivity is one in which the subject 
internalises such a male gaze. John Berger has claimed that this arrogating 
conception of the other has now gone so far for animals that the animal proper 
is now irrecoverable for us as a possible other for encounter and communicative 
exchange. He writes, ‘... animals are always the observed. The fact that they can 
observe us has lost all significance. They are the objects of our ever-extending 
knowledge. What we know about them is an index of our power, and thus an 
index of what separates us from them. The more we know, the further away 
they are’.21 This diagnosis is acute but, in my view, a trifle too fatalistic. Works 
of art like Babe can help us subvert these anthrocentric conceptions of the 
animal and recover the animal as subject and reciprocal observer rather than as 
background, passively observed object; thus, in the final shot of Babe, it is the 
animal who looks back. 
Meat and the Colonising Contract 
Among the film’s other pleasures are the way the lead character Babe, from 
his position as speaking meat, systematically disrupts each of the background 
assumptions of meat I identified in Part 1. In the initial scenes of the film, we have 
(briefly) to confront the first assumption of radical discontinuity in the animal 
gulag, and the second as we are introduced to the meat as a speaking subject. 
The third assumption, that of a neat, rational and unproblematic hierarchy of 
considerability based on intellectual ranking, is systematically disrupted by 
Babe and several other characters throughout the film, and this is one of its 
main ‘breaking out’ arising in post-colonial theory themes and best subversive 
achievements. Thus Babe’s assertion of intelligence and communicative status 
disrupts Fly’s comfortable assurances to her puppies that ‘only stupid animals’ 
are eaten. This disruption poses ethical and political questions, analogous to 
questions arising in post-colonial theory about the role of colonial hierarchies, 
about the distinction between meat and non-meat animals, and about the nature 
of the human contract with that special, more privileged group of animals who 
can never be ‘meat’.
‘Babe’ is the name of an innocent, an original, Christ-like pure soul, to whom the 
first news of the dirty secret of meat is eventually revealed in the outhouse by the 
revolutionary duck Ferdie—where the meat comes from, where ‘babe’ (‘babies) 
himself comes from, in an act of disillusionment which neatly parallels that of 
21 John Berger, About looking, p. 16.
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the human child newly discovering reproductive and sexual relationships. (‘Not 
the Boss!’ breathes the incredulous Babe, in parallel with the child’s shocked 
‘Not my parents!’) But it is from the malevolent cat that Babe finally learns 
the full hurt of the dreadful secret the factory farm and the sinister farm meat 
household. The unspeakable is finally spoken: pigs are meat, pigs are subjects, 
and pigs suffer the reductive violence which denies, distances from, and hides 
their subjectivity. Babe is only called ‘pig’ while he is alive, but ‘they use a 
different word, “pork or bacon”, after you are dead’, explains the satisfied cat, 
revelling in her privileged, protected status. As Babe’s innocence is stripped 
away bit by bit, we see the gradual unveiling of various levels and kinds of 
animal oppressions and colonisations—the baring of the ‘world of wounds’ we 
all somehow learn to come to terms with as part of our loss of innocence and 
‘adult’ accommodation to an oppressive world.
Positioned as counter to these various unveilings of oppression are various 
emancipatory comments and viewpoints from the animals who are presented 
as sceptical and critical spectators of the human show. Their comments deftly 
expose the politics of the mixed community, especially its human violence 
and surrogate dog violence, and the strangeness of human ways. They give us 
positive perspectives on the importance of listening to and being open to others, 
and on the injustice, distortion and violence of the exclusionary boundaries 
which keep Babe positioned as meat. We feel the thrill of broken chains, the 
excitement of emancipation as Babe is gradually enabled to break the boundaries 
which keep him positioned as meat, finally crossing the privileged threshold of 
the house from which he has been so pointedly excluded to watch television 
with the farmer and his surrogate dog–mother Fly. 
What I found particularly illuminating here was the exposure of the levels of 
hierarchy among animals created by human colonisation in the small human 
empire of the farm, an empire which makes concrete human desire and human 
will in its social relations and its rational design of the earth and of the animals 
themselves. The film displays the key role of these boundaries of exclusion and 
levels of hierarchy among animals in maintaining the practices of meat and the 
non-subject status of the meat animal. The dogs, in the canine equivalent of 
human chauvinism, attribute their privilege with some complacency to their 
greater intelligence, but that facile fabrication is disrupted for us nicely by 
Babe’s pig intelligence in some of the film’s earliest scenes. What is exposed as 
unstable, duplicitous and oppressive here is the conventional boundary and 
contract on which the relatively privileged status of the pet and ‘house’ animal is 
based, which bears on the privileged status of dogs and cats in Western society. 
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Because it reveals the conventionality and instability of the considerability 
hierarchy among animals, the film provides us with the materials to reconstruct 
the Contract or political origin story for the privileged group of ‘pets’ or 
conventional companion animals. In early times, hunting, farming and 
shepherding man (‘the Boss’) in certain societies made a contract with certain 
wolves: the contract was that they would be given a respected role and position 
very different from that of other animals, that they would never be meat, in return 
for help with a critical task. That task was their active help in the oppression 
and imprisonment of other animals, whom they would help confine and 
construct as meat. In return for their help in constructing other animals as meat, 
not only would they themselves never be meat, they would be ‘looked after’, given 
a share of the meat themselves. Their subjectivity would be recognised, and the 
reductive Cartesian conception would never apply to them. In the same sense 
as in various human mythic Contracts or founding political stories of alleged 
mutual benefit, this was a Contract of complicity in meat. But as the disruptions 
of Babe neatly demonstrate, inclusion in the contract class has nothing to do 
with ‘intelligence’, and everything to do with complicity.
This contract, originally a contract of privilege in return for complicity in the 
practice of meat and the domination or elimination of the non-contract animals, 
is later extended to the privileged companion animals—the pets—with which so 
many of us continue to share our lives, and whom we continue to feed on the 
flesh of other ‘meat’ animals. The malevolent cat in Babe is seen thus profiting 
from the death of the Christmas duck, Rosalyn; in real life, non-privileged 
animals assigned to the ‘meat’ side of the hierarchy die to make meat for the 
pets of people who think of themselves unproblematically as animal lovers—
kangaroos, dolphins, penguins, anonymous and rare marine animals in yearly 
billions are slaughtered at some remove to feed the cats and dogs whose own 
deaths as meat would be unthinkable to their owners. The companion contract, 
albeit in a form less oriented to the working animal, remains as strong as ever, 
and is a major factor in constructing our cuddly versus non-cuddly boundary, 
and our domestic/wild, clean/dirty, house/outside boundaries as well. 
For most urban dwellers, which increasingly is most of us, animals of the 
Contract Class represent our main contact with the animal world. This is 
unfortunate, because the Companion Contract reflects and repeats many of 
the duplicities, denials and exclusions involved in the surrounding Western 
institution of meat. In historical terms, it is the equivalent of the key colonial 
contract of empire, the one the coloniser has always been able to make, to his 
great advantage, with the privileged class among the colonised. In the history 
of the colonisation of Scotland and Ireland, and everywhere in the history of 
colonisation, some privileged class of the indigenous is selected to carry out 
the coloniser’s dirty work and to control and oppress indigenous populations. 
5. ‘Babe’: The tale of the speaking meat 
73
Without this type of contract, colonisation, in most cases, would not have 
been possible. This type of contract depends on erecting dualistic boundaries, 
originally based on instrumental criteria of merit as cooperativeness, complicity 
and assimilation, and on the need to use some of the colonised to exploit and 
imprison others. This contract creates the strongly dualistic boundaries of the 
‘pet’ and ‘meat’ animal; the pet animal is a communicative and ethical subject, 
ideally subject to consideration, the meat animal is not. The contract forms part 
of an assimilationist strategy toward the other, in which they are recognised by 
the colonising self just to the extent that they resemble, express or serve the 
Self. It is this tainted division that enables our simultaneous claim to love some 
animals and to have a right to ruthlessly exploit other animals who are not very 
different, to simultaneously admit pet subjectivity and ignore or deny meat–
animal subjectivity. 
The contract does much to explain the extraordinary contradictions involved 
in our contemporary treatment of animals and our claims to love and respect 
animals. For example, it is this original colonising contract that ‘animal lovers’ 
honour when they, perhaps even sometimes as vegetarians or vegans themselves, 
bring into existence and even breed pet animals whom they feed on the ‘meat’ 
of other animals; or whom pet lovers irresponsibly introduce to inappropriate 
environments where they are permitted to make other animals meat and to 
disrupt carefully balanced and negotiated communities of free-living animals. 
These result in such abuses as the dumping of domestic cats in the wild by 
‘animal lovers’, to become a menace to indigenous animals in contexts like 
Australia where there may be few checks and balances. 
It is essential to break down this residual contract and its associated dualisms 
if we are to overcome the taboo against recognising the subjectivity of the meat 
animal, as well as the general failure to recognise animal subjectivity. The moral 
dualism of this contract plays a key role in obscuring the immorality of meat, 
especially factory farmed meat. Most people have had some positive experiences 
with such animals as dogs or cats, have allowed themselves to experience them 
as narrative and communicative subjects rather than as Cartesian ‘machine–
animals’ or as mindless bodies. But it is the ethical dualism and impermeability 
of this contract boundary which prevents them transferring this awareness 
to other animals considered ‘meat animals’ or to wild animals, and which is 
reflected in the contradiction of the animal lover’s horror taboo against eating 
dogs and contrasting indifference or complacency about the horrific treatment 
of the ‘meat animal’. 
Babe takes us quite some distance then towards pushing over this key barrier to 
a better consciousness of the moral status of all animals, showing us how Babe 
is excluded from the contract as meat, and how both Babe and the sheep are 
oppressed by the privileged status of the dogs and cats. But in another crucial 
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way the film fails to resolve some key issues surrounding the contract. For one 
way to read Babe’s liberation in the end of the film is as the supposition that the 
colonising contract can and should be extended, that Babe’s liberation consists 
in joining or displacing the dogs in the colonising contract, now recast in the 
role of non-violent communicator with the rest of the farm animals. 
Is Babe’s liberation then no more than that of the pet, the correction of a 
mistaken individual placement in the hierarchical order of rational meritocracy? 
Or can Babe’s liberation be somehow extended to all other animals? Here we 
come up against the liberal understanding of liberation as individual salvation, 
which generates the same problems that various human liberation movements 
encounter in liberalism. To the extent that it is an exclusionary contract, in 
which some make a living by complicity in instrumentalising, imprisoning and 
oppressing others, the contract of colonisation cannot be extended to provide 
liberation for all. Such a contract cannot be made liberatory for all by being 
extended to each, one at a time, and the attempt to do so merely re-erects the 
moral dualist barrier in a new place.
If Babe is to be saved because of his resemblance to the human and his 
discontinuity from other animals, we can recognise this as the same colonising 
contract some forms of liberal feminism have endorsed, to elevate some by 
complicity in the oppression of others. Feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
for example, argued that women should be admitted to the privileged class of 
political rights-holders in virtue of their discontinuity with allegedly ‘lower 
groups’ such as negro slaves, and their similarity to the master group, elite white 
men. The door opens to admit a few, but closes to keep the rest outside where 
they were. One boundary of moral dualism is momentarily penetrated, but the 
rest remain in place or new ones are constructed. So the film apparently displays 
Babe’s liberation, but leaves us with the big questions about whether Babe will 
be admitted alone, with all other pigs, with some other pigs, with all other 
animals, or with everything we might consider food? That the political vision 
of animal liberation poses many of the same political and recognition problems 
and ambiguities that appear for human liberation should be no surprise. It is yet 





6. Animals and ecology: Towards a 
better integration
‘Agriculture has become agribusiness after all. So the creatures that have 
been under our "stewardship" the longest, that have been codified by habit 
for our use, that have always suffered a special place in our regard—the 
farm animals—have never been as cruelly kept or confined or slaughtered 
in such numbers in all of human history. ... The factory farm today is 
a crowded stinking bedlam, filled with suffering animals that are quite 
literally insane, sprayed with pesticides and fattened on a diet of growth 
stimulants, antibiotics, and drugs. Two hundred and fifty thousand laying 
hens are confined within a single building. (The high mortality rate caused 
by overcrowding is economically acceptable; nothing is more worthless than 
an individual chicken).’ (Williams 1997)
Ecological animalism versus ontological 
veganism
Many thinking people have come to believe that there is something profoundly 
wrong in commodity culture’s relationship to living things. That something 
is expressed perhaps most obviously in the factory farms that profit from 
distorting and instrumentalising animal lives. In numerous books and articles I 
have argued that these abuses are enabled and justified by a dominant human-
centred ideology of mastery over an inferior sphere of animals and nature.1 It 
is this ideology that is expressed in economies that treat commodity animals 
reductively as less than they are, as a mere human resource, little more than 
living meat or egg production units. 
People aiming to clarify and deepen their experience of contemporary abuse of 
animals and nature face an important set of choices in philosophical theory. In 
particular, they have to choose whether to opt for theories of animal ethics and 
ontology that emphasise discontinuity and set human life apart from animals 
and ecology, or theories that emphasise human continuity with other life forms 
and situate both human and animal life within an ethically and ecologically 
conceived universe. I represent this choice in this paper by comparing two 
1 See especially, Plumwood, Feminism and the mastery of nature, London, Routledge, 1993; ‘Integrating 
ethical frameworks for animals, humans and nature: A critical feminist eco-socialist analysis’, Ethics and 
the environment, Vol. 5 No. 3, 2000, pp. 1–38; Environmental culture: The ecological crisis of reason, London, 
Routledge, 2002.
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theories that challenge—in quite different ways—the dominant ideology of 
mastery. Ontological Veganism is a theory that advocates universal abstention 
from all use of animals as the only real alternative to mastery and the leading 
means of defending animals against its wrongs. But, I shall argue, another theory 
which also supports animal defence which I shall call Ecological Animalism, 
more thoroughly disrupts the ideology of mastery, and is significantly better 
than Ontological Veganism for environmental awareness, for human liberation, 
and for animal activism itself. 
Ecological Animalism supports and celebrates animals and encourages a 
dialogical ethics of sharing and negotiation or partnership between humans 
and animals, while undertaking a re-evaluation of human identity that affirms 
inclusion in animal and ecological spheres. The theory I shall develop is a 
context-sensitive semi-vegetarian position, which advocates great reductions 
in first-world meat-eating and opposes reductive and disrespectful conceptions 
and treatments of animals, especially in factory farming. The dominant human 
mastery position that is deeply entrenched in Western culture has constructed 
a great gulf or dualism between humans and nature, which I call human/nature 
dualism. Human/nature dualism conceives humans as inside culture but ‘outside 
nature’, and conceives non-humans as outside ethics and culture. The theory I 
advocate aims to disrupt this deep historical dualism by re-situating humans 
in ecological terms at the same time as it re-situates non-humans in ethical and 
cultural terms. It affirms an ecological universe of mutual use, and sees humans 
and animals as mutually available for respectful use in conditions of equality. 
Ecological Animalism uses the philosophical method of contextualising to allow 
us to express our care for both animals and ecology, and to acknowledge at the 
same time different cultures in different ecological contexts, differing nutritional 
situations and needs, and multiple forms of oppression. 
The theory I shall recommend rejecting, Ontological Veganism, has numerous 
problems for both theory and activism on animal equality and ecology. It ties 
strategy, philosophy and personal commitment tightly to personal veganism, 
abstention from eating and using animals as a form of individual action. 
Ontological Veganism insists that neither humans or animals should ever be 
conceived as edible or even as usable, confirming the treatment of humans 
as ‘outside nature’ that is part of human/nature dualism, and blocking any 
re-conception of animals and humans in fully ecological terms. Because it is 
indiscriminate in proscribing all forms of animal use as having the same moral 
status, it fails to provide philosophical guidance for animal activism that 
would prioritise action on factory farming over less abusive forms of farming. 
Its universalism makes it highly ethnocentric, universalising a privileged 
‘consumer’ perspective, ignoring contexts other than contemporary Western 
urban ones, or aiming to treat them as minor, deviant ‘exceptions’ to what 
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it takes to be the ideal or norm. Although it claims to oppose the dominant 
mastery position, it remains subtly human-centred because it does not fully 
challenge human/nature dualism, but rather attempts to extend human status 
and privilege to a bigger class of ‘semi-humans’ who, like humans themselves, 
are conceived as above the non-conscious sphere and ‘outside nature’, beyond 
ecology and beyond use, especially use in the food chain. In doing so it stays 
within the system of human/nature dualism and denial that prevents the 
dominant culture from recognising its ecological embeddedness and places it 
increasingly at ecological risk.
Human/nature dualism is a Western-based cultural formation going back 
thousands of years that sees the essentially human as part of a radically separate 
order of reason, mind, or consciousness, set apart from the lower order that 
comprises the body, the animal and the pre-human. Inferior orders of humanity, 
such as women, slaves and ethnic Others (‘barbarians’), partake of this lower 
sphere to a greater degree, through their supposedly lesser participation in 
reason and greater participation in lower ‘animal’ elements such as embodiment 
and emotionality. Human/nature dualism conceives the human as not only 
superior to but as different in kind from the non-human, which as a lower 
sphere exists as a mere resource for the higher human one. This ideology has 
been functional for Western culture in enabling it to exploit nature with less 
constraint, but it also creates dangerous illusions in denying embeddedness in 
and dependency on nature, which we see in our denial of human inclusion in 
the food web and in our response to the ecological crisis. 
Human/nature dualism is a double-sided affair, destroying the bridge between 
the human and the non-human from both ends, as it were, for just as the 
essentially human is disembodied, disembedded and discontinuous from the rest 
of nature, so nature and animals are seen as mindless bodies, excluded from the 
realms of ethics and culture. Re-envisaging ourselves as ecologically embodied 
beings akin to rather than superior to other animals is a major challenge for 
Western culture, as is recognising the elements of mind and culture present 
in animals and the non-human world. The double-sided character of human/
nature dualism gives rise to two tasks which must be integrated. These are the 
tasks of situating human life in ecological terms and situating non-human life 
in ethical terms. Ecological Animalism takes up both of these tasks, whereas 
Ontological Veganism addresses only the second. 
Conventional animalist and conventional ecological theories as they have evolved 
in the last four decades have each challenged only one side of this double dualist 
dynamic, and they have each challenged different sides, with the result that 
they have developed in highly conflictual and incompatible ways. Although 
each project has a kind of egalitarianism between the human and non-human 
in mind, their partial analyses place them on a collision course. The ecology 
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movement has been situating humans as animals, embodied inside ecological systems 
of mutual use, of food and energy exchange, just as the animal defence movement 
has been trying to expand an extension to animals of the (dualistic) human privilege 
of being conceived as outside these systems. Many animal defence activists seem to 
believe that ecology can be ignored and that talk of the food web is an invention 
of hamburger companies, while the ecological side often retains the human-
centred resource view of animals and scientistic resistance to seeing animals 
as individuals with life stories of attachment, struggle and tragedy not unlike 
our own, refusing to apply ethical thinking to the non-human sphere. As I will 
show, a more double-sided understanding of and challenge to human/nature 
dualism can help us move on towards a synthesis, a more integrated and less 
conflictual theory of animals and ecology, if not yet a unified one.
Non-use or respectful use? 
Human/nature dualism constructs a polarised set of alternatives in which the 
idea that humans are above embodiment and thus any form of bodily use is 
complemented at the opposite extreme by the idea that non-humans are only 
bodies and are totally instrumentalisable, forming a contrast based on radical 
exclusion. Human/animal discontinuity is constructed in part by denying 
overlap and continuity between humans and animals, especially in relation to 
food: non-human animals can be our food, but we can never be their food. 
Factory farmed animals are conceived as reducible to food, whereas humans 
are beyond this and can never be food. Domination emerges in the pattern of 
usage in which humans are users who can never themselves be used, and which 
constructs commodity animals in highly reductionist terms. 
Although, by definition, all ecologically embodied beings exist as food for 
some other beings, the human supremacist culture of the West makes a strong 
effort to deny human ecological embodiment by denying that we humans can 
be positioned in the food chain in the same way as other animals. Predators 
of humans have been execrated and largely eliminated. This denial that we 
ourselves are food for others is reflected in many aspects of our death and burial 
practices—the strong coffin, conventionally buried well below the level of 
soil fauna activity, and the slab over the grave to prevent anything digging 
us up, keeps the Western human body (at least sufficiently affluent ones) from 
becoming food for other species. Sanctity is interpreted as guarding ourselves 
jealously and keeping ourselves apart, refusing even to conceptualise ourselves 
as edible, and resisting giving something back, even to the worms and the land 
that nurtured us. Horror movies and stories reflect this deep-seated dread of 
becoming food for other forms of life: horror is the wormy corpse, vampires 
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sucking blood and sci-fi monsters trying to eat humans (Alien 1 and 2). Horror 
and outrage usually greet stories of other species eating live or dead humans, 
and various levels of hysteria our nibbling by leeches, sandflies, and mosquitoes. 
Upon death the human essence is seen as departing for a disembodied, non-earthly 
realm, rather than nurturing those earth others who have nurtured us. This concept of 
human identity positions humans outside and above the food web, not as part of the 
feast in a chain of reciprocity but as external manipulators and masters separate from 
it. Death becomes a site for apartness, domination and individual salvation, rather 
than for sharing and for nurturing a community of life. Being food for other animals 
shakes our image of human mastery. As eaters of others who can never ourselves be 
eaten in turn by them or even conceive ourselves in edible terms, we take, but do not 
give, justifying this one way arrangement by the traditional Western view of human 
rights to use earth others as validated by an order of rational meritocracy in which 
humans emerge on top. Humans are not even to be conceptualised as edible, not only 
by other humans, but by other species.
But humans are food, food for sharks, lions, tigers, bears and crocodiles, food for 
crows, snakes, vultures, pigs, rats and goannas, and for a huge variety of smaller 
creatures and micro-organisms. An Ecological Animalism would acknowledge 
this and affirm principles emphasising human–animal mutuality, equality and 
reciprocity in the food web; all living creatures are food, and also much more than 
food. In a good human life we must gain our food in such a way as to acknowledge 
our kinship with those whom we make our food, which does not forget the more than 
food that every one of us is, and which positions us reciprocally as food for others. 
This kind of account does not need to erect a moral dualism or rigid hierarchy 
to decide which beings are beneath moral consideration and are thus available 
to be ontologised as edible, and does not need to treat non-animal life as lesser. 
Its stance of respect and gratitude provides a strong basis for opposing factory 
farming and for minimising the use of sensitive beings for food. 
A more egalitarian vision of ecological embodiment as involving not apartness 
but mutual and respectful use has been articulated by many ecological thinkers 
and Indigenous philosophies. Thus Francis Cook, elaborating the ecological 
philosophy of Hua–Yen Buddhism, writes:
I depend upon [other] things in a number of ways, one of which is to use 
them for my own benefit. For I could not exist for a day if I could not use 
them. Therefore, in a world in which I must destroy and consume in order to 
continue to exist, I must use what is necessary with gratitude and respect … 
I must be prepared to accept that I am made for the use of the other no less 
than it is made for my use … that this is the tiger’s world as well as mine, and 
I am for the use of hungry tigers as much as carrots are for my use.2 
2 Francis Cook, Hua–Yen Buddhism: The jewel net of Indra, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University Press, 1977.
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A corollary of accepting that one is for the use of the other is willingness to 
share one’s region with predators of humans and to support the restoration to 
their original range of the many endangered species of large animals whom 
human dominance is eliminating from the face of the earth. 
Ontological Veganism’s treatment of use and instrumentalism could hardly be 
a greater contrast; it extends vegetarianism, prohibiting animal use as food, to 
veganism, prohibiting any kind of use. For Ontological Vegans all the problems 
of animal reduction, of denial of animal communicativity, individuality and 
basic needs in factory farming stem from a simple cause—ontologising them 
as edible. It is a curious and paradoxical feature of Ontological Veganism that it 
basically shares the taboo on envisaging the human in edible terms, and that its 
strategy for greater equality is the extensionist one of attempting to extend this 
taboo to a wider class of beings. The paradox is that it was precisely in order to 
give expression to such a radical separation between humans and other animals 
that the taboo on conceiving humans as edible was developed in the first place.
Carol Adams in various books and articles3 provides a very useful and thorough 
account of the commodity concept of meat as a reductionist form and of 
associated food concepts and practices as sites of domination. However, Adams 
goes on to present the reductions and degradations of animals she describes 
so convincingly as the outcome of ontologising them as edible.4 But saying 
that seeing earth others as edible is responsible for their degraded treatment as 
‘meat’ is much like saying that ontologising human others as sexual beings is 
responsible for rape or sexual abuse. Ontologising others as sexual beings is not 
correctly identified as the salient condition for rape or sexual abuse; rather it is 
the identification of sexuality with domination. Similarly, it is the identification 
of food practices with human domination and mastery that underlies the 
abusive use of food animals. The complete exclusion of use denies ecological 
embodiment and the important alternative of respectful use. 
Thus Carol Adams argues that any use of the animal other (for food or anything 
else) involves instrumentalising them,5 stating that, ‘the ontologising of animals 
as edible bodies creates them as instruments of human beings’.6 Instrumentalism 
is widely recognised (although often unclearly conceptualised) as a feature 
of oppressive conceptual frameworks, but instrumentalism is mis-defined 
by Adams as involving any making use of the other, rather than reductive 
treatment of the other as no more than something of use, a means to an end. This 
3 Carol Adams, The sexual politics of meat: A feminist–vegetarian critical theory, New York, Continuum, 1990; 
‘The feminist traffic in animals’, in Greta Gaard, ed. Ecofeminism: Women, animals and nature, Philadelphia, 
Temple University Press, 1993; Neither man nor beast: Feminism and the defense of animals, New York, 
Continuum, 1994.
4 Carol Adams, ‘The feminist traffic in animals’, p. 103.
5 Carol Adams, ‘The feminist traffic in animals’, p. 200.
6 Carol Adams, Neither man nor beast, p. 103.
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definition of instrumentalism as the same as use is not a viable way to define 
instrumentalism even in the human case—since there are many cases where we 
can make use of one another for a variety of purposes without incurring any 
damaging charge of instrumentalism.7 The circus performers who stand on one 
another’s shoulders to reach the trapeze are not involved in any oppressively 
instrumental practices. Neither is someone who collects animal droppings to 
improve a vegetable garden. In both cases the other is used, but is also seen as 
more than something to be used, and hence not treated instrumentally. Rather 
instrumentalism has to be understood as involving a reductionist conception in 
which the other is subject to disrespectful or totalising forms of use and defined 
as no more than a means to some set of ends. 
Discontinuity, culture and nature: Demonising 
and exceptionalising predation
By affirming that we ourselves are subject to use and that all uses of others 
must involve respect for individual and species life, an Ecological Animalism 
can affirm continuity of life-forms, including humans. An Ontological Veganism 
that occludes the possibility of respectful use and treats food as degraded must 
assume that only things that are not morally considerable can be eaten. It is 
then tied to an exclusionary imperative, requiring a cut-off point to delineate a 
class beneath ethical consideration, on pain of having nothing left to eat. Such 
positions retain the radical discontinuity of Cartesian dualism, repositioning 
the boundary of ethical consideration at a different point (higher animals 
possessing ‘consciousness’), but still insisting on an outsider class of sensitive 
living creatures virtually reduced to machine status and conceived as ‘beyond 
ethics’. It is a paradox that, although it claims to increase our sensitivity and 
ethical responsiveness to the extended class of almost-humans, such a position 
also serves to reduce our sensitivity to the vast majority of living organisms 
which remain in the excluded class beyond consideration. 
Ontological Veganism’s subtle endorsement of human/nature dualism and 
discontinuity also emerges in its treatment of predation and its account of 
the nature/culture relationship. Predation is often demonised as bringing 
unnecessary pain and suffering to an otherwise peaceful vegan world of female 
gathering, and in the human case is seen as an instrumental male practice of 
domination directed at animals and women. But if instrumentalism is not the 
same as simply making use of something, and even less thinking of making 
use of it (ontologising it as edible), predation is not necessarily an instrumental 
practice, especially if it finds effective ways to recognise that the other is more 
7 On Kant’s basically confused treatment of this problem see my discussion in Plumwood, 1993, chapter 6.
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than ‘meat’. Ecologically, predation is presented as an unfortunate exception and 
animals, like women, as always victims: fewer than 20% of animals, Adams tells 
us, are predators8—a claim that again draws on a strong discontinuity between 
plants and animals. In this way it is suggested that predation is unnatural 
and fundamentally eliminable. But percentage tallies of carnivorous species 
are no guide to the importance of predation in an ecosystem or its potential 
eliminability. 
An Ecological Animalist could say that it is not predation as such that is the problem 
but what certain social systems make of predation. Thus I would agree that hunting is 
a harmful, unnecessary and highly gendered practice within some social contexts, but 
reject any general demonisation of hunting or predation, which would raise serious 
problems about Indigenous cultures and about flow-on from humans to animals. Any 
attempt to condemn predation in general, ontological terms will inevitably rub off 
onto predatory animals (including both carnivorous and omnivorous animals), and 
any attempt to separate predation completely from human identity will also serve to 
reinforce once again the Western tradition’s hyper-separation of our nature from that 
of animals, and its treatment of Indigenous cultures as animal-like. This is another 
paradox, since it is one of the aims of the vegan theory to affirm our kinship and 
solidarity with animals, but here its demonisation of predation has the opposite 
effect, of implying that the world would be a better place without predatory animals. 
Ontological Vegans hope to avoid this paradox, but their attempts to do so, I shall 
argue, are unsuccessful and reveal clearly that their worldview rests on a dualistic 
account of human identity. 
The main move Ontological Vegans make to minimise the significance of 
predation and block the problematic transfer of their anti-predation stance 
from humans to animals is to argue that human predation is situated in culture 
while animal predation is situated in nature.9 Human participation in predation 
therefore cannot be justified as participation in an integral natural process, as 
philosophers like Holmes Rolston have justified it. Against simple naturalism, 
Moriarty and Woods argue that ‘meat eating and hunting are cultural activities, 
not natural activities’.10 They claim that ‘our distinctively human evolutionary 
achievement—culture—has strongly separated us from non-human nature. We 
have found freedom from ecosystems ... [and] are no longer a part of ecosystems’. 
Because meat-eating is influenced by culture it can be considered to ‘involve no 
participation in the logic and biology of natural ecosystems’.11 For Ontological 
Vegans, human hunting and meat-eating has an entirely different status from 
the ‘instinctual’ predatory activity of non-human animals—so much so that 
they treat the term ‘predation’ as inadmissible for the case of human hunting. 
8 Carol Adams, ‘The feminist traffic in animals’, p. 200.
9 Carol Adams, ‘The feminist traffic in animals’, p. 399; Paul Veatch Moriarty & Mark Woods, ‘Hunting ≠ 
Predation’, Environmental ethics, Vol. 19 Winter, 1997.
10 Moriarty & Woods, p. 399.
11 Ibid, p. 401.
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There are several further problems and paradoxes here. One paradox is that 
animal activists who have stressed our continuity with and similarity with 
animals in order to ground our obligation to extend ethics to them now stress 
their complete dissimilarity and membership of a separate order, as inhabitants 
of nature not culture, in order to avoid a flow-on to animals of demonising 
predation. Embracing the claim that humans ‘don’t live in nature’ in order to 
block the disquieting and problem-creating parallel between human hunting 
and animal predation introduces a cure which is worse than the disease and 
which is basically incompatible with any form of ecological consciousness. The 
claim that humans are not a part of natural ecosystems is on a collision course 
with most fundamental points of ecological understanding because it denies the 
fundamental ecological insight that human culture is embedded in ecological 
systems and dependent on nature. It also denies an important insight many 
students of animals have rightly stressed—that culture, learning and choice 
is not unique to the human and that non-human animals also have culture. In 
fact Woods and Moriarty’s solution rests on a thoroughly dualistic and hyper-
separated understanding of human identity and of the terms ‘nature’ and 
‘culture’. In order to attain the desired human–animal separation, nature must 
be ‘pure’ nature, ‘strictly biological’, and culture conceived as ‘pure’ culture, 
no longer in or of nature: an activity is no longer natural if it shows any cultural 
influence, and culture is completely disembedded from nature, ‘held aloft on a 
cloud in the air’. 
Of course Ontological Vegans are right to object to any simple naturalisation of 
human hunting and meat eating. On the kind of account I have given, both the 
claim that meat eating is in nature rather than culture and the counter-claim 
that it is in culture and therefore not in nature are wrong and are the product 
of indefensible hyper-separated ways of conceptualising both these categories 
that are characteristic of human/nature dualism. It is only if we employ these 
hyper-separated senses that the distinction between nature and culture can 
be used to block the flow-on problem that demonising human predation also 
demonises animal predation. On the sort of account I have given above, any 
form of human eating (and many forms of non-human eating) is situated in both 
nature and culture—in nature as a biologically necessary determinable and in 
a specific culture as a determinate form subject to individual and social choice 
and practice. Food, like most other human (and many non-human activities) 
is a thoroughly mixed activity, not one somehow throwing together bits of 
two separate realms, but one expressing through the logic of the determinate–
determinable relationship one aspect of the ‘intricate texture’ of the embedment 
of culture in nature. Both naturalising and culturalising conceptual schemes are 
inadequate to deal with the problem, both sides of this debate deny the way 
our lives weave together and criss-cross narratives of culture and nature, and 
the way our food choices are shaped and constrained both by our social and by 
our ecological context. 
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Universalism and ethnocentrism 
Ontological Veganism assumes a universalism which is ethnocentric and fails to 
allow adequately for cultural diversity and for alternatives to consumer culture. 
Carol Adams’ work, for example, follows a methodology that universalises a US 
consumer perspective and hopes to deal with other cultures as exceptions to the 
‘general’ rule. Universalism is supplemented by an exceptionalist methodology 
which dispenses excuses for those too frail to follow its absolute abstentionist 
prescriptions. Deviations from the norm or ideal ‘may occur at rare times’, 
when justified by necessity.12 A methodology which deals with universal 
human activities such as eating in terms of US-centred cultural assumptions 
applicable at most to the privileged 20%, treating the bulk of the world’s people 
as ‘deviations’ or exceptions, is plainly highly ethnocentric. 
In addition, Adams strives to assimilate all possible animal food practices to 
those of commodity culture in what seems to be an effort to deny that any 
cultural difference involving non-instrumental forms of eating animals can 
exist. Thus her discussion of the cultural context of the ‘relational hunt’ (a 
crude attempt to model non-instrumental Indigenous food practices) criticises 
those who refuse to absolutise the vegan imperative, declaring that ‘there is, 
in general, no need to be eating animals’.13 She goes on to suggest that eating 
an animal after a successful hunt, like cannibalism in emergency situations, is 
sometimes necessary, but like cannibalism is morally repugnant, and should 
properly be marked by disgust. Clearly Indigenous foraging cultures are among 
those that would fall far short of such an ideal. 
Ontological Veganism is based around a mythical gender anthropology which 
valorises Western women’s alleged ‘gathering’ roles in contrast to demonic 
‘male’ hunting. A cultural hegemony that falsifies the lives of Indigenous men 
and women underlies the strong opposition it assumes between ‘male hunting’ 
and ‘female gathering’, the sweeping assumption that ‘women’ do not hunt 
and that female-led ‘gathering’ societies were vegetarian or plant-based.14 The 
assumption is that active, aggressive men hunt large animals in what is envisaged 
as a precursor of warfare, while passive, peaceful women gather or nurture 
plants in a precursor of agriculture. This imaginary schema reads contemporary 
Western meanings of gender and hunting back in a universal way into other 
cultures, times and places, assuming a gendered dualism of foraging activities 
12 Carol Adams, ‘Neither man nor beast’, p. 103.
13 Ibid.
14 Andree Collard with Joyce Contrucci, Rape of the wild: man’s violence against animals and the earth, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1989; Marti Kheel, ‘From heroic to holistic ethics’, in Greta Gaard, ed., 
Ecofeminism: Women, animals and nature, and ‘Licence to kill: An ecofeminist critique of hunters’ discourse’, 
in Adams & Donovan, eds., Animals and women, Duke University Press, 1995; Carol Adams, ‘Comments on 
George’s “Should feminists be vegetarians?”’, Signs, Autumn 1995, pp. 221–229.
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in which the mixed forms encountered in many Indigenous societies are denied 
and disappeared. Thus Adams urges us to base our alternative ideals not on 
hunting societies but on ‘gatherer societies that demonstrate humans can live 
well without depending on animals’ bodies as food’.15 But no such purely vegan 
‘gatherer’ societies have ever been recorded! Adams denies the undeniable 
evidence from contemporary Indigenous women’s foraging practices that they 
often include far more than collecting plants. Australian Aboriginal women’s 
gathering contributes as much as 80% of tribal food, but women’s ‘gathering’ 
has always involved killing a large variety of small to medium animals. This is 
not a matter of speculation about the past, but of well-confirmed present-day 
observation and Indigenous experience. 
In assuming that alternatives to animal food are always or ‘generally’ available 
Adams universalises a context of consumer choice and availability of alternatives 
to animal food which ignores the construction of the lifeways of well-adapted 
Indigenous cultures around the ecological constraints of their country, which 
do not therefore represent inessential features of ethnic cultures in the way 
she assumes.16 The successful human occupation of many places and ecological 
situations in the world has required the use of at least some of their animals for 
food and other purposes: the most obvious examples here are places like the high 
Arctic regions, where for much of the year few vegetable resources are available, 
but other Indigenous ‘gathering–hunting’ cultures are similarly placed—for 
example Australian Aboriginal cultures, whose survival in harsh environments 
relies on the finely detailed knowledge and skilful exploitation of a very wide 
variety of seasonally available foods of all kinds, essential among which may be 
many highly valued animal foods gathered by women and children.
This gives rise to another paradox: the superficially sensitive Ontological Vegan 
can implicitly assume an insensitive and ecologically destructive economic 
context. From the perspective of the ‘biosphere person’ who draws on the 
whole planet for nutritional needs defined in the context of consumer choices 
in the global market, it is relatively easy to be a vegan and animal food is an 
unnecessary evil. But the lifestyle of the biosphere person is, in the main, 
destructive and ecologically unaccountable. From the perspective of the more 
ecologically accountable ‘ecosystem person’ who must provide for nutritional 
needs from within a small, localised group of ecosystems, however, it is very 
difficult or impossible to be vegan: in the highly constrained choice context of 
the ecosystem person some animal-based foods are indispensable to survival. 
15 Carol Adams, ‘Neither man nor beast’, p. 105.
16 On the construction of Australian Indigenous cultures around their ecological contexts see Deborah 
Bird Rose, Nourishing terrains: Australian Aboriginal views of landscape and wilderness, Canberra, Australian 
Heritage Commission, 1996.
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Vegan approaches to food that rely implicitly upon the global marketplace 
are thus in conflict with ecological approaches that stress the importance of 
ecological accountability and of local adaptation.
A similarly ethnocentric and inadequately contextualised methodology is 
applied by Ontological Vegans to the issue of the ecological consequences of 
animal food. The cultural hegemony and universalism openly espoused by 
leading vegan theorists assimilates all planetary meat-eating practices to those 
of North American grain-feeding and its alternatives, and is insensitive to the 
culturally variable ecological consequences involved in the use of other animals 
as food. Animal defence theorists stress the ecological and health benefits of 
eating lower down the food chain.17 These principles may be a useful general 
guide, but they are subject to many local contextual variations that are not 
recognised by Ontological Vegans. In some contexts, for instance that of the West 
Australian wheat belt, the ecological costs of land degradation (including costs 
to non-human animals) associated with grain production are so high that eating 
free-living, low-impact grazing animals like kangaroos must at least sometimes 
carry much lower animal and ecological costs than eating vegetarian grains. A 
vegan diet derived from this context could be in conflict with obligations to eat 
in the least harmful and ecologically costly way. 
Veganism does not necessarily minimise ecological costs and can be in conflict 
in some contexts with ecological eating. Yet vegan universalists employ a set of 
simplistic arguments which are designed to show that the vegan way must always 
and everywhere coincide with the way that is least costly ecologically. David 
Waller for example cites as decisive and universally applicable statistics drawn 
from the North American context comparing the ecological costs of meat and 
grain eating. This comparison is supposed to show grain is ecologically better 
and dispose of the problem of conflict between animal rights and ecological 
ethics. But these universalist comparisons assume that grain production for 
human use is always virtually free of ecological costs or costs to animal life 
(whereas it is in many arid land contexts highly damaging to the land and to 
biodiversity). They ignore the fact that in much of the world animals used for 
food are not grain-fed, and that the rangeland over which they graze is often not 
suitable for crop tillage agriculture. 
Suitability for activism
The appeal of Ontological Veganism largely depends on the false contrast it 
draws between veganism and commodity culture traditions of animal reduction 
17 John Robbins, Diet for a new America, Walpole, N.H, Stillpoint, 1987; David Waller, ‘A vegetarian critique 
of deep and social ecology’ Ethics and the environment, Vol. 2 No. 2, 1997, pp. 187–198.
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and human/nature dualism, that is between no use at all and ruthless use based 
on domination and denial. But this is in effect a choice between alienation and 
domination. Adams’ ethnocentric ontological veganism succeeds in this false 
contrast because its conceptual framework obscures the distinction between 
meat and animal food, where meat is a determinate cultural construction in terms 
of domination, and animal food is a cultural determinable. Meat is the result 
of an instrumentalist–reductionist framework, but the concept of animal food 
allows us the means to resist the reductions and denials of meat by honouring 
the edible life form as much more than food, and certainly much more than 
meat. If we must all, including humans, be ontologised ecologically as edible, as 
participating in the food web as a condition of our embodiment, that does not 
mean we must all be ontologised reductively as meat. Food, unlike the reductive 
category of meat that does not recognise that we are all always more than food, is 
not a hyper-separated category and does not have to be a disrespectful category.
This distinction enables Ecological Animalism to stand with Ontological 
Veganism in affirming that no being, human or non-human, should be ontologised 
reductively as meat, and hence in opposing reductive commoditisation of 
animals. But unlike Ontological Veganism it can combine the rejection of 
commoditisation with the framework of ecology and cultural diversity by 
maintaining that all embodied beings are food and more than food, that is, with 
an ecological ontology. A careful contextualisation of food practices provides 
much better guidance for activism than a culturally hegemonic universalism. 
Ecological Animalism can provide a strong basis for opposing the ‘rationalised’ 
commodity farming practices that reduce animals to living meat and are 
responsible for the great bulk and intensity of domestic animal misery in the 
modern West. It is of necessity more flexible, less dogmatic and universalist, but 
can still vindicate the major activist concerns of the animal defence movement. 
It would require us to avoid complicity in contemporary food practices that 
abuse animals, especially factory farming, and can agree there are plenty of 
good reasons for being a vegetarian in modern urban contexts where food 
sources are untraceable or treatment of animals known to be cruel or reductive. 
But for Ecological Animalism, vegetarianism would not represent any disgust 
at ‘corpses’ or ontological revulsion against our mutual condition as food, 
but rather protest at the unacceptable conditions of animal life and death in 
particular societies that reduce animals and commodify their flesh as ‘meat’, in 
terms that minimise their claims on us and on the earth. An ecological animalist 
can affirm the ecological world, despite the fact that it contains predation, 
necessarily and not only contingently, whereas an Ontological vegetarian is 
committed to a rejection of the ecological world. 
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The Ontological Vegan framework in effect presents us with a false choice 
between no use at all and totally instrumentalising forms of use. By counting 
all cases of use as instrumentalism, the most considerate and respectful forms 
of farming which allow animals to lead the kinds of lives they have always led 
and that are respectful of their species life, amount to the same thing as the 
worst forms of factory farming in which an animal’s entire life is deformed and 
instrumentalised. By insisting on highly polarised alternatives (‘either one eats 
animals or one does not’) Ontological Veganism obscures useful and potentially 
popular intermediate positions other than the vanguardist position of total 
abstention, such as semi-vegetarian positions advocating great reductions in the 
use of animal food and boycotts of those forms of ‘meat’ that do not respect 
animal lives or species being. The spaces of ecological ontology and respectful 
use that are eliminated in Adam’s treatment prohibiting any ontologising of 
others as edible are precisely the ones that could be occupied by alternative 
models which see the food chain in terms of reciprocity rather than domination 
or alienation, for example as a sacrament of sharing and exchange of life in 
which all species ultimately participate as food for others, and the ‘moreness’ of 
all beings is recognised.18 
An over-emphasis on personal conversion and individual abstention has 
meant a focus on a vanguard politics of individual moral purity. Other forms 
of popular action based on a politics of coalition and political alliance with 
other social movements have consequently been under-developed and under-
theorised. Recovering a liberatory direction would mean replacing the over-
individualised and culturally hegemonic vanguard focus on veganism as 
a politics of personal virtue and self-denial, with its demonstrated potential 
for fostering self-righteousness and holier-than-thouism, by a more carefully 
contextualised vegetarianism, a more diverse and politically sensitive set of 
strategies for collective action, and by a stronger focus on the responsibility 
of systems of economic rationality for the atrocities daily committed against 
animals, especially in the factory–farming framework. 
18 See Gary Snyder, The practice of the wild, New York, North Point Press, 1990. Adams in her discussion of 
the ‘relational hunt’ asks in relation to reciprocity, ‘what does the animal who dies receive in this exchange’ 
(1994, p. 104). The answer is that it has already received it in life itself, existence as part of the cycle of 
embodiment and exchange. The idea of the food chain as a cycle of sharing and exchange of life in which all 
ultimately participate as food for others is what we should understand by reciprocity here.
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7. Tasteless: Towards a food-based 
approach to death
Food/death
Two encounters with death led to my becoming radically dissatisfied with 
the usual Western selection of death narratives—both Christian–monotheist 
AND modernist–atheist. I think both major traditions inherit the human 
exceptionalism and hyper-separation that propels the environmental crisis. 
However, there are encouraging signs of a developing animist consciousness 
and mortuary practice that challenges exceptionalism and grasps human death 
in terms of reciprocity in the earth community.
It has seemed to me since my near-death experience with the crocodile that our 
worldview denies the most basic feature of animal existence on planet earth—
that we are food and that through death we nourish others. As I have written 
in previous articles, the food/death perspective, so familiar to our ancestors, is 
something the human exceptionalism of Western modernity has structured out 
of life. Attention to human foodiness is tasteless. Of course we are all routinely 
nibbled both during and after life by all sorts of very small creatures, but in the 
microscopic context our essential foodiness is much easier to ignore than in one 
where we are munched by a noticeably large predator.
Modernist liberal individualism teaches us that we own our lives and bodies, 
politically as an enterprise we are running, experientially as a drama we are 
variously narrating, writing, acting and/or reading. As hyper-individuals, we 
owe nothing to nobody, not to our mothers, let alone to any nebulous earth 
community. Exceptionalised as both species and individuals, we humans cannot 
be positioned in the food chain in the same way as other animals. Predation 
on humans is monstrous, exceptionalised and subject to extreme retaliation. 
Dominant concepts of human identity position humans outside and above the 
food chain, not as part of the feast in a chain of reciprocity. Animals can be our 
food, but we can never be their food. Human Exceptionalism positions us as 
the eaters of others who are never themselves eaten and has profoundly shaped 
dominant practices of self, commodity, materiality and death—especially death. 
For an ecological culture, major rethinking is required.
The Western problematic of death—where the essential self is disembodied 
spirit—poses a false choice of continuity, even eternity, in the realm of the 
spirit, versus the reductive materialist concept of death as the complete ending 
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of the story of the material, embodied self. Both horns of this dilemma exact a 
terrible price, alienation from the earth in the first case and the loss of meaning 
and narrative continuity for self in the second.
Indigenous animist concepts of self and death succeed in breaking this pernicious 
false choice and suggesting satisfying and ecologically responsive forms of 
continuity with and through the earth. By understanding life as circulation, 
as a gift from a community of ancestors, we can see death as recycling, a 
flowing on into an ecological and ancestral community of origins. In place of 
the Western war of life against death whose battleground has been variously 
the spirit-identified afterlife and the reduced, medicalised material life, the 
Indigenous imaginary sees death as part of life, partly through narrative, and 
partly because death is a return to the (highly narrativised) land that nurtures 
life. Such a vision of life fosters an imaginary of the land as a nourishing terrain, 
and of death as a nurturing, material continuity/reunion with ecological others, 
especially the lives and landforms of country.
My proposal is that the food/death imaginary we have lost touch with is a key 
to re-imagining ourselves ecologically, as members of a larger earth community 
of radical equality, mutual nurturance and support. Re-imagining in terms 
of concrete practices of restraint and humility, not just in vague airy–fairy 
concepts of unity. Our loss of this perspective has meant the loss of humbling 
but important forms of knowledge, of ourselves and of our world. We can learn 
to look for comfort and continuity, meaning and hope in the context of the 
earth community, and work in this key place to displace the hierarchical and 
exceptionalist cultural framework that so often defeats our efforts to adapt to 
the planet.
Atheism, exceptionalism and heavenism
The second experience that disrupted my concepts of death was burying 
my son in a small country cemetery that was also a refuge for a remarkable 
botanical community. This experience suggested ways in which a radical animist 
reconception of identity can re-imagine death in terms of a reciprocity ethic of 
mutual nurturance.
The exceptionalist denial that we ourselves are food for others is reflected in 
many aspects of our conventional death and burial practices—the strong coffin, 
conventionally buried well below the level of soil fauna activity, and the slab 
over the grave to prevent anything digging us up, supposedly keeps the Western 
human body from becoming food for other species. The local bush cemetery I 
found for my son was a place which powerfully enacted the modernist dramas 
opposing exceptionalist heavenism to exceptionalist–atheism. When I first 
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visited the cemetery on a sunny autumn day, it seemed an extraordinarily 
serene and beautiful place, a place with a satisfying feeling of the acceptance 
of mortality. The wounds the old burials had made in the earth had long 
since healed, and only a few raw scars bore witness to recent ones. But the 
exceptionalist imaginary that theologian Norman Habel calls ‘heavenism’ had 
shaped the old memorials nearest the gate, which date back over a 150 years. 
From a distance, the tall pillars of marble or sandstone look eerily like pale 
shrouded forms, already freed from the clay, beginning their journey upwards. 
Most of these early modern gravestones bore inscriptions invoking a heavenly 
home, such as, ‘Sleep on, dear husband, take they rest/God called you home 
when he thought it best.’ Many inscriptions insist that the earth is an inferior 
place, best left behind. ‘Mourn not for them who God has blest/And taken to 
their heavenly rest/Freed from all sorrow, grief and pain/Our loss is their eternal 
gain.’
For heavenism, the earth is at best a temporary lodging; the true human home is 
beyond the earth, in heaven. Buried six-feet down, the strong wooden or steel 
coffin aims to keep the heaven-bound body apart from the earth and other life 
forms for as long as possible and to preserve it for departure to its higher home. 
For this transcendental solution to the problem of death and continuity, we are 
split into an embodied and perishable part belonging to earth, and a thinking 
imperishable ‘spirit’ part belonging to heaven. Bodies must perish, but the soul, 
the true self, has eternal life in a realm apart. Such transcendental solutions 
to the problem of identity and continuity depend on denying our kinship to 
other life forms and our shared end as food for others. Heavenism is strongly 
exceptionalist, and its funerary practices deplore or demonise materiality, 
hyper-separating the human body from the earth and hindering decay that 
benefits other forms of life. The cemetery itself is exceptionalised as sanctified 
ground, in contrast to the profane or fallen zone beyond it.
The later (post-1920’s) mortuary practices further from the gate express the 
exceptionalist dynamic in different terms. Gone are the pale standing ghosts, 
the pointing stone fingers—in their place lies a grey regiment of massive 
concrete slabs, their rectangles, straight lines and polished surfaces marking 
the starker vision of modern rationalism and reductive materialism. These 
memorials are silent about death, the big taboo topic of modernity, and their 
minimal inscriptions rarely give away more than names and dates. The now-
massive slab even more emphatically hyper-separates the human dead from their 
surroundings and prevents the decaying body from nourishing other forms of 
life. The expressive poverty of these hyper-expensive memorials represents the 
silence at the heart of the modernist reductionist paradigm and its concept of 
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death. Their anti-life function is intensified by modern herbicide technology: 
many slabs are surrounded by large bare areas, where all encroaching vegetation 
has been poisoned and nothing now can grow.
This lifeless zone is the modernist, concrete expression of the transcendent ideals 
which continue to hyper-separate human and nature and conceive death as apart 
from and opposed to life. Its mortuary practice expresses human exceptionalism 
and the Cartesian project of defeating human mortality not by religion in the 
afterlife but by a technological–medical war against nature in this life. As I 
wrote of reductive materialism,1 ‘Contemporary Western identity has rejected 
the otherworldly significance and basis for continuity, but has given it no other 
definitive meaning, provided no other satisfactory context for continuity or 
embeddedness for human life.’ Modernity, despite its pride in throwing off the 
illusions of the past, has failed to provide an ecological or earthian identity or 
narrative to replace the heavenist one. ‘To the extent that death can express 
an unity (sic) with nature, it is a unity with an order of nature conceived as 
a dualised other, as itself stripped of significance, as mere matter … death is 
a nothing, a void, a terrifying and sinister terminus, whose only meaning is 
that there is no meaning.’ The old narratives of post-earth transcendence are 
dead, but modernity has not replaced them by any meaningful or comforting 
new ones about earthly life. Hence the modernist avoidance around death these 
memorials so clearly express.
On this analysis, reductive materialism and associated forms of atheism are 
not rejection of the heavenist problematic so much as a continuation and 
even affirmation of it in an amputated form—a reversal in which the original 
spirit/matter split is maintained but the previously devalued side (the body, 
materiality) is now affirmed—without however the fuller re-conception of 
materiality required for a genuine healing of the dualistic problematic. A good 
deal of contemporary atheism, humanism and materialism expresses only a 
truncated dualism and disillusioned heavenism, failing to provide alternative 
reshaping narratives of meaning, comfort and continuity for self and body. 
(So this kind of materialism is NOT A BOLD NEW BEGINNING, as it usually 
claims, but is haunted by its lost former half.) What I am arguing here is that an 
ecological understanding of the self can point towards such reshaping narratives 
and practices, of which we stand so greatly in need.
It is these conventional dualised choices—spirit or matter—that have framed 
the central dilemma about death as now conceived in the West: the choice of 
(narratives of) alienated continuity versus reductive–materialist discontinuity—
the supposed finality of material death, or the narrative of no narratives. On 
the second, immanent choice of reductive atheism and materialism, the human 
1 Plumwood, 1993, p. 101.
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body is still seen as being peripheral or inessential to identity, so no continuity 
beyond death can be based on it. Interviewed shortly before her recent death, 
and openly avowing her atheism, movie star Katherine Hepburn was seen as 
courageous in her averment that ‘death is final’ … there is nothing beyond. 
The death of self (self-lying in individual consciousness) is final and complete. 
Reductive materialism is marked especially by the Finality Thesis, the claim that 
death is the final END OF THE STORY. It is this loss of story, the narrative of no 
narratives, that is expressed in the massive mute modernist headstones.
Animist death: Another story
The thesis of finality shows clearly how both conventional theist and conventional 
atheist positions collaborate in the conception of matter as a reduced sphere 
inessential to the self and completely ‘left behind’ in the ending that death is 
supposed to represent. Because of course the body does not just ‘end’—it decays 
or decomposes, its matter losing its prior organisational form and taking on or 
being incorporated into new forms in a sharing of substance/life force. Lots of 
linking, afterlife narratives here!
The finality thesis depends on a covert continuation of the heavenist identification 
of self with spirit, and on a thoroughly reductionist and denarrativised 
understanding of the body and of materiality that results from spirit/matter 
dualism. The finality story subtly accepts the dualist–Cartesian proposition that 
our essential element is consciousness, so when that finishes, so must ‘we.’ With 
the end of consciousness, we are confronted unavoidably with the end of self. 
A more fluid and embodied concept of self and its boundaries can be employed 
here to suggest a complex narrative of continuities, in which the story goes on, 
although no longer mainly a story about human subjects.
There are then important differences in the reductionist versus non-reductionist 
account of the afterlife. Heavenism expresses exceptionalism in its concept 
of afterlife in an exclusively human realm utterly apart, while reductionist 
materialism treats the afterlife in terms of absence, nullity. For an ecological, 
animist materialism, however, the afterlife is a positive, ecological presence, 
positive traces in the lives of other species—not no story, but another, continuing 
story.
The recognition of life as in circulation and of our death as an opportunity for 
other life can discourage the human greediness and ingratitude that tries to grasp 
for eternal youth through transcendence, privilege and technological mastery. At 
the individual level, death confirms transience, but on the level of the ecological 
community, it can affirm an enduring, resilient cycle or process. Thus the cemetery 
of my first visit revealed a route to healing grief through the joyful vision it offered 
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of death flowing on into, even a journey into, a tranquil and beautiful landscape. 
The tranquillity proved illusory, but not the background vision of burial and 
bodily decay as the ground of entry to a scared ecological community.
Corresponding mortuary symbolisms and grave practices might aim to nourish 
rather than exclude other life forms, affirming rather than demonising our 
transition to the non-human in death. It is encouraging to note then in my 
son’s cemetery, the hint of an emerging post-modern mortuary sensibility in the 
establishment of a lawn cemetery. This at least accepts that living things should 
grow from a grave. Is the consciousness worm at last starting to turn, with an 
acceptance of the idea of human recycling beginning to challenge entrenched 
norms of human apartness represented by the concrete slab?
It is of course not the use of stone itself, even in its subjugated, instrumentalised 
modern form as the concrete slab, that is the problem, but rather the way stone 
has been mobilised by our split culture in the service of Human Exceptionalism 
in an effort to exclude and deny life (‘the world of changes’ in Plato’s terms) and 
to associate the human essence with an unchanging order of eternity. This use 
of stone to affirm transcendence of life forgets that we are bodies, plain members 
of the ecological order, and that our life is a gift from an embodied community of 
prior others we must nurture. The use of stone to confirm transcendence forgets 
that stone is the earth’s body (or rather skeleton), and like other skeletons, prone 
to decay. It also forgets the reptiles, for whom stone is generally splendid habitat. 
On a recent visit to my son’s grave to pull out thistles, I was pursued by a tiny, 
exquisite dragon lizard, flashing its thorny orange mouth in a show of defiance. 
A gravestone—or even a concrete slab—can make a fine lizard hunting and 
basking spot, and can easily be redesigned to incorporate a small reptile shelter 
(let’s get the reptiles back into the garden!)
The re-conception of death and the sacred in terms of an animist or ecological 
materialist imaginary calls, then, for different philosophies, sensibilities and 
iconographies of death from those normalised in our culture, ones that can 
revere the burial place as a site of union with the prior sacred presences of earth 
rather than as set apart from it, and can honour the dissolution of the human 
into the more-than-human flux. Overcoming the Human Exceptionalism that 
has had such a deep hold on Western consciousness is the crucial pre-condition 
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